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ABSTRACT

The two most important decisions in the history of NASA after its founding have
been John Kennedy’s decision to send humans to the moon and Richard Nixon’s
decision to develop the space shuttle. This study examines the nature of each
decision, and illustrates how each decision resulted from a confluence of world
events, presidential personalities, and domestic political pressures.
This examination of both primary and secondary historical and policy source
materials demonstrates that the individual personalities of each president,
especially how each reacted to domestic and international political and economic
pressures, played a major role in the formulation of these space policy
decisions. Furthermore, the presidential election of 1960 played a critical role in
determining the focus of NASA's activities from the early 1960s to this day.
These policy decisions directly shaped the nature of NASA's human spaceflight
program in the short term, but had unintended consequences in the long
term. While each decision produced spectacular results in the moon landings
and in the space shuttle program, each decision affected NASA's ultimate growth
and curtailed other space-related projects that had been proposed.

vi

CHAPTER I
THE ELECTION OF 1960

A Tale of Two Men
America entered the space race in October of 1957 with a shock: global news
coverage of the successful launch of the Soviet satellite, Sputnik. Reactions to
this news around the Western world were nothing short of hysterical, especially
in the Western press. President Eisenhower, who secretly launched the
American space effort in 1955 when he signed NSC memo 5520 outlining a
civilian American space program largely as cover for a more aggressive spy
satellite program, had advocated a more moderate space program with a modest
budget. His proposals instead focused American space policy on ICBM and
reconnaissance satellite development. The Sputnik launch, however, changed
the whole character of the nascent space race, placing it firmly in the context of
the already full-blown Cold War, at least in the eyes of the press, public, and
Congress.
Eisenhower remained reluctant to become involved in an all-out race for space
supremacy with the USSR, but his hand was forced by political factors, the press,
and the public, all of which favored a direct approach to address the apparent
space gap. The American President favored a more measured response over a
1

crash program, whose high costs were anathema to him. Because he supported
a civilian rather than a military response to Sputnik, the Vanguard project was
given priority over Wernher von Braun’s effort with the Army’s Redstone Arsenal.
The largely civilian nature of Project Vanguard was a factor in this decision;
however, the US Navy was involved, as was Eisenhower’s reluctance to rely on
von Braun and the former V-2 team—he loathed any dependence on a team of
people he considered deplorable Nazis, which was understandable considering
his history in the Second World War. Moreover, Eisenhower was concerned with
the perception that von Braun’s project implied that America had to import rocket
expertise from elsewhere. It was only when the Vanguard test flight failed
spectacularly on live television that the ever-growing pressure from the press,
public, and political forces prompted the US to turn to von Braun and his
German-born team, now relocated to Huntsville, Alabama. America and von
Braun answered the Soviet challenge with the successful Explorer I mission on
January 31, 1958, and the space race was underway. NASA was formed later
that same year, launching America’s civil space program under the more modest
terms that Eisenhower favored.
A key milestone in the development of the US space program, and one that still
affects NASA more than 50 years later, was the US presidential election of 1960.
The presidential campaign and ensuing election occurred at the beginning of the
US space program, while national space policy was still being debated. It was
contested by two public figures who would arguably play the most influential roles
in the short- and long-term future of NASA, Senator John F. Kennedy and Vice
2

President Richard M. Nixon. These men both campaigned vigorously for the
position in one of the closest presidential elections in US history. Each man
would serve as US president and each, in turn, would have his presidency ended
in a national tragedy, albeit one of his own making, in Nixon’s case.
These two men competed for the presidency against each other by a strange
turn of fate. They had each served as officers in the US Navy during the Second
World War, although Nixon did not see combat. Richard Nixon served in the US
Congress as a Representative from California from 1947 to 1950, when he was
elected to the US Senate, and served as a Senator representing California from
1950 to 1953. Nixon left his Senate seat to serve as Eisenhower’s Vice
President for two terms. John Kennedy was also elected to Congress in 1946,
and served as a Representative from Massachusetts from 1947 to 1953, when
he was elected as a Senator from Massachusetts, where he served until he was
elected President in 1960. While they served in the House, both were strong
anti-Communists and were interested in matters of national defense. They
became friends while serving in the House, but this friendship ended during the
presidential campaign, and in Nixon’s case, turned into hatred after the campaign
ended in victory for Kennedy.
Despite the similarities in political views while serving in Congress, the two men
had drastically different personalities. Nixon was insecure, secretive, and
obsessed with the fact that he did not come from wealth and lacked an Ivy
League education; although accepted at Harvard and offered a tuition waiver,
family issues forced him to attend Whittier College; he then attended Duke Law
3

School. By all accounts, Kennedy was a hyper-competitive risk taker who loved
to meet and be around people and was largely secure in himself; he came from a
fortune, had a father who had been an ambassador to Great Britain, and was
educated at the Choate prep school, then Harvard, Stanford, and the London
School of Economics. Sid Davis, a reporter who was a friend of Kennedy,
summarizes the differences between the two presidents:
I think [Kennedy] was curious about people. . . . If you look at the golfing
partners and that sort of thing, they were reporters. He had certain
reporters he enjoyed, [such as] Bill Lawrence of the New York Times, that
he enjoyed being with. They were invited to the White House. A friend of
mine, Hugh Sidey . . . wrote for Time magazine and had great access to
Kennedy. But he loved to have people like that to talk to, and they weren’t
all successful millionaires.
If you look at Nixon’s closest associates, they really were very successful
businessmen. There was a different attitude, different outlook. Not that
that’s bad. But he was curious in a different way.1
These respective personality traits played large roles in how they governed.
Kennedy’s penchants for soliciting the opinions of others and risk-taking informed
both his personal conduct while President and his decision-making process,
which was evident in his decisions during the Cuban Missile Crisis and in his
policy decision to pursue a crash lunar landing program, which we will discuss in
1

Sid Davis, recorded interview by Vicki Daitch, February 10, 2003, (15-16), John
F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.
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depth in Chapter Two. Nixon’s desire for secrecy and his tendency to trust only a
few people contributed to the Watergate scandal and also influenced his space
shuttle policy decision, which we will examine in detail in Chapter Three.
One of the great historical ironies involving these two men lies in their respective
views on space and space policy. Evidence suggests that John Kennedy did not
understand space science, nor did he show any curiosity toward the subject; yet
he spearheaded the largest space project in world history: Project Apollo.
Richard Nixon, on the other hand, fully understood space policy and exhibited
this knowledge on several occasions, but single-handedly killed the proposed
Apollo follow-on projects, such as a moon base, Mars mission, and other
ambitious space endeavors, and approved a much smaller budget for the space
shuttle than NASA desired. How could a President who had little interest in
space make the decision to pursue NASA’s and the United States’ signature
space achievement, the moon landings, while a President who was a vocal
advocate of space exploration end the grand ambitions of NASA soon after their
greatest triumph, and consign human spaceflight to LEO for the next 40+ years?
In order to better understand how the Apollo and Shuttle decisions were made
and how they have affected NASA in the years since, we must take a close look
at each man, the political environments in which each choice was made, and the
factors that went into informing each decision. It is only by doing this can we
learn how such monumental decisions are made, warts and all, and can use this
knowledge to make better decisions concerning the US space program moving
forward. This study will examine in depth the rationale for each decision in
5

historical context, and will evaluate each on its own terms to determine the
answer to the question, why was each decision made? However, before we
attempt to answer this question by analyzing the individual situations and factors,
we must first consider how each man viewed space and space policy before he
became President.

Nixon Before the 1960 Campaign
From the earliest days of the Space Age, Richard Nixon fully understood the
implications of the United States’ maintaining a leading role in space exploration.
On October 4, 1957, the day of the Sputnik launch, Vice President Nixon was the
first member of the Eisenhower administration to make a public statement on the
Soviet feat.2 Eight days later, in a speech in Oklahoma City on October 12,
Nixon restated the Eisenhower administration position when he publicly stated,
It is obvious that we are behind as far as the ability to launch a satellite is
concerned . . . but there is a tendency to overestimate what the satellite
will do in military power. Russia is not one iota stronger than it was before
it put [Sputnik] up. As far as the missile field is concerned, we intend to
keep the Soviet Union from gaining an advantage, and keeping our
advantage.3

2

Emme in Durant, Between Sputnik and the Shuttle, 96.

3

Emme in Durant, Between Sputnik and the Shuttle, 96.
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Under withering criticism from the press and political opposition, the
administration began to admit that Sputnik had a profound effect on the prestige
of the US with respect to the USSR. In a speech in San Francisco on October
15, Nixon continued his role as the public mouthpiece for US space efforts by
stating,
We could make no greater mistake than to brush off this event as a
scientific stunt of more significance to the man on the moon than to men
on Earth. We have had a grim warning and a timely reminder of truth; we
must never overlook that the Soviet Union has developed a scientific and
industrial capacity of great magnitude.4
This suggests that the administration was beginning to recognize the geopolitical
implications of the Sputnik launch (and by extension, Soviet space/military
capabilities) as a threat to the US. Moreover, they suspected a domestic threat
to the administration. A later speech given in Pasadena in early February of
1958 seems to imply that Nixon not only understood the geopolitical and policy
implications of space, but that he might have taken a personal interest in the
space program; he told the press that JPL “had not had the credit it deserves for
its part in the development of the satellite, Explorer. Insofar as the public is
concerned, the part played by the Army and its arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama, is
well known. I have followed the work at Cal Tech with interest.”5 Whether this

4

Emme in Durant, Between Sputnik and the Shuttle, 96. Also Krug, Space
Politics and Policy, 66, and Krug, Presidential Perspectives, 48.
5

Emme in Durant, Between Sputnik and the Shuttle, 97.
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interest stemmed from a personal or official capacity is unclear, but Nixon clearly
understood the importance of space to the US.
A hint of Nixon’s future position on space when President, as well as his
tendency towards diplomacy, was on display during a speech he gave while
visiting Moscow in 1959 in his role as Vice President:
Let us expand the concept of ‘open skies.’ What the world needs are
open cities, open minds, and open hearts. Let us have peaceful
competition, not only in producing the best factories but providing better
lives for our people. Let us cooperate in our exploration of outer space.
As a worker said to me at Novosibirsk, let us go to the moon together.6
Here, Nixon mentions the “Open Skies” concept that Eisenhower had originally
put forward at the Geneva Conference of 1955. The proposed policy of allowing
each superpower to overfly the territory of the other for reconnaissance purposes
was rejected by Krushchev because of the strategic need for Soviet secrecy; it
was one of the concepts proposed to enable satellite reconnaissance in NSC
5520, the original US space policy, as “Freedom of Space.” Nixon then goes on
to advocate open cities, minds and hearts. He seems to suggest here that the
two nations’ space efforts should make life better on Earth, or at the very least,
should take equal priority with improving the lives of the citizens. This impulse
toward balancing space efforts with social and civil improvement was a key
Nixonian innovation that is discussed at length in Chapter Three. It is also

6

Emme in Durant, Between Sputnik and the Shuttle, 99.
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interesting to note that here Nixon’s offer of a joint mission to the moon predates
Kennedy’s overtures to Krushchev by several years.
The most striking demonstration that Nixon fully understood the political
implications of the space program at an early date is his testimony, recorded in
the notes from the Greenewalt Committee meeting held on September 23, 1959.
The committee, assembled by T. Keith Glennan, the first NASA Administrator,
and NASA Deputy Director Hugh Dryden, was composed of non-NASA thought
leaders: a group of five business leaders, five scientists, and two academics,
Paul Nitze and Walt Rostow. Charged by Glennan and Dryden with determining
whether and how to match the Soviet space program (that is, whether or not to
race), they appointed Crawford Greenewalt, the CEO of DuPont, as the
chairman. The committee’s findings are summarized by Walter McDougall in his
history The Heavens and the Earth, where he remarks that during the meeting of
the committee in question,
the debate reached a climax after dinner in the basement of the White
House. Vice President Nixon presided. He had studied and listened
carefully, and revealed a technical knowledge greater than some of the
panelists’. Speaking without notes, Nixon rambled on for forty-five
minutes, the august audience listening in confusion, boredom, or
admiration to a man who grasped, rightly or wrongly, the political

9

symbolism of the Space Age. Politics, thought Nixon, had to rank higher
than science.7
In typical Nixonian fashion, he displayed an understanding of how a space race
would play out on the international stage, and of the role that international
prestige would play in the years ahead as both the US and the USSR wooed the
non-aligned nations of the world. A closer look at the actual hand-typed notes
from the meeting reveals much more: a snapshot of exactly how Nixon viewed
space at this time. Not only did he understand the foreign-policy implications of a
robust space policy, but he foresaw how it would all play out, within the
government (both in Congress and in the tension between the military and
civilian space programs), with the American public, and internationally.
Responding to the question of “what is the importance of prestige to the US, the
Vice President answered:
On the matter of organization, there will be a fight in the Congress on this.
The Air Force is distressed at NASA attempts to take over space. They
will stress the importance of military missions in space. They will point out
that it is hard to get funds for pure science. On the other hand, NASA has
going for it the tremendous appeal of space. The space effort should be
pulled together under one agency. The type of agency best suited to get
money would be a combination of military and civilian.

7

McDougall, the Heavens and the Earth, 204.
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As between the scientific and political motivations (political in the
international sense), political implications would rate highest.
There will be a drive in Congress to make the US failure in space a reason
to vote for more money for space. This could result in the overriding of
budgetary considerations. NASA should be thinking how more money
could be spent. The motivation will be largely the prestige factor, but the
excuse for action will be military implications.
[Kruschev’s] current trip [to the US] is having a massive impact. Even so,
it is a somewhat transitory impact and covers only one aspect of the
problem. The uncommitted nations are thinking about which system could
produce the best, the most, the soonest. Sputniks have a tremendous
impact on the leaders of these nations. The image of a backward country
coming up from nowhere has strong appeal. The 1963-66 time period will
be critical in international affairs. The USSR will have moved out from our
major counter-deterrent. The eyes of the world will be directed toward the
competition between the US and USSR. They will be trying to judge
which is the system for them. The question will be how many more USSR
successes we can stand. The US is clearly on the spot in this time period.
We will have to be forthright about our programs. Our case is going to be
pretty hard to sell in the face of things Mr. K[rushchev] has said in which
he has clearly labeled this a race. This is an issue which will be raised.
When combined with the missile problem, with the exploding problems in
the underdeveloped countries, we must look at the 2 or 3 years which
11

could be gained in the space field, not just any 3 years, but as 3 vital,
important years.
When the committee suggested that there were priorities other than prestige,
such as reducing the missile gap, greater foreign aid, and building bigger
boosters, Nixon agreed and continued,
But insofar as other areas are concerned, we must recognize that from a
political standpoint, that space and the new world concept captures the
imagination. It indicates power; the people do not downgrade the military
potentiality of space. I would hope otherwise, but I do not think this is the
case. What are we talking about when we talk about firsts in other
areas—the cancer cure? This would have impact. Nonlinear
mathematics?—space has it all over both of these from an appeal point of
view.
I think we can assume that the next administration, whichever party is in
power, will have a balanced budget. As far as additional money is
concerned, I am afraid that Congress will not put it in foreign aid. They
might put it in the military, but I think they will put it in space so that as far
as priorities are concerned, this is also a fact. What are the alternatives?
. . . We cannot categorically say to the Congress that it is not worth it to
spend more in space. It is not a matter of what they might do, but what
they are willing to do. If I thought that Congress would support a larger

12

program in the foreign aid area—dramatically larger—I would trade space
for this, but they will not buy it.8
Nixon’s perceptive read on the politics of space at the Greenewalt committee
meeting shows that he supported going head-to-head with the Soviets for
reasons of international prestige and believed that Congress would be ready to
fund such an effort. He even understood the romantic appeal of space to the
human psyche, comparing people’s feelings about it to those associated with
other potential scientific holy grails, such as a cure for cancer.

Kennedy Before the 1960 Campaign
By contrast with Nixon’s, John F. Kennedy’s thoughts about space before the
1960 presidential campaign are harder to categorize. Few of his public
statements on the subject have entered the historical record. Instead, we must
rely on the accounts of the people who knew Kennedy. The earliest account of
Kennedy’s opinion on space matters comes from a friend who knew Kennedy as
a young senator. Charles Stark Draper, designer of the Apollo Guidance
Computer that enabled the moon landings, recounted a dinner in a Boston
restaurant with John and Robert Kennedy in the late 1950s in which he was
unsuccessful in winning over the young Senator and his brother to an admiration
of the wonders of space flight. The Kennedy brothers “treated the ideas with

8

Greenewalt Committee Notes, September 23, 1959, NASA History Office.
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good-natured scorn” and “could not be convinced that all rockets were not a
waste of money, and space navigation worse.”9 Kennedy’s lack of interest in
space matters was perhaps due to his lack of knowledge on the subject. Hugh
Sidey believed that of all of the issues that Kennedy would later face as
President, he “probably knew and understood least about space,”10 and Sidey
considered this a policy weakness.11 Jerome Weisner, who became Kennedy’s
science adviser, believed that Kennedy had simply not given much thought to
space before he became President.12
Kennedy was not enticed by the exotic allure of space travel; the thought
Kennedy had devoted to space matters as a senator was strictly of a practical
nature. Roger Launius describes Kennedy’s approach to space as pragmatic:
He was not a visionary enraptured with the romantic image of the last
American frontier in space and consumed by the adventure of exploring
the unknown. He was, on the other hand, a cold warrior with a real sense
of Realpolitik in foreign affairs, and worked hard to maintain balance of
power and spheres of influence in American/Soviet relations.13

9

Murray and Cox, Apollo, 45.

10

McDougall, Heavens, 302.
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Murray and Cox, Apollo, 45.
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Murray and Cox, Apollo, 45.
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Launius, History, 55-6.
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This assessment is especially intriguing when one considers that, as President,
Kennedy employed exactly this type of romantic imagery and emotional appeal to
sell his policies, which we will explore in Chapter Three.
John Logsdon’s seminal book on John Kennedy and the Apollo program
presents a telling insight into Kennedy’s view of the developing space race in
February 1960. In his answer to a college student’s letter to him requesting an
escalation in the US space program to counter that of the USSR, Kennedy
responded that
whatever the scale and pace of the American space effort, it should be a
scientific program. . . . In this interval when we lack adequate propulsion
units, we should not attempt to cover this weakness with stunts. . . . When
this weakness is overcome, our ventures should remain seriously scientific
in their purpose. . . . With respect to the competitive and psychological
aspects of the space program, it is evident that we have suffered damage
to American prestige and will continue to suffer for some time. . . . [O]ur
recent loss of international prestige results from an accumulation of real or
believed deficiencies in the American performance on the world scene:
military, diplomatic, and economic. It is simply not a consequence of our
lag in the exploration of space vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.”14
This letter provides evidence that Kennedy understood that the space race
should be situated within the larger context of the Cold War, and that he was
14

Logsdon, Race, 7.
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concerned that we lagged behind in booster development, a point that he would
repeatedly drive home during the presidential campaign. On the stump, he made
multiple claims about a missile gap, which he often linked to space by referring to
it as the “missile-space problem.”15 Kennedy also came out against the space
race itself by dismissing it as a series of publicity stunts, and argued that any US
space program should be of a scientific nature; he felt that any loss of national
prestige was a result of more comprehensive deficits and gaps, not that we
trailed the Soviets in space spectaculars.
Perhaps the most obvious indication of Kennedy’s lack of personal interest in
space comes from the mouth of Kennedy himself. In the preface to the
aforementioned book, Logsdon recounts a scene that occurred in the White
House cabinet room on November 21, 1962, well after Kennedy’s dramatic
challenge to the nation arguing that the US should go to the moon. During a
discussion with NASA administrator James Webb concerning budgetary matters,
Kennedy frankly admits, “I’m not that interested in space.”16 This statement,
taken in light of the epic pro-space public rhetoric and the immense amount of
political capital that Kennedy risked on the moon landing program, is a stunning
admission. The lack of personal attraction to the mysteries and intrigue of space
exploration places Kennedy’s decision to pursue a moon landing directly into the
category of a political move, which we will further discuss in Chapter Two.

15

Logsdon, Race, 6.
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That Kennedy was only interested in space as it related to politics is reinforced
by Kennedy aide Ted Sorenson, who explained in 1964,
It seems to me that [Kennedy] thought of space primarily in symbolic
terms. By that I mean he had comparatively little interest in the substantive
gains to be made from this kind of scientific inquiry. He did not care as
much about new breakthroughs in space medicine or planetary
exploration as he did new breakthroughs in rocket thrust or humans in
orbit. Our lagging space effort was symbolic, he thought, of everything of
which he complained in the Eisenhower administration: the lack of effort,
the lack of initiative, the lack of imagination, vitality, and vision; and the
more the Russians gained in space during the last few years in the fifties,
the more he thought it showed up the Eisenhower Administration’s lag in
this area damaged the prestige of the United States abroad.17
While Sorenson’s statement seems to contradict Kennedy’s view on the scientific
importance of space that was stated in the letter to the college student quoted
above, it is clear that Kennedy believed that the subject of space mattered
politically. Its symbolic value mattered deeply to the public, both in the value of
the US space program to world opinion, and in the fact that American
deficiencies with respect to the USSR in space matters could be used as a
political weapon against the Eisenhower administration and later in the 1960
presidential campaign against Richard Nixon. It is clear that Kennedy had little to
17

Theodore C. Sorensen, recorded interview by Carl Kaysen, March 26, 1964,
(1), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.
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no interest in space itself before he won the office of the presidency in November
of 1960. With this understanding of his views on space, it appears at first blush
to be very unlikely that Kennedy would spearhead the greatest and most
expensive space project in world history.
It is in the context of politics that we can explain how this change occurred in
Kennedy’s attitudes. Once he decided to embrace a lunar landing program as a
political tool, he came to embrace the trappings and benefits of a successful
space program, such as being in the company of astronauts and sharing in
NASA’s successes, if not becoming a space enthusiast himself. Politics can also
explain how Richard Nixon, who fully understood the implications of space and
advocated a strong US space program, would later put an end to America’s
ambitions in space by cancelling the final three moon landings and severely
curtailing NASA’s ambitious plans at the moment of its greatest triumph, even as
he personally benefitted from America’s space successes. It is ironic that these
two men, who arguably would have the greatest effect on NASA and the human
spaceflight program for the next 40 years, should meet in the 1960 presidential
election.

The 1960 Presidential Campaign
The 1960 presidential campaign was vigorously contested by two former Navy
officers, congressmen, senators, Cold Warriors, and friends. As mentioned
previously, it was one of the closest presidential elections in US history, the first
18

in which general election debates were held, and the first in which television
played a major role. The first of the four televised presidential debates was
watched by an estimated 66 million viewers (approximately one-third of the total
US population of 179 million), considered by multiple commentators to be the
most widely viewed presidential debate in history, with a substantial impact on
the outcome of the election. Technology had come to influence US presidential
politics, and this influence has never waned. Another technology, the US space
program, played a role in the campaign, although the role of the space program
was not decisive.
While the space race had already captured the imagination of the American
people, by 1960 the initial panic over the threat of Soviet domination of space
had largely subsided. While the US still did not have a launch vehicle that could
match the Soviets’, the US had racked up a series of space successes after the
initial flurry of disasters and led the USSR in successful missions by an order of
magnitude. In his work Defining NASA, W.D. Kay notes that “by the end of the
decade the launching of satellites had become a familiar enough event (although
by no means routine) that some of the deepest fears associated with the
Sputniks had begun to decline.”18
John Kennedy, as the challenger from the Democratic Party, ran primarily
against the record of the Republican Eisenhower administration, and Richard
Nixon, as Eisenhower’s two-term Vice President, was forced to defend

18

Kay, Defining NASA, 61.
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Eisenhower while at the same time laying out his own vision of the future of the
nation. As the primal fears associated with militarized space receded, the space
race also began to fade as a political issue; when space was mentioned during
the campaign, it was typically an attack by Kennedy on what he characterized as
Eisenhower’s lethargic response to early Soviet space victories, and how this
perceived weakness affected America’s standing in the eyes of the world. This
charge was often leveled in the form of an accusation that the Eisenhower
administration had allowed the US to fall behind the USSR militarily in what
Kennedy described as a missile gap. Logsdon characterizes Kennedy’s evolving
assault on the Eisenhower space record thus:
Kennedy said little about space issues except in the context of the linkage
between space launch vehicles and strategic missile capabilities. That
changed once he became the Democratic nominee for President in 1960.
The growing disparity in global prestige between the United States and the
Soviet Union under the Eisenhower administration became a central
theme of JFKs campaign, and the fact that the United States was trailing
the Soviet Union in space achievement was frequently cited by Kennedy
as very visible evidence of this disparity.19
While Kennedy hammered Nixon and Eisenhower for doing too little in space, in
typical political challenger fashion he never outlined just how a Kennedy
administration space policy would differ (and certainly did not call for a crash-

19
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program-level mobilization that he would later advocate as President). Rather,
his campaign rhetoric suggested “greater activism in space” without describing
this “activism” explicitly.20 It could be argued that the accusation of a failure of
the previous administration and allusion to ambitions in space were just political
ploys by Kennedy. There is scant evidence that Kennedy planned to pursue a
strong space agenda if he won, or pursue a space policy at all.
Space historians also have questioned the intentions behind Kennedy’s space
rhetoric. Murray and Cox note that candidate Kennedy referred to a “space gap”
along with the missile gap during the campaign, but that Kennedy
remained silent about what he had in mind for his own space program.
Many in NASA had hoped for more. Space flight, and especially manned
space flight, had the dash and drama that would have seemed to fit
perfectly with the spirit of the Kennedy campaign. But Kennedy was only
being honest. At that time, he really wasn’t convinced that manned space
flight had a place in his vision of the New Frontier.21
There is evidence, however, that what little discussion about the space program
during the campaign was political posturing, and perhaps even pandering. When
Kennedy campaign journalist Sid Davis was asked years later whether Kennedy
talked about the space program while on the stump, he replied,
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The missile gap, yes. He did talk about the missile gap. He talked about
the fact that we weren’t as strong as we should have been, that we didn’t
pay enough attention to the strength of the Soviet Union. But at this date,
looking back, I’m not sure I can recall, as part of the campaign, whether he
discussed the space program in those terms. He did address it when we
were in places where [the members of the audience] were involved in the
space program. 22 [emphasis mine]
Another instance of potential political pandering (or at least playing to an
audience) concerning the space program came in response to an open letter
published in Missile and Rockets, a space industry journal, which solicited each
of the candidates’ positions on the space program. In a manner similar to what
Davis described above, Kennedy responded as follows:
We are in a strategic space race with the Russians, and we are losing. . . .
Control of space will be decided in the next decade. If the Soviets control
space, they can control earth, as in past centuries the nation that
controlled the seas has dominated the continents . . . We cannot run
second in this vital race. To insure peace and freedom, we must be first. .
. . The target date for a manned space platform, US citizen on the moon,
nuclear power for space exploration, and a true manned spaceship should
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be elastic. All of these things and more we should accomplish as swiftly
as possible. 23 [emphasis mine]
Once again, Kennedy plays to his audience; here he suggests an accelerated
space program to an aerospace-minded readership.
During his nomination acceptance speech given at the Democratic National
Convention on July 15, 1960, Kennedy links space to his vision of the New
Frontier:
But I tell you the New Frontier is here, whether we seek it or not. Beyond
that frontier are the uncharted areas of science and space, unsolved
problems of peace and war, unconquered pockets of ignorance and
prejudice, unanswered questions of poverty and surplus. It would be
easier to shrink back from that frontier, to look to the safe mediocrity of the
past, to be lulled by good intentions and high rhetoric—and those who
prefer that course should not cast their votes for me, regardless of party.24
However, despite this campaign rhetoric, the first few months of Kennedy’s
administration saw no mention of or movement to address the issues of space
that were delineated so vividly during the campaign. McDougall also suggests
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that this was campaign rhetoric: “For all their ‘space gap’ talk, the Kennedy men
had little notion of what to do with the space program after election day.”25
In September of 1960, a position paper prepared for candidate Kennedy by
physicist Ralph Lapp, veteran of the Manhattan Project, stated that if the US was
to compete in a space race against the Soviets, it was imperative that the US
land on the moon before their rivals. Lapp argued that such an effort would fulfill
more of a political objective than a scientific one, and that “in the psycho-political
space race the rewards for being first are exceedingly great,” adding that “there
was little payoff for being second.”26 Kennedy did not advocate this belief during
the campaign, or during the first few months of his presidency, but it had been
suggested by a prominent person connected to the administration. If Kennedy
had read this paper, and we have no evidence that he had, he might have
considered it; in any case, Kennedy’s advisors had it on their mind.
It wasn’t just Kennedy who made space a campaign issue, albeit in a minor role.
The Democratic Party was of similar mindset, and the Democratic Party platform
sought to use what it saw as Republican space race shortcomings as a blunt
weapon against Nixon. This was a chance to avenge Republican charges during
the 1950s that the Democrats “lost China” to Communism and were weak on
foreign policy issues. Seeing an opportunity for a reversal, the Democratic
platform stated,
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The new Democratic Administration will press forward with our national
space program in full realization of the importance of space
accomplishments to our national security and our international prestige.
We shall reorganize the program to achieve both efficiency and speedy
execution. We shall bring top scientists into positions of responsibility.
We shall undertake long-term basic research in space science and
propulsion.27
The implications were that the Republicans had not prosecuted the space race
against the USSR aggressively enough and had not placed sufficient emphasis
on international prestige and science. A later stump speech by Kennedy echoes
the charge that the Eisenhower administration lost the opportunity to bolster US
international prestige and presided over a decline in world standing:
Because we failed to recognize the impact that being first in outer space
would have, the impression began to move around the world that the
Soviet Union was on the march, that it had definite goals, that it knew how
to accomplish them, that it was moving and we were standing still. This is
what we have to overcome, that psychological feeling in the world that the
United States has reached maturity. That maybe our high noon has
passed . . . and that now we are going into that long, slow afternoon.28
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The linking of a watered-down space program to the international perception of
American decline would again rise to confront the American President in the
early 1970s, where it was invoked by Casper Weinberger to convince Nixon to
approve the space shuttle program. We will discuss this rhetorical linkage fully in
Chapter Three.
But a decade earlier, Candidate Nixon was understandably very frustrated by
Kennedy’s accusations of weakness in the face of Soviet space successes. He
knew, as Kennedy would later learn as President, that there was, in fact, no
missile gap. Nixon, privy to confidential intelligence information indicating as
much, was prohibited from revealing the truth. He therefore bristled at the
suggestion that America was a distant second in space to the Soviets, and
argued that Kennedy’s claims epitomized “irresponsibility of the highest sort for
an American presidential candidate to obscure the truth about America’s
spectacular achievements in space in an attempt to win votes.”29
This animus took center stage during the final debate between Kennedy and
Nixon, held on October 21, 1960. The debate had been scheduled to discuss the
matter of American-Cuban relations, but the topic of space was pushed to the
forefront when Nixon accused Kennedy of damaging American prestige when
incorrectly criticizing our efforts in space and science. Kennedy denied the
accusation and quickly turned the discussion to the missile gap and how that
affected the perception of the US throughout the world:
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Nixon: Now, when we have a presidential candidate, for example--Senator
Kennedy-- stating over and over again that the United States is
second in space and the fact of the matter is that the space score
today is twenty-eight to eight--we've had twenty-eight successful
shots, they've had eight; . . . that we're second in science because
they may be ahead in one area or another, when overall we're way
ahead of the Soviet Union and all other countries in science; . . .
when he makes statements like this, what does this do to American
prestige? Well, it can only have the effect certainly of reducing it.
Well, let me make one thing clear. Senator Kennedy has a
responsibility to criticize those things that are wrong, but he has
also a responsibility to be right in his criticism. Every one of these
items that I have mentioned he's been wrong--dead wrong.
Kennedy: Now I didn't make most of the statements that you said I made.
The s- I believe the Soviet Union is first in outer space. We have-may have made more shots but the size of their rocket thrust and
all the rest--you yourself said to Khrushchev, "You may be ahead of
us in rocket thrust but we're ahead of you in color television" in your
famous discussion in the kitchen. I think that color television is not
as important as rocket thrust. . . . What I said was that ten years
ago, we were producing twice as many scientists and engineers as
the Soviet Union and today they're producing twice as many as we
are, and that this affects our security around the world. And fourth,
27

I believe that the polls and other studies and votes in the United
Nations and anyone reading the paper and any citizen of the United
States must come to the conclusion that the United States no
longer carries the same image of a vital society on the move with its
brightest days ahead as it carried a decade or two decades ago.
Part of that is because we've stood still here at home, because we
haven't met our problems in the United States, because we haven't
had a moving economy. Part of that, as the Gallup Polls show, is
because the Soviet Union made a breakthrough in outer space.
Mr. George Allen, head of your Information Service, has said that
that made the people of the world begin to wonder whether we
were first in science. We're first in other areas of science but in
space, which is the new science, we're not first.30
Space certainly played a role in the presidential campaign of 1960, but it was not
a major role, and space exploration was largely used as a political weapon rather
than a serious policy issue.
The politicization of space during the presidential campaign of 1960 can be
clearly seen when, after Kennedy won the presidency, there was no movement
toward accelerating the space program during the transition period. Nor was any
action taken during the first three months of the administration—it took several
months before a NASA administrator was even appointed. Kennedy did not
communicate with NASA at all during the period between the election and the
30
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inauguration.31 NASA, eager to follow the lead of the new President, who, they
well knew, had criticized the previous administration’s indifferent attitude toward
space, anxiously looked for guidance from the White House. According to NASA
Associate Administrator Bob Seamans, “trying to read the tea leaves in the
weeks after the election, it looked as if manned spaceflight was not only not at
the top of the new President’s agenda, it might not be on the agenda at all. And
he was right.”32 Where, during the campaign, Kennedy had suggested that
space was a vital area in which we had to vigorously compete with the Soviets as
a matter of international prestige, during his inaugural address he called for USSoviet cooperation in space rather than competing directly, as he also did in his
first State of the Union address. At the start of Kennedy’s term, space took a
back seat to other administration priorities. Only later would it be thrust front and
center, following a series of political setbacks to the administration, which we will
examine in the next chapter. The evidence suggests that space was not on
Kennedy’s policy agenda at all. The truth of the matter was that Kennedy was
just not interested in space.
This sets up the great irony of early NASA history and policy. John Fitzgerald
Kennedy, no lover of space, won the election of 1960 and became the President
who drove NASA and America to its greatest space triumph over the Soviet
Union. Many historians believe that the Apollo lunar landings were the sole
events that occurred during the 20th century that will be remembered one
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thousand years from now. Richard Milhous Nixon, space advocate, lost the 1960
election, but went on to win the presidency in 1968 and again in 1972, became
the President who shut down the ambitions of NASA, leaving it with an
underfunded space shuttle program with no clear mission. What is even more
striking is that Nixon, the consummate politician, who presided over the Apollo
moon landings, personally reaping the political benefits of Kennedy’s space
legacy—Nixon’s name is on the plaques placed on the legs of all of the lunar
landers, not Kennedy’s—then went on to cancel the last three Apollo missions,
shut down the Saturn assembly lines, cancelled the moon base and Mars
mission, and downsized America’s role in space, thereby confining NASA’s
human spaceflight to LEO for the next 40 years.
How did this historical irony occur? Why did each man go against his natural
inclinations toward space and act in an antithetical manner after assuming the
presidency? How did the two men who met in the presidential election of 1960
go on to become the two most influential figures in NASA’s history for the next
four decades? The ironies flow from a combination of domestic politics, world
events, presidential personalities, and a changing national culture that collided
violently during a turbulent ten-year period to shape NASA’s future for the next
forty years and, most likely, for the foreseeable future. NASA is still influenced
by (if not suffering from) the effects of these two men, the men who stood sideby-side on stage at the ABC studios in New York City during the presidential
debate in on that day in late October of 1960.
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CHAPTER II
JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE APOLLO DECISION

John Kennedy’s decision to go to the moon remains among the more influential
ever made by an American President. It has been extensively chronicled by
historians and political scientists alike. Most rightfully attribute the decision to
Kennedy’s reaction to world events and domestic politics. What changes among
the various accounts is the degree to which Kennedy’s decision was a rational
response to events, or one born out of political desperation.
Kennedy’s “space program by fiat” model was an act of political will that was
used as a model for later presidents seeking to jump-start an ambitious space
program. In particular, George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush, who both failed
to reproduce Kennedy’s spectacular and historic success in the area of space
policy, drew upon the Kennedy model. What the Bushes and other presidents
failed to realize was that Kennedy’s Apollo decision was not a textbook case of
how to marshal political will and spur a nation into action. It was instead a
historical and political anomaly, a once-in-a-lifetime event that would likely never
again occur.
For many reasons, it is difficult for those who chronicle the moon decision to
report on it objectively. The challenges largely arise from the historian’s personal
31

relationship with Kennedy, whether perceived or actual. The historical accounts
contain many examples of the Kennedy mythos, and the emotions that this
mythos engenders among those who lived through Kennedy’s tenure as
President and its tragic end seep into the reporting. Kennedy’s assassination
and the national sorrow it engendered continue to color the way that Kennedy
and his presidency are viewed by historians even to this day. Historians know
that they must separate the fact from perceptions, and this task is especially
difficult in the case of John Kennedy. We are a mere 50 years from the Apollo
decision and Kennedy’s murder, which might not constitute sufficient temporal
and emotional distance to allow for the objectivity to which historians strive.
Even so, historians have done an adequate job of dealing with Kennedy’s Apollo
decision, but they appear to be more reluctant to attribute elements of the
decision to Kennedy’s personal failings and less likely to engage in iconoclastic
attributions of causes and effects, insofar as these can be determined. (A similar
situation exists when assessing Richard Nixon, which we do in Chapter Three,
but it arises from the negative feelings engendered by Nixon for those who lived
through his terms in office.)
A second factor that can affect the accounts of Kennedy and Nixon is the political
philosophy of the historian. While some academics and historians are liberal and
others conservative, and their political philosophy informs their opinions of
political decisions made by our leaders, that philosophy can also color their
interpretations of events and their evaluation of the factors that drove the
decisions. A history of the space age written by an admitted liberal like Roger
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Launius contains different interpretations of events than does the history written
by an admitted conservative like Walter McDougall. As much as historians try to
minimize the effects of these factors, historians are human and, as such,
subjective creatures.
A great deal of scholarly work has already chronicled the Apollo decision,
partially due to the enormity of the event and the favored place it inhabits in
American history and myth. Another factor that ensures a considerable scholarly
output is the simple fact that much of the mundane and official documentation of
the actions of the individuals who played parts in the decision have been
declassified and made available to the public. We do not focus here on
chronicling the series of events that occurred during the first months of John
Kennedy’s presidency--this has been done far better than I could ever hope to
achieve by John Logsdon, Professor Emeritus of Political Science and
International Affairs and former director of the Space Policy Institute at George
Washington University. Logsdon’s John Kennedy and the Decision to Go to the
Moon, originally written as his doctoral dissertation during the late 1960s, in the
midst of Apollo’s triumph and filled with interviews of those who were directly
involved in the project, was revisited by the author several years ago and
republished in 2011, having been updated with the primary source material that
had become available to scholars since the original book was written. Logsdon’s
study will likely serve as the final word on the event and the decision.
We will instead recount the decision on a high level, only to draw a comparison
with Nixon’s shuttle decision, in an effort to draw a distinction between the
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natures of the two decisions. For an in-depth discussion of the chronological
chain of events, see Logsdon’s seminal book; here, we will touch instead on the
role that Kennedy’s personality, world events, and domestic politics played in the
decision and entertain a discussion of what caused Kennedy to quickly
metamorphose from a person who had little interest in the US space program to
its greatest advocate.
The launch in 1957 of an artificial satellite by the Soviet Union sent a wave of
existential panic throughout the Western world and triggered alarmist fears of
impending nuclear attacks from space. The “Sputnik moment” seemed to
frighten every politician in the US except for President Eisenhower, who,
although under siege by his political opposition and the media, reacted in a
measured fashion. Eisenhower approved the formation of NASA, and with it, a
modest civilian space program, one that he sought largely as a cover for his
military space ambitions. Rejecting a large-scale accelerated space program,
with the exception of aggressive ICBM and spy satellite development,
Eisenhower instead favored a smaller national space program that would grow at
a more natural pace, with limited cost to the US taxpayer. This strategy stands in
stark contrast to the next President, John Kennedy’s, reaction to the successful
Soviet feat of putting a man in space on April 12, 1961.
As discussed previously, Kennedy in 1960 campaigned on how his
predecessors’ policies had resulted in the US losing global prestige to the USSR,
a loss that, he argued, was evident in the growing Soviet lead in space
capabilities. Kennedy saw an increasing missile gap between the US and USSR,
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and claimed that Eisenhower had neglected US capabilities in space to the
detriment of the nation. But just three months into his presidency, Kennedy
suffered the twin political embarrassments of witnessing a Soviet military officer
orbit the Earth before the US had even achieved a ballistic flight into space,
followed closely by the Bay of Pigs debacle. Kennedy responded by issuing a
challenge to the nation of sending a human to land on the moon and achieving a
safe return, and, to raise the stakes, of doing so before the decade ended.
This bold challenge was announced during a special joint session of Congress
shortly after the US put Alan Shepard into space for a few minutes, an
accomplishment that nonetheless starkly illustrated to the world just how far
behind the Americans were in space capabilities. Why did Kennedy choose a
risky path that would cost billions and ultimately involve over 400,000 of
America’s finest minds?
Logsdon’s work shows not a young and inexperienced President scrambling
frantically to recover lost political capital, as other accounts of the decision have
asserted; instead he portrays a rational and deliberate decision maker who took
the advice of many trusted experts, sorted through the conflicting views, and
determined what he thought would be the best course of action for the nation
during the mortal struggle of the West to stem the advance of communism.
Going to the moon was not a vanity program of a space enthusiast; indeed, as
we have shown, Kennedy himself stated that he was “not that interested in
space”—but was instead a vital component of the existential struggle between

35

the US and the USSR, “part of the battle along the fluid front of the cold war.”33
Kennedy saw space as an integral part of the Cold War, and saw three ways in
which he could prosecute the Cold War—militarily, economically, and
technologically. A direct military confrontation was not an option because a
nuclear war would prove disastrous for both sides. An economic competition
was a possibility, but it would take years to develop to the point where the
nonaligned countries would be able to see the difference between the two
economic systems; indeed, while it was evident from the 1970s on that the US
economy was greatly outproducing that of the USSR, it was not until the early
1990s that the Soviet economy collapsed under the stress of competition and
signaled the end of the USSR. That left technology, of which the space program
was the marquee feature, as the optimal means of competing with the Soviet
Union for the hearts and minds of the world. And Kennedy did not limit this
technological “warfare” to the space program—he also desired to compete with
Europe and the USSR in developing a supersonic airliner that would surpass the
planned jetliners Concorde and the Tu -144.34

The First Months of the Presidency

As a senator, Kennedy’s opinions on space matters were confined to the area of
national defense and what he saw as the growing distance between the missile
33
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capabilities between the US and USSR—what he termed the “missile-space
problem.” At this point in his career during the late 1950s, Kennedy saw space
as the domain of the ICBM and saw this “missile gap” purely as a national
defense and foreign policy issue: the Soviets’ superiority in missile and space
technology simply meant to him that the USSR could rain nuclear-tipped missiles
down on the US. This capability would at worst threaten the very existence of
the US, and at best tip the tenuous balance of power toward the USSR. The
Soviets would thus be able to put some real muscle behind their aggressive
foreign policy. In addition, Senator Kennedy had begun to think of the changing
balance of technological (as well as military, diplomatic, and economic) power as
a means by which the USSR could mitigate American prestige among the
uncommitted nations whom both nations were actively courting. This theme of
prestige would play a larger role in Kennedy's mind as President.
When he assumed the presidency, Kennedy inherited Eisenhower’s version of
NASA and its Mercury, Saturn, and F-1 programs; he also inherited NASA’s
ongoing plans to go to the moon, which had begun internally in 1959. Kennedy
did not visibly change Eisenhower’s approach to a low-key space program.
There was one key difference, however. While Eisenhower favored a space
program that grew at a natural pace without regard to what the Soviet program
did, Kennedy thought of the space program as a tool of diplomacy. During his
inaugural address, Kennedy called for superpower cooperation in space when he
suggested to the Soviets, “Together let us explore the stars.”35 Kennedy
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returned to the topic of superpower space cooperation again and again during his
presidency, and during his first State of the Union Address, he offered the option
of space cooperation with the USSR:
Today this country is ahead in the science and technology of space, while
the Soviet Union is ahead in the capacity to lift large vehicles into orbit.
Both nations would help themselves as well as other nations by removing
these endeavors from the bitter and wasteful competition of the Cold War.
The United States would be willing to join with the Soviet Union and the
scientists of all nations in a greater effort to make the fruits of this new
knowledge available to all—and, beyond that, in an effort to extend farm
technology to hungry nations—to wipe out disease--to increase the
exchanges of scientists and their knowledge—and to make our own
laboratories available to technicians of other lands who lack the facilities to
pursue their own work.36

While Kennedy did bring up the topic of the US space program in public
speeches, there was in fact little activity going on within his administration
concerning space during his first several months in office. He did not contact
NASA at all during the two-plus months between the election and his
inauguration, nor did he propose a NASA administrator.37 Despite the
accusations leveled against the Eisenhower administration during the
36
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presidential campaign concerning neglect of the space program and the Soviet
lead, the evidence suggests that space policy was a low priority, at best. Linda
Krug points to the irony of this situation when she comments, “Interestingly, when
Kennedy entered the White House, space exploration was not high on his
political or political agenda. Some have even asserted that space was not on
Kennedy’s policy agenda at all.”38 This neglect is remarkable, especially when
considering the composition of Kennedy’s cabinet. A number of members of the
Kennedy administration, including Vice President Lyndon Johnson (who believed
that a focus on space policy would propel him to the White House), were far
more disposed to think of US space policy in the terms of the Cold War, than
were those of the previous administration.39 Kennedy’s Secretary of State, Dean
Rusk, testified to the Senate Space Committee that he thought the US was in a
“space race” against the USSR. He further asserted that he feared the
ramifications if the world misinterpreted the current state of the race regarding
current US versus Soviet space capabilities as symbolic of America’s limited
strategic future.40
During the period between the election and the inauguration, NASA did not stand
still while waiting for Kennedy to implement the space policy he implied while
campaigning. NASA continued development of its ten-year plan, which now
included a post-Mercury program, named Apollo, that sought to land on the moon
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by the late 1960s, and which was identified as a “prime NASA goal.”41
Kennedy’s efforts to find a NASA administrator was not a simple task—many
who were approached either doubted the future of NASA under the Kennedy
administration or did not relish the idea of working with or under Lyndon Johnson
who, as Vice President, would be head of the National Space Council. Kennedy
finally settled on James Webb, which was an inspired choice; Webb was
arguably the best administrator that NASA ever had, possessing the right mixture
of administrative talent and political savvy.
Logsdon portrays Kennedy as a thoughtful and open-minded decision maker,
one who did not seem averse to changing his mind in the light of compelling
information that ran contrary to his opinion. In the weeks after his inauguration,
while Kennedy considered a modest increase in the NASA budget that he
inherited from Eisenhower, he sought input from several sources because he
was concerned that a budget increase for the F-1 engine and Saturn program
might not result in increased US prestige.
Kennedy’s science advisor, Jerome Weisner, strongly opposed what was then
called “manned” spaceflight. Weisner instead favored science-based missions
carried out by instrument packages and robotic probes. However, in March of
1961, the National Academy of Sciences advocated a lunar landing as the
ultimate objective of the US space program.42 (This endorsement seems to have
had an influence on Kennedy’s decision several months later to call for an effort
41
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to land a human on the moon, but to what extent is difficult to determine.) What
is clear is that Kennedy had seen the overwhelming public support for the
Mercury program and realized that he needed to support it in an effort to coopt
the political goodwill it engendered.43 But it was not a decision made without
political calculation. Historian Roger Launius describes Kennedy’s assessment
of the risks: “[Project Mercury] was a risky enterprise—what if the Soviets were
first to send humans into space, what if an astronaut was killed and Mercury was
a failure—and the political animal in Kennedy wanted to minimize those risks.”44
Also in March of 1961, new NASA administrator Webb wrote Kennedy’s budget
director, David Bell, to request a 30% budget increase over the limited
Eisenhower space budget, citing the need to increase U.S. international prestige
through a robust space program. Webb and Bell met in the White House to
discuss whether the President should commit to an aggressive and more
expensive space program, one that included a lunar landing. Bell disagreed,
reasoning that it was folly to run a race that we would probably lose anyway, and
that Kennedy had more important issues to worry about. While the
administration did not support the accelerated program, they approved a modest
budget increase to develop a more robust heavy-lift capability, which would
eventually enable a lunar landing.45 During the heated discussions between
NASA and the Bureau of the Budget (BoB), NASA Deputy Administrator Hugh
Dryden made a prophetic statement. After being told that Kennedy did not have
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time to personally address a NASA budget increase request, Dryden told Bell,
“You may not feel he has the time, but whether [Kennedy] likes it or not he is
going to have to consider it. Events will force this.”46

The Events of April-May, 1961

Those events occurred less than a month later, on April 12, 1961, when Kennedy
received word that the Soviets had successfully launched Yuri Gagarin into orbit.
The world media reacted with similar hysteria to that which accompanied the
Sputnik launch in 1957, and Kennedy immediately saw this as a political setback
for his new administration. Kennedy special counsel Ted Sorenson commented,
“Then came the first Soviet to orbit the earth – Gargarin [sic] I believe that was –
and the President felt, justifiably so, that the Soviets had scored a tremendous
propaganda victory, that it affected not only our prestige around the world, but
affected our security as well in the sense that it demonstrated a Soviet rocket
thrust which convinced many people that the Soviet Union was ahead of the
United States militarily.”47 The newest evidence of Soviet technical prowess was
especially damning in light of the charges that Kennedy had made during the
presidential campaign that the previous administration had not done enough to
compete with the USSR in space. Kennedy now looked guilty of the same

46

Logsdon, Race, 67.

47

Theodore C. Sorensen, recorded interview by Carl Kaysen, March 26, 1964, (12), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.
42

charge. Michael Beschloss suggests that Kennedy was not politically concerned
over the Gagarin flight; he contends that Kennedy understood that he would not
be held widely accountable for this latest example of Soviet space superiority,
having only been in office for three months—hardly enough time to put his own
space policy in place.48 Other historians, however, argue that “the specter of
another Soviet space triumph haunted Kennedy and his advisers.”49 The event
certainly forced Kennedy to circle back to the US space program, and raised the
level of importance of the issue of the inferior position that the US occupied in the
space race and its implications on world opinion. But Kennedy was not yet ready
to enter an all-out race.
Krushchev characteristically played up this event as a victory for world
communism over moribund capitalism. Kennedy sent a congratulatory telegram
to the Soviet premiere, using the occasion to again suggest space cooperation
between the superpowers:
THE PEOPLE of the United States share with the people of the Soviet
Union their satisfaction for the safe flight of the astronaut in man's first
venture into space. We congratulate you and the Soviet scientists and
engineers who made this feat possible. It is my sincere desire that in the
continuing quest for knowledge of outer space our nations can work
together to obtain the greatest benefit to mankind.
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JOHN F. KENNEDY
[N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman, Council of Ministers, Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics]50

It is clear that in the immediate aftermath of the Gagarin flight, Kennedy had not
yet decided to go head-to-head against the Soviets in space. A press release
published on the same day by the White House press office hails the feat as a
technological, but not a political, triumph:
THE ACHIEVEMENT by the USSR of orbiting a man and returning him
safely to ground is an outstanding technical accomplishment. We
congratulate the Soviet scientists and engineers who made this feat
possible. The exploration of our solar system is an ambition which we and
all mankind share with the Soviet Union and this is an important step
toward that goal. Our own Mercury man-in-space program is directed
toward that same end.51 [emphasis mine]
Kennedy congratulates the Soviet scientists and engineers, revealing that he fully
understands the political implications that are in play. These expressions were
not an admission of an inferior political or economic system; they were an
announcement to the world that Gagarin’s flight was merely a technological
triumph, one that was shared by “all mankind,” and that the US shared the

John F. Kennedy: "Message to Chairman Khrushchev Concerning the Flight of
the Soviet Astronaut," April 12, 1961.
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Soviets’ ambitions to understand the universe and was, in fact, pursuing their
own human spaceflight initiative. Congress quickly jumped into the fray by
turning the ongoing NASA budget hearings into an investigation of why Kennedy
had not yet increased the budget for manned spaceflight, and seemed primed to
increase the NASA budget in order to catch up to and surpass the Soviets.
Pressure from Congress added to pressure from the public. Logsdon reports,
“Over the next few days, as he absorbed the political reaction in the United
States and around the world to the Soviet achievement, Kennedy would change
his mind.”52 While seeking to downplay the political implications of the Soviet
triumph, Kennedy was beginning to feel this pressure, and he responded by
calling a meeting of his top advisors.
On April 14, Kennedy presided over a fateful meeting of his space advisors to
determine how best to respond to the Soviet public relations coup. Asked how
the US could surpass the USSR in space primacy, Kennedy put the same
question to the assembled team. Science Advisor Jerome Weisner suggested
that the US focus on communications, meteorological, and navigation satellites,
the area in which the US stood the best chance of surpassing the Soviets.
Kennedy solicited other opinions from around the table, and the topic soon
turned to a manned moon landing.
While a moon landing was deemed technologically feasible, the assembled
advisers agreed that the costs would be staggering, and there would be no
guarantees that the US could beat the Soviets at the task. Time Magazine
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reporter Hugh Sidey, who was present at the meeting, reported that “the main
thing everybody was hung up on was the projected cost that might be at the
outset as much as forty billion dollars.”53 While budget director Bell was
intimidated by the $40 billion figure, Kennedy seemed to agonize over the
decision, “running his hands through his hair, tapping his front teeth with his
fingernails, a familiar nervous gesture.”54 Logsdon states that attendees at that
meeting got the sense that it was then that Kennedy began to see a moon
landing as important both to his presidency and to the US in the struggle against
the USSR.55 But while Kennedy was visualizing a moon landing as the way to
beat the Soviets, he was still not willing to sign off on the program because in his
mind the potential payoff was not worth the cost; during the discussion, he
uttered, “the cost—that what gets me.”56 Kennedy had started to believe that
“nothing was more important” than beating the USSR in space capabilities, but
was reluctant to spend the nation’s treasure in doing so.
That is, until the Kennedy administration suffered a second political humiliation in
a week. The attempted invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, conducted between
April 17-19, 1961, by the CIA and Cuban refugees, failed miserably and very
publicly. Although, like the space program, Kennedy inherited the military
operation from the Eisenhower administration, the second political debacle in a
week shook the new presidency to its core. Historians generally agree that the
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Bay of Pigs fiasco greatly upset Kennedy and filled him with self-doubt. Public
opinion questioned whether the young President was up to the task of
prosecuting the Cold War. The public fallout for the president was substantial, but
Logsdon believes that Kennedy’s vulnerable emotional state was a contributing,
not a decisive factor in his moon-landing decision.57
Beschloss gives us perhaps the most vivid description of the effect of the Bay of
Pigs on the Kennedy presidency:
No matter how much Kennedy’s aides tried, through background
interviews with reporters, to shift the blame for the Bay of Pigs fiasco onto
Eisenhower—and they did—Kennedy knew that the debacle had the
power to shatter his entire administration. The Bay of Pigs had suggested
to Americans that they had elected a President who was at least
inexperienced and at worst incompetent. . . . He was desperately in need
of something that would divert the attention of the public and identify him
with a cause that would unify them behind his administration.58
Hardesty and Eisman consider the Bay of Pigs debacle to be a critical influence
on Kennedy’s view of the US space program: “While the debacle was not cited
explicitly as a reason for the Apollo go-ahead, Kennedy clearly sought a new
initiative to help restore the nation’s tattered prestige.”59 Heppenheimer, too,
cites this incident, coming close on the heels of the Gagarin flight, as deeply
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affecting Kennedy: “This was humiliation. Yuri Gagarin’s flight had suggested
Soviet strength and American weakness, but here was the real thing,” and he
goes on to assert that this humiliation caused Kennedy to make “his decision
intuitively, knowing the cost would be frightful but accepting that this challenge
was one he had to face, then and there.”60 Launius also attributes the
acceleration of the space program to these two events: “A nonchalant space
program might have remained the standard for the US civil space effort had not
two important events happened to force Kennedy to act.”61
The unfavorable and somewhat panicked world reaction to Gagarin and the Bay
of Pigs ultimately convinced Kennedy that “prestige was a real and not a public
relations factor in world affairs.”62 As Kennedy came around to the realization
that space would be the symbol of the 20th century and that the US had to be the
leader, rather than being merely a way to score political points during a
campaign, he decided that something needed to be done in space. Yet even at
this stage, he remained troubled over the costs that would be incurred by a moon
landing program.
In search of answers to this crisis of presidential confidence, both from without
and within, Kennedy on April 20 asked Lyndon Johnson to prepare a report
suggesting options for taking the lead in space from the Soviets. Ted Sorensen
recalls:
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[H]e asked the Vice President [Lyndon B. Johnson], as the chairman of
the Space Council, to examine and to come up with the answers to four or
five questions of a similar nature: What were we doing that was not
enough? What could we be doing more? Where should we be trying to
compete and get ahead? What should we have to do to get ahead? And
so on. That inquiry led to a joint study by the Space Administration and
the Department of Defense.63

Kennedy followed up this discussion with a memo formalizing the terms of
Johnson’s inquiry. The memo, described by Beschloss as being “redolent of
presidential panic,”64 reads as follows:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
In accordance with our conversation I would like for you as Chairman of
the Space Council to be in charge of making an overall survey of where
we stand in space.
1. Do we have a chance of beating the Soviets by putting a laboratory in
space, or by a trip around the moon, or by a rocket to go to the moon and
back with a man. Is there any other space program which promises
dramatic results in which we could win?
2. How much additional would it cost?
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3. Are we working 24 hours a day on existing programs? If not, why not?
If not, will you make recommendations to me as to how work can be
speeded up.
4. In building large boosters should we put out emphasis on nuclear,
chemical or liquid fuel, or a combination of these three?
5. Are we making maximum effort? Are we achieving necessary results?
I have asked Jim Webb, Dr. Wiesner, Secretary McNamara and other
responsible officials to cooperate with you fully. I would appreciate a
report on this at the earliest possible moment.
John F. Kennedy65
Whether the memo truly conveys a state of “panic” is uncertain, but it certainly
stresses the urgency of the matter. Considerations related to a moon landing
were surely on the President’s mind the next day, April 21st, when he was
pressed on the matter during a press conference:
Question: Mr. President, you don’t seem to be pushing the space program
as energetically now as you suggested during the campaign that you
thought it should be pushed. In view of the feeling of many people in this
country that we must do everything that we can to catch up with the
Russians as soon as possible, do you anticipate applying any sort of crash
program?
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The President: . . . We have to consider whether there is any program
now, regardless of its cost, which offers us hopes of being pioneers in a
project. It is possible to spend billions of dollars in these projects in space
to the detriment of other programs and still not be successful. We are
behind, as I said before, in large boosters. We have to make a
determination whether there is any effort we could make in time or money
which could put us first in any new area.
Now I don’t want to start spending the kind of money that I am talking
about without making a determination based on careful scientific
judgments as to whether a real success can be achieved or whether we
are so far behind now in this particular race we are going to be second in
this decade.
So I would say to you that it is a matter of great concern, but I think that
before we break through and begin a program that would not reach a
completion, as you know, until the end of this decade; for example, trips to
the moon, may be ten years off, maybe a little less, but are quite far away
and involve, as I say, an enormous sum, I don’t think we should rush into it
and begin them until we really know where we are going to end up. And
that study is now being undertaken under the direction of the Vice
President.
Question: Mr. President, don’t you agree that we should try to get to the
moon before the Russians, if we can?
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The President: If we can get to the moon before the Russians, we should.
[emphasis mine]
Question: Isn’t it your responsibility to supply the vigorous leadership to
spark up this program?
The President: When you say ‘spark up the program,’ we first have to
make a judgment, based on the best information we can get, whether we
can be ahead of the Russians to the moon. We are now talking about a
program which may be—which is many years away.66
Here the President first mentions the moon landing program publicly and in doing
so seems rational rather than panicked. He argues against rushing into such a
massive endeavor, and asserts that all aspects of the potential project should be
analyzed, especially whether it would be likely to fulfill its objective (which he
defines as “being ahead of the Russians to the moon”), before making the
decision. He confirms that Johnson is currently working on the analysis.
Johnson, long a space advocate for political purposes, spent two weeks soliciting
input from all stakeholders in a typically Johnsonian way—meeting personally
with the stakeholders when possible, getting in their faces, twisting arms when
necessary. Johnson engaged in the type of personal politics at which he
excelled: “Whenever he heard reservations, Johnson used his forceful
personality to persuade. ‘Now,’ he asked, ‘would you rather have us be a
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second-rate nation or should we spend a little money?’”67 At Kennedy’s
prompting, Johnson put all of his prodigious political gifts to work to drum up
support for an expanded space program.
Kennedy’s science advisors, space advisors, NASA, and the Department of
Defense (DoD) presented their views to Johnson, and later, other stakeholders
such as Congressional leaders did the same. In a foreshadowing of the funding
issues that we will discuss in a later chapter, Vice Admiral John Hayward
“stressed the need for an integrated, orderly space program rather than an
emphasis on one project at the cost of neglecting others.”68 Hayward’s prophetic
statement, which was ignored, pointed to the post-Apollo problems that the US
space program faced—Apollo, because of its singularity of purpose, which was
primarily due to the end-of-decade time constraint, used technologies that could
not be leveraged for non-lunar purposes and as such, proved an engineering
dead end. Ultimately, the stakeholders whom Johnson queried suggested a
lunar landing as the optimal way to gain the lead from the Soviets in space and to
rebuild America’s lost prestige. They recommended an increased space budget
and a marked acceleration of effort. Members of Congress who were consulted
responded that “the United States must do whatever is necessary to gain
unequivocal leadership in Space Exploration.”69 Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara explicitly agreed to the idea of going to the moon to increase national
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prestige. In a memo to Johnson, he said, “What the Soviets do and what they
are likely to do are . . . matters of great importance from the viewpoint of national
prestige. Our attainments constitute a major element in the international
competition between the Soviet system and our own.”70 In a foreshadowing of
the Nixon shuttle decision ten years later, McNamara also opined that an
accelerated space effort that would be a gift to the aerospace industry, which
was set to suffer under the planned cutbacks in the defense budget.71
Space pioneer Wernher von Braun agreed that we should race the Soviets to the
moon, but with a caveat; in his written reply to Johnson’s query, von Braun
prophetically commented that
in the space race we are competing with a determined opponent whose
peacetime economy is on a wartime footing. Most of our procedures are
designed for orderly, peacetime conditions. I do not believe that we can
win this race unless we take at least some measures which thus far have
been considered acceptable only in times of national emergency.72

Not all of the stakeholders were on board, however. NASA administrator Webb
was reluctant to commit NASA to such an endeavor without first ascertaining
whether it was technologically feasible. He also lacked confidence that NASA
had the long-term political support such a massive project like a moon landing
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would take—he did not want to set NASA up for failure. A consummate politician
himself, Webb understood the nature of the US political system and budget
process, and he also understood that NASA needed the administration’s
unstinting, long-term commitment and political capital.73 Science Advisor Jerome
Weisner, who argued for the scientific aspects of space exploration over political
ones, became “resigned to the inevitable. The decision to go to the moon was ‘a
political, not a technical issue,’ as he would later put it, ‘a use of technological
means for political ends.’”74
Alan Shepard’s flight of May 5, 1961 flight was critical, not just to NASA, but to
the Kennedy administration. The administration greatly feared that a failure
(especially one on live television) would compound the national humiliation of the
twin shocks of Gagarin and the Bay of Pigs. The US had a history of public
space failures, and now the stakes had never been higher, especially in the
context of international prestige. Several prominent Senators suggested that the
flight be postponed and later conducted in secret to mitigate any negative effects
of another very public failure.75 This advice was not heeded, and Shepard’s flight
was a success. The fact that it was conducted in public actually worked in favor
of the US and against the USSR, which was criticized for their blatant
propagandizing of their successes, conducted under a sham cloak of secrecy.
Logsdon reports that:
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A May 1961 report of the US Information Agency comparing international
reactions to the Gagarin and Shepard flights noted that in terms of public
reaction, “the US reaped a significant psychological advantage over the
Soviet Union.” This was due in large part to the “openness” surrounding
the Shepard flight, plus the flight’s “technological refinements and the
poise and humility of the US astronaut.”76
The resulting perceptible gain in US prestige was probably a major contributing
factor in convincing Kennedy to back a push to the moon, since he witnessed the
cause-effect relationship firsthand; a failure surely would have prevented
Kennedy from making that decision and most likely would have doomed any of
the President’s nascent lunar ambitions. Later that day, Kennedy announced at
a press conference that the US would next undertake a “substantially larger effort
in space.”77
Johnson, who was leaving the country for several weeks, passed the task of
reporting his findings back to Kennedy on to a team headed by Robert
McNamara and that included key members of the DoD and NASA, as well as
members of the Bureau of the Budget (BoB). Before he left, Johnson briefed
Kennedy on his interim findings in a memo that states, “If we do not make a
strong effort now, the time will soon be reached when the margin of control over
space and over men’s minds through space accomplishments will have swung so
far on the Russian side that we will not be able to catch up, let alone assume
76
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leadership,” and that a successful moon mission would be an “achievement with
great propaganda value” and one in which we would have the possibility of being
first.78 Johnson’s memo to Kennedy addressed the relationship between national
prestige and space:
The US has greater resources than the USSR for attaining space
leadership but has failed to make the necessary hard decisions and to
marshal those resources to achieve such leadership. . . . This country
should be realistic and recognize that other nations . . . will tend to align
themselves with the country they believe will be the world leader—the
winner in the long run. Dramatic accomplishments in space are being
increasingly identified as a major indicator of world leadership.79
The memo went on to answer Kennedy’s last question, whether the US was
doing all it could to take the lead over the Soviets: “We are neither making
maximum effort nor achieving results necessary if this country is to reach a
position of leadership.”80
The team met and reviewed the responses from Johnson’s queries to the various
stakeholders. Webb, for reasons already stated, was reluctant to consent to a
program as ambitious as a moon landing. But he was eventually persuaded by
the others and signed on to the findings.
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The thirty-page report that emanated from Johnson’s and the team’s work was
authored by McNamara and Webb. It argued that the US should pursue an
aggressive space policy that featured a lunar landing by 1970 for the purposes of
national prestige, and should abandon the natural progress of the Eisenhower
administration approach in favor of a crash program. “Our [space] attainments
are a major element in the international competition between the Soviet system
and our own. The non-military, non-commercial, non-scientific but ‘civilian’
projects such as lunar and planetary exploration are, in this sense, part of the
battle along the fluid front of the Cold War.”81 The report recommended that the
US space program be placed on a war footing and would be accorded the types
of resources available only during times of national emergency. The report itself
provided four reasons for pursuing a robust space program: scientific research,
commercial enterprise, defense, and national prestige. While the US was ahead
in the first three categories, the report stated, it lagged behind in the area of
prestige. The report conceded that the US was behind in “space spectaculars”
that bestow prestige in the world community and suggested pursuing a lunar
landing program as its focus:
We recommend that our National Space Plan include the objective of
manned lunar exploration before the end of this decade. It is our belief
that manned exploration to the vicinity of and on the surface of the moon
represents a major area in which international competition for
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achievement in space will be conducted. The orbiting of machines is not
the same as the orbiting or landing of man. It is man, not merely
machines, in space that captures the imagination of the world.
The establishment of this major objective has many implications. It will
cost a great deal of money. It will require large efforts for a long time. It
requires parallel and supporting undertakings which are also costly and
complex. Thus, for example, the RANGER and SURVEYOR Projects and
the technology associated with them must be undertaken and must
succeed to provide the data, the techniques and the experience without
which manned lunar exploration cannot be undertaken.
The Soviets have announced lunar landing as a major objective of their
program. They may have begun to plan for such an effort years ago.
They may have undertaken important first steps which we have not begun.
It may be argued, therefore, that we undertake such an objective with
several strikes against us. We cannot avoid announcing not only our
general goals but many of our specific plans, and our successes and our
failures along the way. Our cards are and will be face up--theirs are face
down.
Despite these considerations we recommend proceeding toward this
objective. We are uncertain of Soviet intentions, plans or status. Their
plans, whatever they may be, are not more certain of success than ours.
Just as we accelerated our ICBM program we have accelerated and are
passing the Soviets in important areas in space technology. If we set our
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sights on this difficult objective we may surpass them here as well.
Accepting the goal gives us a chance. Finally, even if the Soviets get
there first, as they may, and as some think they will, it is better for us to
get there second than not at all. In any event we will have mastered the
technology. If we fail to accept this challenge it may be interpreted as a
lack of national vigor and capacity to respond.82
Kennedy received the report on May 8, and two days later, he held a meeting to
review the findings. It was at this meeting that Kennedy finalized his decision to
go to the moon. He clearly understood that the massive, lengthy, and almost
prohibitively expensive effort would likely “reduce our flexibility as a nation to
undertake large-scale, all-out efforts in other areas not now foreseen which may
suddenly appear to be of comparable national importance.”83 This was a
prescient statement, and later in the decade presented a challenge to President
Johnson as he tried to prosecute the Vietnam War and implement Great Society
social programs while sustaining the Apollo project. Recollecting the formation of
the report and the April 10 meeting, Ted Sorensen commented that “Inasmuch as
that study was going on simultaneously with the studies and reviews we were
making of the defense budget, military assistance, and civil defense, and
inasmuch as space, like these other items, obviously did have some bearing
upon our status in the world, it was decided to combine the results of all those
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studies with the President’s recommendations in the special message to
Congress.”84
Kennedy then called a joint session of Congress on May 25th to sell his lunar
landing program (along with several other elements of the space program) to the
Congress, the American people, and the world. The “Urgent National Needs”
speech is perhaps Kennedy’s most often quoted one, with the possible exception
of his inaugural address. (It appears that no book, movie, or television
documentary on the US space program starts without a clip from Kennedy’s
address to Congress or from his later speech at Rice University.) In his televised
speech to both houses of Congress and to other dignitaries, given in an
environment typically associated with States of the Union addresses and national
emergencies such as declarations of war, Kennedy discussed various pressing
matters: national defense, economic and social progress at home and abroad,
the nature of the Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union. Finally, Kennedy laid
out his vision of America’s future in space and issued a challenge to the nation.
In the May 25th speech, Kennedy clearly ties the space program to the larger
Cold War, and sets it on a war footing.
Finally, if we are to win the battle that is now going on around the world
between freedom and tyranny, the dramatic achievements in space which
occurred in recent weeks should have made clear to us all, as did the
Sputnik in 1957, the impact of this adventure on the minds of men
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everywhere, who are attempting to make a determination of which road
they should take. Since early in my term, our efforts in space have been
under review. With the advice of the Vice President, who is Chairman of
the National Space Council, we have examined where we are strong and
where we are not, where we may succeed and where we may not. Now it
is time to take longer strides—time for a great new American enterprise—
time for this nation to take a clearly leading role in space achievement,
which in many ways may hold the key to our future on earth.
I believe we possess all the resources and talents necessary. But the
facts of the matter are that we have never made the national decisions or
marshaled the national resources required for such leadership. We have
never specified long-range goals on an urgent time schedule, or managed
our resources and our time so as to insure their fulfillment.
Recognizing the head start obtained by the Soviets with their large rocket
engines, which gives them many months of lead time, and recognizing the
likelihood that they will exploit this lead for some time to come in still more
impressive successes, we nevertheless are required to make new efforts
on our own. For while we cannot guarantee that we shall one day be first,
we can guarantee that any failure to make this effort will make us last. We
take an additional risk by making it in full view of the world, but as shown
by the feat of astronaut Shepard, this very risk enhances our stature when
we are successful. But this is not merely a race. Space is open to us
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now; and our eagerness to share its meaning is not governed by the
efforts of others. We go into space because whatever mankind must
undertake, free men must fully share.
I therefore ask the Congress, above and beyond the increases I have
earlier requested for space activities, to provide the funds which are
needed to meet the following national goals:
First, I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal,
before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him
safely to the earth. No single space project in this period will be more
impressive to mankind or more important for the long-range exploration of
space; and none will be so difficult or expensive to accomplish. We
propose to accelerate the development of the appropriate lunar space
craft. We propose to develop alternate liquid and solid fuel boosters,
much larger than any now being developed, until certain which is superior.
We propose additional funds for other engine development and for
unmanned explorations—explorations which are particularly important for
one purpose which this nation will never overlook: the survival of the man
who first makes this daring flight. But in a very real sense, it will not be
one man going to the moon—If we make this judgment affirmatively, it will
be an entire nation. For all of us must work to put him there.
[Kennedy here then asks for funding for nuclear rocket engines,
communications satellites and weather satellites]
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Let it be clear—and this is a judgment which the Members of the
Congress must finally make—let it be clear that I am asking the Congress
and the country to accept a firm commitment to a new course of action, a
course which will last for many years and carry very heavy costs: 531
million dollars in fiscal '62—an estimated seven to nine billion dollars
additional over the next five years. If we are to go only half way, or reduce
our sights in the face of difficulty, in my judgment it would be better not to
go at all. . .
Kennedy then appeals to the emotions of the American people who have
witnessed first the Sputniks, then Gagarin:
It is a most important decision that we make as a nation. But all of you
have lived through the last four years and have seen the significance of
space and the adventures in space, and no one can predict with certainty
what the ultimate meaning will be of mastery of space.
I believe we should go to the moon. But I think every citizen of this
country as well as the Members of the Congress should consider the
matter carefully in making their judgment, to which we have given
attention over many weeks and months, because it is a heavy burden, and
there is no sense in agreeing or desiring that the United States take an
affirmative position in outer space, unless we are prepared to do the work
and bear the burdens to make it successful. If we are not, we should
decide today and this year.
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This decision demands a major national commitment of scientific and
technical manpower, materiel and facilities, and the possibility of their
diversion from other important activities where they are already thinly
spread. It means a degree of dedication, organization and discipline
which have not always characterized our research and development
efforts. It means we cannot afford undue work stoppages, inflated costs of
material or talent, wasteful interagency rivalries, or a high turnover of key
personnel.
New objectives and new money cannot solve these problems. They could
in fact, aggravate them further—unless every scientist, every engineer,
every serviceman, every technician, contractor, and civil servant gives his
personal pledge that this nation will move forward, with the full speed of
freedom, in the exciting adventure of space.85
His address on “Urgent National Needs” was pitch-perfect and very well
received. Space advocates were both shocked and delighted—“they realized
that this was their chance to make their wildest dreams of space exploration
come true.”86 In a manner that was also similar to that which only occurs at times
of national emergency, Congress approved Kennedy’s request almost
unanimously and “practically without debate,”87 and dramatically increased

85

Kennedy, "Special Message to the Congress on Urgent National Needs," May
25, 1961.
86

Hurt, For All Mankind, 52.

87

Van Dyke, Pride and Power, 147.
65

NASA’s budget. The US budget for space was increased by 50 percent in 1961.
The next year, it exceeded all pre-1961 space budgets combined.88 Congress,
which had already been discussing an appropriate response to Gagarin (and
which had been heavily worked over politically by Johnson to reach a consensus
in his favor), clearly agreed with the President.
Kennedy had correctly assessed the mood of the nation and harnessed their will
to solve the problem of his recent political setbacks. Behind the scenes,
Kennedy saw a problem and then sought advice from his team of trusted experts
to develop the best solution. However, to the public, Kennedy had a vision for
the future of America, which he articulated very well. In the fashion of a true
leader, he brought the people to agreement. Logsdon notes, “His commitment
captured the American imagination and was met with overwhelming support. No
one seemed concerned either about the difficulty or about the expense at the
time.”89 In hindsight, it seems like a crazy idea—landing on the moon—
especially since Kennedy issued the challenge in an unprecedented public forum
at a time when the US had logged a total of just 15 minutes in space, and had yet
to put a human into orbit. The daunting risk that Kennedy took speaks to the
severity of his political quandary in 1961. The nation was hungry for a large
gesture to combat their geopolitical foe, the menacing Soviet bear. Kennedy
sensed this mindset, and in an act of supreme leadership, he brought the
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American people along with him and showed them a way out of its, and his,
predicament.
The idea of landing on the moon fit perfectly into Kennedy’s theme of the New
Frontier, and it had a certain romance surrounding it, not to mention a quite a
large measure of patriotism. In a time of complicated technologies like rocket
science, and when considering the difficulties in measuring whether the US, with
its lead in successful launches and unmanned exploration, or the USSR, with its
success in human spaceflight, were in the lead in space exploration, Von Braun
commented on the simplicity, clarity, and elegance of Kennedy’s challenge:
“Everybody knows what the moon is, everybody knows what the decade is, and
everybody can tell a live astronaut who returned from the moon from one who
didn’t.” 90 Once it was selected as the best way to beat the USSR, the selling of
the moon landing program to the nation was perfectly executed. Kennedy,
NASA, and the nation got their moon landing program.

After the Decision

Despite the overwhelming support from Congress and the American people, not
everyone was on board with the moon landing program. Kennedy’s most notable
critic was, understandably, Dwight Eisenhower. Eisenhower had advocated a
more organic program that did not compete with the Soviet program for public
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relations victories through space “spectaculars”; as outlined in NSC 5520, he
advocated a policy and program that took care of America’s needs, especially
those of national defense. He advocated the Vanguard program as a civilian
cover for the development of reconnaissance satellites and the means to launch
them. The launchers would be repurposed ICBMs, whose development would
aid in the defense of the nation. After unanticipated humiliation surrounding the
fallout from the Soviet Sputnik triumph, Eisenhower began to support Project
Mercury and NASA, but only as a civilian program (largely to avoid intra-service
rivalries and for international optics). To shore up the civilian program,
Eisenhower took rocket-related projects from the military, such as part of Army
Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) in Huntsville (that contained von Braun’s team)
and JPL at Caltech, and gifted them to the newly-formed NASA, a civilian
agency. He allowed the military to pursue their own space initiatives, however,
because Eisenhower knew that the US led the USSR in nuclear technology and
would soon lead in ICBMs. The Soviet R-7, while a capable heavy-lift launch
vehicle, was a poor ICBM—it was inaccurate, took an inordinate amount of time
to prepare for launch, and was produced in numbers too insignificant to pose a
threat to the US. Eisenhower also knew that there was in fact no missile gap; he,
like Nixon during the 1960 presidential campaign, was prohibited from saying this
publicly because the information was classified and of strategic value to the
nation. Knowing this, and being a practical and very cost-averse leader, he did
not want to spend the huge sums of money required to produce what he
considered “space stunts” to compete for illusory international prestige. As such,
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he criticized Kennedy’s Apollo decision over the years in various public forums.
In August of 1962, Eisenhower published an article in the Saturday Evening Post
questioning the moon landing initiative being pursued by Kennedy and NASA.
Why the great hurry to get to the Moon and the planets? We have already
demonstrated that in everything except the power of our booster rockets
we are leading the world in scientific space exploration. From here on, I
think we should proceed in an orderly, scientific way, building one
accomplishment after another, rather than engaging in a mad effort to win
a stunt race.91
Eisenhower was not a believer in reckless national spending (as President, he
advocated strengthening America’s nuclear capabilities because they were
cheaper than conventional forces), and he himself was unjustly attacked by
Kennedy and the Democrats during the run-up to the 1960 election over the nonexistent “missile gap” issue and accused of putting the nation at risk by allowing
the USSR to achieve dominance in space. In 1963, Eisenhower wrote a letter to
Republican House Minority Leader Charles Halleck criticizing Kennedy’s reaction
to Gagarin and Bay of Pigs as “almost hysterical” and immature.92 During a
press conference in April of 1963, Kennedy was asked about Eisenhower’s
criticism:
Q. Mr. President, General Eisenhower has taken a crack at the national
budget. He told Charlie Halleck in a letter that he thought it could be
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reduced by about $13 billion. The General was especially critical of your
space program. He said that there were enormous sums being wasted in
that field. Would you care to comment?
THE PRESIDENT . . . the United States Congress almost unanimously
made a decision that the United States would not continue to be second in
space. We are second in space today because we started late. It requires
a large sum of money. I don't think we should look with equanimity upon
the prospect that we will be second all through the sixties and possibly the
seventies. We have the potential not to be. I think having made the
decision last year, that we should make a major effort to be first in space. I
think we should continue to do so.
Now President Eisenhower--this is not a new position for him. He has
disagreed with this, I know, at least a year or year and a half ago when the
Congress took a different position. It is the position I think he took from the
time of Sputnik on. But it is a matter on which we disagree.
It may be that there is waste in the space budget. If there is waste, then I
think it ought to be cut out by the Congress, and I am sure it will be. But if
we are getting to the question of whether we should reconcile ourselves to
a slow pace in space, I don't think so.93
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In this exchange, Kennedy goes on the offensive against Eisenhower, again
blaming him for the US’ inferior position in space versus the Soviets and citing
his policies as the reason for the need to play catch up, at greater expense. In
1965, the former President complained to astronaut Frank Borman that Kennedy
took what Eisenhower considered a well-constructed and balanced space
program, featuring a panoply of diverse activities that would benefit the country in
many areas, and traded in that approach in a moment of panic in exchange for
an all-out competition. Eisenhower felt that the balanced space policy “was
drastically revised and expanded just after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. . . . It
immediately took one single project or experiment out of a thoroughly planned
and continuing program involving communication, meteorology, reconnaissance,
and future military and scientific benefits and gave the highest priority—
unfortunate in my opinion—to a race, in other words, a stunt.”94 Eisenhower
criticized Kennedy’s decision publicly and privately. And despite his public
defense of it, there is some evidence that Kennedy himself had doubts about his
decision to race the Soviets to the moon.
After making his decision, Kennedy never stopped worrying about the costs of
the Apollo program. The Cold War cooled off noticeably following the Cuban
Missile Crisis, and Kennedy began to question whether the cost, nearly 4% of the
federal budget, was justified. He revisited the decision several times before his
death, each time soliciting his advisors’ opinions. In addition, he made several
public attempts to defray the costs by suggesting cooperation with the Soviets, at
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times even offering a joint US/USSR mission to the moon. Each time, however,
Krushchev tied any offers of Soviet cooperation to progress in nuclear
disarmament; this was not a realistic proposal because at that time, the US had a
decided advantage in nuclear capabilities that it was not willing to surrender.
Later gestures to encourage space cooperation by Kennedy were met with
Soviet demands to eliminate reconnaissance satellites, which was also
unacceptable to the US. In September of 1963, Kennedy told US ambassador to
the USSR Foy Kohler that a joint mission to the moon would “save a great deal of
expense if we could come to some type of agreement with the USSR on the
problem of sending a man to the moon.”95 At this point, he had begun to see the
moon program not only as a means of gaining and maintaining prestige, but as a
powerful tool to improve international relations. But Krushchev was not the only
opponent of such teamwork in space. In an attempt to head off any cooperation
with the Soviets, the House of Representatives passed an amendment to the
NASA appropriations bill in early October prohibiting NASA from partnering with
“any Communist, Communist-controlled, or Communist-dominated country.”96 In
early November of 1963, Krushchev seemed ready to accept Kennedy’s offer of
cooperation, but further negotiations were cut short by an assassin’s bullet on
November 22.
That the Apollo decision was never far from Kennedy’s mind is not debatable—
there is too much evidence to the contrary to conclude that Kennedy had no
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second thoughts about the merits of his decision. In typical Kennedy style, he
continued to solicit advice from many people, including other heads of state.
At a state dinner for Tunisia’s president Habib Bourguiba the day after
Shepard’s flight, Weisner was standing in a corner chatting with Bourguiba
when Kennedy joined them. ‘You know, we’re having a terrible argument
in the White House about whether we should put a man on the moon,’
Kennedy said to Bourguiba. ‘Jerry here is against it. If I told you you’d get
an extra billion dollars a year in foreign aid if I didn’t do it, what would be
your advice?’ Weisner watched as Bourguiba stood silent for several
moments. Finally Bourguiba said, ‘I wish I could tell you to put it in foreign
aid, but I cannot.’ ‘Kennedy went around like that all the time, to get a feel
for what he was doing,’ Weisner said. And the probes kept coming back
with the same answer. The United States did not have the option of
withdrawing from the space race.97

Before he died, Kennedy made a trip to Cape Canaveral to see firsthand the
progress that the US space program had made under his watch. The trip took
place amid growing public calls to slow the pace of Project Apollo and decrease
the NASA budget. During his visit, Kennedy was particularly impressed by the
Saturn I vehicle that was being prepared on the launch pad. After learning that
the Saturn I would carry a heavier payload than any Soviet booster, Kennedy
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responded that the US’ lead in booster capabilities was “very, very significant.”98
Under Kennedy’s leadership, the US had surpassed the Soviets. Although some
historians feel that had Kennedy lived, he would likely have slowed the trajectory
of the space program, Logsdon argues against this belief, pointing out that a
speech that was scheduled to be delivered by the President on November 22
mentioned that America had no intention of finishing second in space.99
Once Kennedy was dead, the moon landing program became, in the minds of the
American public, a holy quest, a national obsession, a memorial to their fallen
leader. Less than a week after Kennedy’s death, President Johnson announced
that Cape Canaveral would be renamed Cape Kennedy and that the launch
facilities would be called the John F. Kennedy Space Center. Johnson and
Webb both at times used political appeals to Congress and others that Apollo
should continue because it was a fitting tribute to Kennedy. The image of John
Kennedy and the project Apollo are still inseparable. Kennedy, a man who had
no interest in space, challenged the nation to land a human on the moon and
return him safely, then drove the political process of developing the moon landing
program to the day of his death. Few Presidential acts since Kennedy’s death
can match the mastery and sheer force of will that Kennedy exhibited while
birthing Apollo, a masterpiece of leadership and political skill that stands as a
lesson in leadership to all who follow.
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Nature of the Decision

Kennedy’s decision to race the Soviets to the moon was undoubtedly influenced
by the events of April 1961—the triumphant flight of Yuri Gagarin and the tragic
events in the Bay of Pigs, Cuba. While NASA had been planning a moon
mission, and the Kennedy administration had finally begun negotiating with
NASA over a budget increase at this time, there were absolutely no discussions
of a crash program to go to the moon to the exclusion of other NASA priorities.
Historians and political scientists have their own explanations for why Kennedy
decided that a grand action was needed.
The evidence strongly suggests that Kennedy’s decision was based on a
confluence of factors: international events, domestic politics, and Kennedy’s
personality. As we discussed in Chapter One, Kennedy was a gregarious man
who enjoyed being in the company of others, especially others who were not like
him. He filled his administration with Ivy Leaguers, and leaned heavily on them
for advice before making a decision. This reliance seems to suggest both selfconfidence and insecurity at the same time: self confidence in the sense that
Kennedy felt comfortable enough about himself to be seen soliciting advice from
various sources without having to constantly assert his power as President;
insecure in that he sought the advice of others, and may not have trusted his own
instincts as well as he should. Kennedy was a very complex man with a complex
personality. While he was alive, his competitive nature was often on display,
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including during touch football games on the White House lawn with staff and
reporters.
Decades after his death, reports have surfaced of Kennedy’s risk-taking
personality—he was not a risk-averse person—whether this involved taking
chances publicly with the Apollo decision or during the Cuban Missile Crisis, or
privately during his frequent dalliances and extramarital affairs. As a young man,
he had a relationship with a German spy while his father was Ambassador to
England and later, while President, an affair with Judith Exner, the girlfriend of
mobster Sam Giancana, as well as with various young White House employees.
These affairs were conducted with the full knowledge of, and some participation
by, Kennedy’s staff, the Secret Service and the White House press corps. But
unlike during the post-Watergate era, the media observed a code of silence
about a sitting president and could be counted on to keep unfavorable facts from
the public, whether it be President Roosevelt’s confinement to a wheelchair from
polio or the playboy lifestyle of John Kennedy before and during his presidency.
Stories have emerged describing how Kennedy and members of his staff would
frolic in the White House pool with young secretaries and interns, and would be
alerted by the Secret Service that Jacqueline Kennedy was arriving at the White
House, at which point the women would be escorted hurriedly off the White
House grounds. The need for excitement evinced by such behavior may have
played a role in Kennedy’s decision to take risks during his term. Kennedy also
seemed to favor tactics over long-term strategy. This habit of mind is evident in
his committing troops to Vietnam without a long-term plan, and also in the Apollo
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decision—in neither case did Kennedy seem to consider the long-term
implications of his decisions, just the immediate or near-term effects. To be fair,
this seems to be a weak spot in many modern presidents, not just Kennedy—
often, presidential decisions are made only after assessing the political calculus
of the effects on their own presidential terms and legacies, and not based on how
these decisions will affect their successors or the nation in the long term.
Unfortunately, this is one of the major disadvantages of our system of
government—that it is run by politicians who make political choices.
Another secret about Kennedy that was kept from the public was his poor health.
Kennedy suffered from constant back pain due to his World War II injury in the
Pacific, constantly wore a back brace, and was taking painkillers most of the
time. He suffered from Addison’s disease, which was treated by Kennedy
physician Max Jacobson with massive doses of steroids and amphetamines.
Jacobson was found to have visited Kennedy at the White House no fewer than
38 times before May 1962, and the FBI found five vials of steroids and
amphetamines in the presidential residence. Robert Kennedy became
concerned with John’s relationship with Jacobson and had fifteen vials tested by
the FDA. Jacobson was later found guilty of 48 charges of unprofessional
conduct by the New York State Board of Regents' Review Committee. Kennedy
was also the first Addison’s sufferer to survive surgery when he underwent back
surgery in the 1950s. Addison’s disease and the unconventional treatments by
Jacobson on Kennedy may be an issue in an examination of the push for the
moon because, as Oxford University’s esteemed Quarterly Journal of Medicine
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reports, if Kennedy did in fact undergo this non-traditional medical regime, the
symptoms of such a treatment would be impetuousness, irritability and tension.
All of these psychological side-effects could have affected Kennedy’s decisionmaking process during this time. QJM goes on to say, however: “In fairness
these [symptoms] were not displayed in his public life, even in the abortive Bay of
Pigs invasion of Cuba early in his presidency. His risk‐taking seems to have
been mainly confined to his private life, such as seeing a Mafia leader's girlfriend
in the White House.”100 Whether or not the steroids and amphetamines had an
effect on Kennedy’s decision-making and, more broadly, his personality, it is
likely that a risk-taking thrill-seeker like Kennedy could have been affected by the
potent pharmacological cocktail coursing through his system. Yet Kennedy’s
decision-making abilities did not appear to be impaired during the Cuban Missile
Crisis, in which Kennedy displayed a rational coolness that prevented a nuclear
war.
The events of April certainly caused Kennedy to act on space policy sooner than
he had intended. After using Eisenhower’s space policy and alleged failings as a
blunt instrument against candidate Nixon during the 1960 campaign, space
dropped almost completely off Kennedy’s radar for several months. Kennedy
clearly did not believe in space exploration as a worthy enterprise in itself, but
rather, as a tool to gain and keep American prestige, and he certainly had no
personal affinity for it. Space was simply a tool for achieving political ends. It
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was only after the Gagarin flight that Kennedy called for a review of US options in
space, and after the Cuban debacle, Kennedy became even more determined to
use space as a way out of his predicament. The President had found himself in
the same position into which he and the media had placed Eisenhower after
Sputnik: “But suddenly it was he, not the gentlemanly general, who was
becoming target of restive wrath in Congress and in the press.”101 The young
President was definitely feeling the heat.
Those who were present when the decision was made, or who knew Kennedy,
felt that the previously mentioned events had a definite impact on Kennedy. T.
Keith Glennan, the first NASA Administrator (he retired in January of 1961) felt
that both the Gagarin flight and the Bay of Pigs misadventure were the reason for
Kennedy to ask for a “reevaluation” of US space program and policy.102
According to Launius, Science Advisor Jerome Weisner believed that the aborted
invasion of Cuba “had an impact,” though he was unsure as to how large that
impact was on Kennedy; he stated “I think the President felt some pressure to
get something else in the foreground” of public opinion a classic case of political
misdirection of public attention.103 Logsdon quotes Weisner as saying, “I think
the Bay of Pigs put him in a mood to run harder than he might have.”104 Weisner,
who argued against an accelerated space program in meetings with Kennedy,
shared some additional insights into Kennedy’s thought process in an interview
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with Logsdon: “I think he became convinced that space was the symbol of the
twentieth century. It was a decision he made cold-bloodedly. He thought it was
good for the country.”105 While Weisner recalls that Kennedy was feeling
immense pressure after the two events, he still suggests that there was
rationality behind the decision. In light of Kennedy’s later possible misgivings
about the decision before his death, Wiesner’s characterization of the decision as
“cold-blooded” may be interpreted to connote hasty or without sufficient
consideration. Special assistant to the president Arthur Schlesinger, however,
felt that there was a definite link between the events and Kennedy’s decision.106
Logsdon relates an interesting anecdote that provides some insight as to the
nature of Kennedy’s space aspirations. After Alan Shepard had been awarded
the NASA Distinguished Service Medal by Kennedy at the White House on May
8, the seven Mercury astronauts, Kennedy, NASA officials, and other
administration figures gathered in the Oval Office. Full of pride and flushed with
success over Shepard’s flight, Kennedy “gushed with questions” for the
assembled NASA personnel. Kennedy announced that he aspired to US space
primacy when he announced, “I want to be first.”107 Bob Gilruth, Director of
NASA’s Space Task Group, which was responsible for human space flight,
explained that in order for the US to be first, American engineers would need to
do something so difficult that the USSR could not use their existing launch
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systems—the Soviets would need to build a new launcher from the ground up
and would thereby lose their current advantage. Gilruth suggested that going to
the moon would require entirely new systems on both sides, and that the US
stood a good chance of winning because of that fact. To that, Kennedy replied, “I
want to go to the moon.” Gilruth observed to Logsdon that Kennedy “was a
young man; he didn’t have all the wisdom he would have had. If he’d been older,
he probably would never have done it.”108 Here Gilruth reflects that Kennedy’s
youthful exuberance had a role in his accepting the risky moon landing proposal.
Kennedy confidante Ted Sorensen thought the twin shocks of Gagarin and the
Bay of Pigs had the effect of convincing Kennedy of the power of spectacles over
the public imagination.109 Sorensen believed that a risky idea with a dramatic
payoff, like a moon landing, appealed to the President’s personality: “The very
notion of a manned flight to the moon, as impossible as that seemed, was one
that I knew would engage President Kennedy’s keen interest.”110 While Kennedy
had little interest in space before, Sorensen believed that after the Gagarin flight,
the President was fully committed to “a race to the moon.”111 Sorensen later said
that Kennedy wanted three things in space: 1) demilitarization; 2) No Soviet
monopolization of space; 3) American scientific prestige and effort as priorities.
“Those three goals all would have been assured in a space effort which
culminated in our beating the Russians to the moon. All three of them would
108
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have been endangered had the Russians continued to outpace us in their space
effort and beat us to the moon.” But Sorensen goes on to bring up Kennedy’s
later thoughts on space cooperation with the Soviets after the US pulled even
with the USSR in space:
But I believe all three of those goals would also have been assured by a
joint Soviet-American venture to the moon.
The difficulty was that in 1961, although the President favored joint effort,
we had comparatively few chips to offer. Obviously the Russians were
well ahead of us at that time in space exploration, at least in terms of the
bigger, more dramatic efforts of which the moon shot would be the
culmination. But by 1963, our effort had accelerated considerably. There
was a very real chance that we were even with the Soviets in this effort.112
This seems to suggest that, as discussed earlier, Kennedy began to reevaluate
his moon landing mandate in the light of US space parity. Sorensen’s analysis
suggests that Kennedy regretted committing the nation to such an expensive
undertaking and that, even though the accelerated effort had drawn America
even with the USSR in space and in the lead in some areas by the end of his
term as President, he was reconsidering that commitment.
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There is no evidence that James Webb thought Kennedy had been affected by
Gagarin or Bay of Pigs.113 Nor did Lyndon Johnson seem to believe that there
was any connection between Kennedy’s decision and the events of April 1961.
Johnson wrote that Kennedy “never gave the least indication in any of our
discussions that he thought there was any relationship.”114 Neither of these
figures could be considered impartial sources, however; they were both
administration figures with large stakes in an accelerated space effort. Another
administration member, Willis Shapley (son of astronomer Harlow Shapley), who
worked for the BoB and was part of the decision-making process, recounted:
after having been through quite a few major decisions, there was never a
major decision like this made with the same degree of eyes-open,
knowing-what-you’re-getting-in-for character. President Kennedy, at first
uncertain but finally convinced that the United States should accept the
Soviet challenge in space, decided that “whatever mankind must
undertake, free men must share.”115
We also have eyewitness accounts of the two journalists we have already
mentioned who knew Kennedy personally. Hugh Sidey, who was present at
several of the key meetings, later opined that the idea of a risky moon program
appealed to Kennedy’s personality; the lunar landing “was a classic Kennedy
challenge. If it hadn’t been started, he might have invented it all, since it
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combined all those elements of intelligence, courage, and tenacity that so
intrigued John Kennedy.”116 Sidey believed that to the President “it was
inconceivable that there was no way to accept the challenge and win the race if it
was worth it and the country wanted to do it.”117 This assessment suggests a
certain jingoistic naïveté on the part of the President. Reporter Sid Davis in
2003, soon after the Columbia accident, commented on how the risky nature of a
moon landing challenge appealed to Kennedy’s personality:
That flimsy crate, the lander, was a flimsy piece of machinery. If it didn’t
get back in orbit up there, these guys were gone. They were going to be
left on the moon. I mean there were a lot of gambles in this thing. That’s
still dangerous, as we learned just recently, last week. But Kennedy was
a visionary in that sense. I think it came in those Kennedy genes. They
were gamblers. They’re going to do it.118 [emphasis original]
Both men knew Kennedy and spent time with him in social situations and on the
golf course; they had a good idea of what he was like as a man. They both felt
that the courage/risk aspect of the moon program appealed to Kennedy’s
psychological makeup.
Few contemporary histories of the decision were written around the time of the
moon decision or even during the late 1960s. Of those that exist, two discuss the
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Apollo decision: political scientist Vernon van Dyke’s Pride and Power: The
Rationale of the Space Program, published in 1964, and John Logsdon’s The
Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest, published in
1970 and revisited in 2011.
Van Dyke’s book is interesting because it comes right on the heels of the
Kennedy presidency and does not have the advantage that time and hindsight
affords a historian or political scientist. As such, it is a fascinating look into the
thought processes of the time. One must keep in mind that at the time this study
was written, America was still a year away from the first Gemini flights, and the
moon landing was still very much an unknown possibility. The longest
spaceflight for an American was Gordon Cooper’s 34-hour, 22-orbit Faith-7 flight
in Project Mercury—America was still taking its first steps into LEO.
In Pride, Van Dyke directly addresses whether the Bay of Pigs had an effect on
Kennedy’s decision to race to the moon:
Many in the United States, as we have seen, were already smarting under
the relatively bad showing of the country in space. NASA officials have
cited the Gagarin flight as a factor that helped to sting the country into
action. The Cuban failure came a week later, carrying American prestige
and pride to a very low point; and it may well have had a sharp impact on
the new President personally, because responsibility for the miserable
episode was his. Certainly it would not be surprising if his advisers
thought that in such circumstances he might be especially likely to

85

respond to proposals of a bold and dramatic sort, with considerable
potential appeal, and if in fact the circumstances did affect his attitudes.
Such speculations may or may not ever be confirmed.119
Van Dyke goes on to discuss the types of grand gestures in space that the
Kennedy team could have alternately selected:
It is arguable (though doubtful) that we could gain deference more surely
by stressing the development of capabilities in near space—especially
military capabilities—than by stressing a lunar landing. It is also arguable
that other goals are more important than the attempt to enhance prestige
by beating the Russians to the moon. But for prestige purposes it would
be hard to imagine any national achievement in space that would have a
value comparable to a successful manned lunar mission and return to
earth—unless it be a manned exploration of Mars.120
The moon landing was still seen at this time as the essential act needed to
combat the Soviets in space; however, it was still viewed as a unitary act rather
than as a complex technological feat, with tens of thousands, if not millions, of
elements, variables, and procedures, all of which needed to function correctly.
Van Dyke ascribes the decision to go to the moon as one dominated by national
pride, which had been bruised by Sputnik, then Gagarin and the Bay of Pigs; the
moon program decision was one of foreign policy, although a foreign policy
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decision that relied primarily on technological means for resolution: “The
evidence is abundant that the complex of values here identified with pride was a
powerful factor in influencing the President and Congress to expand and
accelerate the space program in the spring of 1961, and that it has remained an
important factor ever since.” Unfortunately, Van Dyke’s account follows the
events too closely in time for him to be afforded access to the inner workings of
Kennedy and his advisors. The documents he needed to make his case were
still classified as secret.
Logsdon’s original version of The Decision to Go to the Moon cites Van Dyke’s
book as a stimulus for choosing the moon landing decision as the topic for his
doctoral dissertation. Logsdon had the good fortune of interviewing many of the
people who were directly involved with the Apollo program and who had access
to many of NASA’s resources, so he is able to give us an inside view of the
decision-making process. One mistake that Logsdon makes, however, is
claiming that understanding how the Apollo decision was made can lead to a
better understanding of how to influence those type of decisions in the future.
The Apollo decision was a unique decision made during unique circumstances; a
similar situation will probably never be repeated. As discussed earlier, “space
exploration by presidential fiat” was a misrepresentation of the genesis of the
Apollo program and although it has been tried by other presidents, all of them
have failed.
In any case, Logsdon’s book was a vital analysis of the Apollo decision, and the
insights it provides form the basis for how we understand the decision that
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Kennedy made. Any serious discussion of the decision since the early 1970s
cites this reference, which remains the seminal account of the event, only
eclipsed by Logsdon’s own revision. The second edition fills out the narrative on
the Kennedy administration side with primary source material, such as
administration memos, letters, and recorded conversations documenting the
actual turn of events, items that were not available to researchers or the general
public at the time of the writing of the original account. Many of Logsdon’s
insights in this book have been revisited, illuminated, and placed into context.
When discussing Logsdon’s take on Kennedy’s decision, we will draw from the
accounts and sources in his later book.
In a 1979 article for Astronautics & Aeronautics, Logsdon makes a very insightful
and salient point. Whether the US had ever met its goal in beating the Soviets to
the moon by the end of the decade or had failed to achieve this goal, Kennedy’s
challenge served a more immediate short-term effect. In announcing such a
large and audacious ambition, Kennedy thereby neutered the effects of Soviets
space successes to come. Unless the Soviets were to land on the moon, their
efforts would be measured against America’s desire to land on the moon and be
found wanting: the proposed moon landing became the measuring stick by which
all space activities would be measured. “By entering the race with such a visible
and dramatic commitment, the United States effectively undercut Soviet space
spectaculars without doing much except announcing its intention to join the
contest.”121
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Modern accounts of the moon landing decision, as we have discussed, have the
benefit of hindsight and of more available primary source materials. What will
always be missing, however, is a memoir of the period written by the President
himself—he never had a post-presidential period of reflection and memoir writing.
Such an account surely would have served to help sort out what Kennedy had in
fact been thinking, rather than relying on eyewitness accounts, testaments to
Kennedy’s character, or primary source documents.
Walter McDougall comes to the conclusion that it is impossible to know what
Kennedy had been thinking at the time of the decision. He infers that what “may
have tipped the balance for him and for many was the spinal chill of leaving the
moon to the Soviets. Perhaps Apollo could not be justified, but, by God, we
could not not do it.”122 Kennedy had been placed in a tough situation, but the
ramifications of inaction, Soviet mastery of space and world opinion, were worse
than the downside of the moon program. (McDougall also asserts that Kennedy
fell prey to his liberal belief that certain behaviors should be subject to political
control, resulting in large, technocratic projects moving from the military into the
private realm.) Kennedy thought of himself as a man of action—W.D. Kay notes
that during the presidential campaign of 1960, Kennedy wanted to impress this
idea on the populace. Perhaps to counter any claim that Kennedy was too young
and inexperienced for the White House, he turned his youth and energy into an
advantage as he campaigned (one wonders how much of this was compensation
for Addison’s Disease, which sapped his energy). “Kennedy was a younger man
122
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[than Eisenhower] who wished to convey an impression of vigor and vitality. He
campaigned on a pledge to ‘get America moving again.’”123 This image stood in
stark contrast to the previous administration, which Kennedy painted as old and
slow-moving. Kennedy promoted a public persona of dynamism and forward
thinking, and the Apollo decision was a dynamic, dramatic, and forward-thinking
gesture. Moreover, Kennedy could not not do anything, especially after he spent
months criticizing Eisenhower of inaction and now found himself in a similar
predicament to that of the elderly general.
Other historians have also agreed that Gagarin and the Bay of Pigs had a
definite effect on the decision. J. Henry Lambright feels that the twin events of
April 1961 forced Kennedy’s hand. “Although no explicit evidence links the Bay
of Pigs to Kennedy’s actions on space, the fiasco created an atmosphere in the
White House in which the President felt he had to exert leadership right away.”124
Nathan Goldman believes this to be the case, and argues that the events forced
Kennedy to look seriously at US space efforts. While Kennedy campaigned on
missile and space issues, he did little on either once in the White House. It was
“only after the Gagarin flight did Kennedy undertake a major review of space
technology and space planning and make the calculated decision that the only
way to meet the Russian challenge was to meet it at the source of Russian
prestige—in the space arena.”125 Hardesty and Eisman also concur—the
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decision to go to the moon was a Cold War-based decision that “must be viewed
through the prism of the rivalry between the two superpowers. The intense
competition engendered a strongly felt American need to respond to Soviet
space triumphs by showing that America was at least capable as the Soviets in
this area.”126
T.A. Heppenheimer ascribes Kennedy’s decision to this Cold War competition
and Kennedy’s sense of the march of history.
Waging total cold war, Kennedy believed that it was essential to deny
Moscow propaganda victories as well as military ones. A prime topic for
propaganda was spaceflight, and in no way would Kennedy concede that
the Soviets might concentrate resources into this area while failing their
citizens in a host of ways that were far more important. The issue was one
of national prestige, what in earlier times had been known as national
honor: if the world viewed space as important and saw that the Soviets
were ahead, then America would have to meet this challenge and take the
lead.127
Heppenheimer also suggests that Kennedy’s sense of his own legacy had much
to do with the decision. “Apollo suited his sense of history, his view of the future,
his spirit as a man. It was also very important in that it could deny Moscow
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further victories and help to hold the line in the Third World.”128 Kennedy had a
keen sense of history, having written two books on the subject, and understood
the effects that such an ambitious challenge would have on the nation and the
world. Heppenheimer does not seem to think that the decision was rushed,
short-term, or panicked. He believes that Kennedy fully understood that the
moon program decision was a way to put all of America’s advantages to work
against the Soviets, including technology and economic powers as well, where
Kennedy understood America held an advantage. In an argument similar to Bob
Gilruth’s, Heppenheimer lays out Kennedy’s reasoning:
[The moon program] represented a simple and dramatic goal that
everyone could understand. It appeared reachable during that decade,
and would not impose a prolonged effort that might lose public interest. In
addition to this, the moon was demanding enough to call for an entirely
new array of launch vehicles and spacecraft, requiring far more power
than the Soviet rockets of the day could provide. The Soviet lead in
rocketry would not help them; like the Americans, they would have to start
afresh. Kennedy believed, correctly, that in the resulting competition the
U.S. would prove more capable in coming up with the enormous sums of
money that would be necessary to reach the moon.129
Eugene Emme agrees with Heppenheimer and attributes the decision to
Kennedy’s personality and sense of history. “John F. Kennedy’s quick memory
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and his acute political instincts, his love of competition, debate, and winning, his
intellectual and his managerial sense of history—these unsimple virtues were to
be increasingly evident in the course of space history.”130 The moon landing
decision satisfied Kennedy’s predilection for all of these skills: it is a way to solve
a political problem with a political solution; it sets up a direct competition with the
Soviets that his predecessor avoided; he had to win the nation and Congress
over with his oratory, a form of public debate; he expected that this was a way to
win against the Soviets, who boasted of an advantage; and it certainly appealed
to his sense of history in that it would take its place among great American
triumphs over implacable foes, much like the Manhattan Project. Kennedy’s
solution to his immediate problem satisfied all of his personal needs as well as
resolving a national need for increased prestige. It also fulfilled his desire for
risk-taking, since at the time it was the riskiest of endeavors from a national
perspective and would at the time of the missions involve great personal risk and
heroism for the astronauts involved.
Logsdon’s original assertion that Kennedy’s decision was an example of the
“Rational Choice Model,” first asserted in his 1970 book, is reiterated unchanged
in his 2011 update. The rational choice model assumes that after a desired
outcome is identified, a decision-maker analyzes various options, deciding on the
option that appears to offer the best cost-to-benefit ratio. The decision is thus
made by being deliberate and pragmatic, although the desired outcome or
solution to a problem does not necessarily need to be pragmatic. Logsdon
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places the Apollo decision squarely in the context of the Cold War, considering it
to be the last major political act of the Cold War. Once Kennedy decided that
beating the Soviets in space was the solution to the national and his personal
problems, the rational choice model for decision-making became active, and
Kennedy began a deliberative process that ended with selecting a moon landing
as the solution. The rational choice model makes sense in the context of
meeting the objective, but was the objective itself, or Kennedy’s reaction to the
crisis rational? Logsdon argues that the nature of determining the objective is
irrelevant to the rational choice model.
Logsdon argues that after the historian analyzes his decision-making process,
President Kennedy “emerges as a pragmatic political leader who soon after
entering office came to see the US civilian space program as an important tool to
advance US foreign policy and national security goals. He was flexible in his
approach to space activities, willing to compete if necessary but preferring to
cooperate if possible.”131 Logsdon argues that Kennedy did not make a single,
irrational, spot decision, but rather a series of decisions, each one after careful
deliberation of facts and anticipated effects. Kennedy may have been willing to
cooperate before the Bay of Pigs event and after he made the Apollo decision,
but the idea that the US could cooperate with the USSR as a solution for the
crisis was never considered. Logsdon considers Kennedy’s emotions and
examines the President’s personality, but cites insufficient evidence for factoring
them into his equation. “How much Kennedy’s emotional state and competitive
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character determined or merely reinforced his resolve to proceed rapidly in space
cannot be definitively known, but most evidence shows that they were influential
but not decisive factors.”132 Instead, Logsdon attributes Kennedy’s decision to a
basic rationality, as he did with Eisenhower:
Eisenhower had come to a different judgment of the importance of space
achievement (or rather its lack of importance) in terms of preserving US
global leadership, which he saw as being based more on a sound
defense, fiscal soundness, and social stability. John Kennedy, with his
much more activist approach to government, had an opposing view.
Kennedy was not at all a visionary in the sense of having a belief in the
value of future space exploration; rather, his vision was that space
capability would be an essential element of future national power, and
thus that the United States should not by default allow the Soviet Union to
have a monopoly of large-scale capabilities to operate in this ‘new ocean.’
I believe that this was a wise judgment, one from which the United States
has benefitted over the past half century.133
Logsdon does take into consideration that Kennedy’s solution resolved his
personal political problems at the same time that he resolved the nation’s issues,
but prioritizes the nation’s problems over Kennedy’s problems in terms of the
objective that the decision sought to address. “Certainly the immediate stimulus
to the decision to go to the Moon was the threat to US global leadership posed
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by the world’s reaction to Soviet space successes at the same time as the United
States looked weak in its conduct in the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Kennedy’s desire to
regain his personal prestige and his administration’s momentum were also
problems addressed by the Apollo choice.”134 Logsdon argues that Kennedy’s
decision was not a personal one, but that of a great leader. That the decision
solved Kennedy’s personal political issues were coincidental. Logsdon sums up
his case with the closing argument:
In summary then, I conclude that President Kennedy’s commitment to a
lunar landing program as the centerpiece of an effort to establish US
space leadership was the result of thoughtful consideration, particularly
given that it was reiterated a number of times between May 1961 and
November 1963. The commitment was publicly embellished with
rhetorical flourishes, but at its core was a Cold War-driven but rational
policy choice.”135
In a surprising conclusion to his book, Logsdon’s evaluation of Apollo’s effect on
the US space program as being a negative one is brutally honest for someone
who clearly loves Kennedy and the Apollo program. He agrees with Kennedy’s
decision, but believes that the prosecution of the program has ultimately hurt
NASA. Logsdon feels that Apollo was the product of a particular moment in time,
one not to be repeated; this moment in time, the moon landing, was the first
globally-shared human experience.
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Roger Launius, the Head Curator of the National Air & Space Museum’s Human
Spaceflight collection and a prolific space historian, has authored countless
books, collections, and articles on the US space program, and pn Apollo in
particular. His view on Kennedy’s decision is that it was driven by events, a
once-in-a-lifetime set of circumstances that allowed such an unlikely decision to
be made. To Logsdon, it wasn’t simply the Gagarin and Bay of Pigs incidents,
but a larger set of historical forces, that influenced the decision. “A unique
confluence of political necessity, personal commitment and activism, scientific
and technological ability, economic prosperity, and public mood made possible
the 1961 decision to carry out an aggressive lunar landing program.”136 The
geopolitical effects of World War II were still being felt, and the two superpowers
were slugging it out for world opinion and world supremacy. Modern
communications methods such as radio, television, and newspapers guaranteed
that the press’ impression of events had become as influential as the events
themselves had in years past. Kennedy needed to not only battle the Soviets in
military, political, and economic arenas, but also in the world press which, in its
influence as shaper of world opinion, became another front of the Cold War. And
on many of these fronts, Apollo seemed like an ideal solution. “As Apollo was a
remedial action ministering to a variety of political and emotional needs floating in
the ether of world opinion. Apollo addressed these problems very well, and was
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a worthwhile action if measured only in those terms.”137 Launius seems here to
suggest that only when taken in terms of geopolitical value could the Apollo
decision be deemed a good one. Launius is not as positive regarding Kennedy’s
decision as is Logsdon, and has some reservations. He cites the Bay of Pigs as
the trigger for the decision, much as the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand by
Gavrilo Princip was the trigger that started the First World War; other, larger
factors had built over years, and the incident served to set things in motion—the
same may be said regarding Apollo. “While the Bay of Pigs invasion was never
mentioned explicitly as a reason for stepping up US efforts in space, the
international situation certainly played a role as Kennedy scrambled to recover a
measure of national dignity.”138 Launius mentions, as do most of the other
historians, that the President sought to restore national dignity, but I find it
interesting that Launius uses the word “scramble” here—“scrambling” denotes an
element of chaos and perhaps a touch of desperation. And what Launius does
not mention is that Kennedy was also scrambling to restore a semblance of his
own political dignity, which had suffered more than our national dignity.
Launius takes issue with Logsdon’s assertion that Kennedy’s decision followed
the “Rational Choice Model” and that the decision was a logical one. Launius
argues that Kennedy’s decision was politically pragmatic, but that it was not
entirely rational in nature. Launius suggests that the decision was “muddled
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through” rather than decided upon rationally. Launius believes that Kennedy’s
personality comes into play much more than does Logsdon:
Kennedy’s tortured background and aggressive tendencies may have
affected his decision making process, causing him to take a more
combative approach towards the Soviet Union than required and
necessitating “winning” at whatever challenges came his way. At some
level, Kennedy may have created some crisis situations wherein he
reaffirmed his quintessential masculinity and enhanced his own
dominance over everyone and everything. Most of these analyses depict
Kennedy in an unfavorable light and focus on his tendencies towards
competitiveness, recklessness and ambition.
President Kennedy’s assertive self-confidence may have provided an
important element of the “Camelot mystique” but carried to a logical
conclusion, it also led to tense Cold War situations in which on more than
one occasion nuclear holocaust became a probable outcome. At the
same time, that assertiveness hid a Kennedy weakness for indecisiveness
and procrastination until pressed to take a stand. That, coupled with the
lack of any essential ideology beyond a basic anticommunism and a faith
in active government, ensured that there was more to the Apollo decision
than rational action.139
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Launius takes the view that Kennedy’s rationality and his emotions contributed
to his decision to go to the moon. Kennedy’s initial reaction was emotional, since
his leadership was being questioned, but once he decided he needed a “big”
solution, he methodically worked through the possible solutions with his trusted
advisors, of which there were many.
I must agree more with Launius than I do Logsdon. Kennedy’s personality traits
are well-documented. To think that just three months after taking office that a
confidence shattering series of events took place in full view of the world, that a
man with Kennedy’s temperament would reaction in a totally logical manner is, I
think, a stretch. Having grown up after Kennedy’s murder (I was born in 1962), I
was not affected by his tragic death, but was surrounded by those who were. He
was always a martyred President, much like Lincoln—tragic to say the least, but
a historical figure for whom I had no emotional memories. All of the presidents
since Kennedy were affected by their diverse personalities and predilictions. I
must assume that Kennedy’s decision emanated from an emotional response to
events as much as it did from his rational response to events and conditions, in
the absence of convincing data to suggest otherwise.
This brings us to Michael Beschloss, who wrote an essay in 1997 that criticized
Kennedy’s moon landing decision as being emotional, irrational, and illconsidered. Beschloss agreed with Eisenhower that Kennedy’s decision
suggested panic and immaturity.
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It is a measure of Kennedy’s aversion to long-term planning and his
tendency to be rattled by momentary crises that one may conclude that in
the absence of a Gagarin triumph and the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April 1961,
he might never have gone to the length of asking Congress to spend $20
billion on a crash Moon program. Kennedy’s desire for a quick, theatrical
reversal of his new administration’s flagging position, especially just before
a summit with Krushchev, is a more potent explanation of his Apollo
decision than any other. Johnson’s desire for turf, McNamara’s desire to
use aerospace overcapacity, and Kennedy’s own conviction that a Moon
program was consistent with what Sorensen called ‘the New Frontier spirit
of discovery’—these things helped the decision along, but none was so
important.140
Beschloss’ damning rationale for Kennedy’s decision assumes that the worst
attributes of a person’s personality override the nobler. While Beschloss
believed that Kennedy’s behavior during the Cuban Missile Crisis was
exemplary, his view that Kennedy, while achieving his immediate political
objectives, “did not necessarily think much about the long-term
consequences.”141 Beschloss goes further with his assessment that the Apollo
program was a wrong decision:
As Kennedy concluded, his decision for an accelerated Moon landing was
ultimately a political decision made in terms of cold war strategy. How
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does it stand up now that the cold war is over? Not well. We now know
that the reason the Soviet Union gave up in that struggle was that it
recognized that it could not compete with the Western economies and
Western societies in those areas of life and death that mattered. Although
the Moon program contributed a great deal to the United States, the tens
of billions of dollars spent in the 1960s on what Kennedy essentially
thought of as world propaganda could probably have been better devoted
to US defense or the American domestic economy, and that might have
convinced the Soviets more quickly of the fruitlessness of the tragic
conflict with the United States.142
There is no conclusive evidence either way as to why Kennedy made his
decision to set America on the path to the moon, such as a diary entry or a
memoir that Kennedy himself wrote. Historians and political scientists alike have
argued that the decision was a rational one and others have argued that it was a
reaction to a momentary crisis. The answer probably lies somewhere in
between.
It is also interesting to consider whether Kennedy would have made the Apollo
decision had the Bay of Pigs invasion not turned out so poorly. I tend to think
that because space was not an issue on the forefront of Kennedy’s mind when
the incident occurred, the US space program would have progressed at a more
natural rate. After the Gagarin mission, Kennedy began to consider a moon
mission to establish American dominance in space, but the cost was considered
142
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too high—the very definition of the Rational Choice Model. It was not until the
political fallout of the Bay of Pigs hit that the issue was raised to crisis level. It is
here that the Rational Choice Model rationale breaks down. The choice would
have the same outcome as it would have had just after Gagarin. However, the
cost was now deemed to be acceptable in a cost-benefits analysis—the Rational
Choice Model fails. Roger Launius sums up this alternate reality neatly:
Had the balance of power and prestige between the United States and the
Soviet Union remained stable in the spring of 1961, it is quite possible that
Kennedy would never have advanced his Moon program and the direction
of American space efforts might have taken a radically different course.
Kennedy seemed quite happy to allow NASA to execute Project Mercury
at a deliberate pace, working toward the orbit of an astronaut sometime
before the middle of the decade, and to build on the satellite programs that
were yielding excellent results both in terms of scientific knowledge and
practical application. Jerome Weisner reflected: ‘If Kennedy could have
opted out of a big space program without hurting the country in his
judgment, he would have.’143
While some historians view Kennedy as weak and not totally in charge of events
and foreign policy, and while others view Kennedy as strong, in charge, and an
insightful leader, the full narrative that is laid out in Logsdon’s book and in the
accounts of the other historians and political scientists illustrate that Kennedy
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was a “complex figure whose personality embraced elements of both images.”144
Kennedy’s vision that space capabilities would be intricately entwined with
national power is a view with which Logsdon agrees: “I believe that [the moon
program] was a wise judgment, one from which the United States has benefitted
over the past half century.”145
Kennedy’s decision was a complex one that provided America with perhaps its
proudest moment—two humans walking on the surface of another planet. It also
cost the nation dearly in treasure, and was scaled back after the mid-1960s due
to conflicting priorities as judged by President Lyndon Johnson, who was
prosecuting the war in Vietnam, a Kennedy legacy (although Johnson
accelerated the effort), the Apollo program, another Kennedy legacy, and the
Great Society initiative, Johnson’s legacy. The budgetary pressure from these
three factors eventually caused Congress to slash NASA’s budget, and the war
eventually destroyed Johnson politically.
However, despite the Apollo 1 tragedy and delays, Neil Armstrong and Buzz
Aldrin planted the American flag on the plains of the Sea of Tranquility on July
20, 1969, six months ahead of Kennedy’s deadline, and ahead of the Soviets,
who had unsuccessfully prosecuted their own moon program. The Apollo
program, and in particular, the first lunar landing of Apollo 11, has been hailed as
the high point of the century.
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Several days after the historic landing of Eagle, as the world was still celebrating
that humanity was now a multi-planet species, the engineers in the mission
control room were reminded why they were all there. When the Columbia
splashed down, the center view screen in Houston’s Mission Control room, which
had up to now displayed trajectory data, went black. When it relit, it displayed:
I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before
this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely
to earth.
--John F. Kennedy to Congress, May 1961
Then the right-hand screen, which had been showing the mission patch,
displayed:
Task Accomplished. July 1969.
Kennedy’s decision, made over the course of several weeks, drove 400,000
Americans for eight years, at unprecedented cost, through tragedy and triumph,
culminating in an event inconceivable just 20 years earlier. Although he never
lived to see the results of his challenge, John Kennedy and the Apollo program
will likely be the one event from the 20th century remembered centuries years
from now.
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CHAPTER III
RICHARD M. NIXON AND THE SHUTTLE DECISION

Apollo in an Era of Change

In the late 1960s, NASA had brought triumph to the United States by fulfilling
John Kennedy’s challenge to get to the moon and back by the end of the decade.
The task had taken tens of billions of dollars, the tireless efforts of over 400,000
people, and eight years to accomplish. During that time, getting to the moon
within Kennedy’s mandated timeframe and before the Soviets was NASA’s
monomaniacal quest. As discussed in Chapter Two, the spirit of the martyred
President animated and drove NASA’s activities during this period. Both
President Lyndon Johnson and NASA Administrator James Webb appealed to
Kennedy’s legacy when waning public and Congressional interest resulted in
decreasing budgets after 1966, deftly avoiding program cancellation, even after
the Apollo 1 accident and inquiry. As the Golden Era neared its peak with the
planned series of ten lunar landings, NASA began to plan for their next ten years,
which they saw as even more grand and dramatic than the preceding ten. NASA
envisioned a space station, a space shuttle to get there, a permanent moon
base, a space tug, a trip to Mars, and other spectacular and ambitious projects.
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Until now, NASA had operated with an unprecedented budget (although it had
been scaled back from 4% of the federal budget) and maximum political clout in
the person of James Webb, a veteran politician who knew just how to work
Congress in NASA’s favor. But while Webb was a political master, he had
steered NASA through a largely favorable political climate. Apollo had been
spearheaded by Kennedy, had been approved almost unanimously by Congress,
and had enjoyed the good will of the nation. After Kennedy’s death, it became
something of a sacred tribute to Kennedy’s memory, and although President
Johnson had become entangled with the Vietnam war and the escalating costs of
his Great Society social initiatives, Apollo was in no real danger of being
cancelled before it could fulfill its destiny by landing on the moon.
The events that would soon take place would change the nation and NASA
forever. The Cold War was largely on hiatus, and although the Soviets continued
to engage the US in proxy wars and in space, the threat of nuclear annihilation
had largely abated after the Cuban Missile Crisis. The national culture shifted
over the decade from a Cold War mentality to a more liberal, socially-conscious
culture that enabled the Civil Rights movement, the anti-war movement, the
environmental movement, feminist movement, growing counterculture and social
permissiveness, and a general lack of trust in the government, which spread
throughout the nation. Assassinations, race riots, domestic terrorism, and a
general unrest shifted the national mood from one that was tense because of the
perceived Soviet threat to one of internal tension caused by shifting priorities and
changing mores.
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NASA was oblivious to much of this shift because their employees were working
long hours to meet Kennedy’s deadline, and they missed the changes that were
occurring on the street and on television. One need only compare the colorful
clothes and long hair worn by people on the street at that time to the white shirts,
crew cuts, and pocket protectors evident in the NASA control rooms to see that
the culture had shifted without NASA. As an organization, NASA seemed frozen
in the early 1960s, and the management’s thought process was seemingly stuck
in that mode as well. NASA was born of Cold War competition and grew to an
enormous size in that environment. Having missed the cultural revolution, they
planned for a future under the old assumptions—that NASA was fighting a quasimilitary battle on the frontlines of the Cold War. This was no longer the case, but
NASA had not changed its internal mindset to reflect the changes. Perhaps it
was bureaucratic inertia or the hubris that comes with competing head-to-head
with a mortal enemy in full view of the world and winning, but NASA was
suddenly out of phase with the rest of the nation and its priorities. NASA
administration believed that their triumph and their elevated place in the theater
of geopolitics would guarantee continued growth, but the soil that had nourished
it for so many years would no longer support its inflated budget.
Astronaut William Anders’ iconic photograph of the “Earthrise” taken during the
Apollo 8 mission in late December 1968 elicited a visceral reaction for the
astronauts who witnessed the event firsthand and for all who viewed the
photograph. It pictured the Earth with no political boundaries, floating solitary in
the blackness of space with a wispy-thin atmosphere, appearing very vulnerable
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and alone in the cosmos. The image prompted epiphanies in many minds,
revealing that the Earth was fragile and that humans needed to become better
stewards of it. This image, with the associated concept, was immediately
appropriated by the budding environmental movement, and it quickly became a
popular poster that hung in many American bedrooms. The “Earthrise” revelation
was indicative of a more general “awakening” in the public that while traveling
into space was admirable, it was our duty to solve problems back on the planet
first and foremost.
President Johnson, worn down by prosecuting the War in Vietnam and the War
on Poverty, decided not to run for reelection. Richard Nixon won the presidency
in 1968, and assumed office over a very different America than in 1960. Nixon
also inherited a flourishing Apollo program, one that was ready to land on the
moon and fulfill Kennedy’s challenge. It is arguable whether Nixon would have
chosen the same path as Kennedy in going to the moon; the evidence strongly
suggests that Nixon would have continued Eisenhower’s organic space program,
which operated at a natural pace and certainly did not attempt to race against the
Soviets. Original NASA Administrator T. Keith Glennan would likely have stayed
on had Nixon beaten Kennedy in 1960, and he probably would not have pushed
for Apollo to the degree that Webb did under Kennedy. What Nixon did with this
thriving program is the opposite of what Kennedy did: Nixon sought to scale the
US space program back drastically. Nixon was more fiscally conservative and
wanted to dramatically reduce government spending on the War, on the Great
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Society initiatives, and in space; he felt that the federal budget was bloated, as
did Eisenhower, and sought to slash it.
Nixon’s governing style was very different from Kennedy’s. While Kennedy was
gregarious and sought input from many quarters (including threatening to ask the
White House janitors for an answer to how the US could beat the Soviets in
space), Nixon sought to isolate himself from others, trusting only a few long-time
friends and aides, from whom he took counsel. Nixon held very few meetings
with people outside these few aides, preferring to rely on his trusted inner circle.
Unfortunately for NASA, there were few in this group who advocated for the
aggressive space policy that NASA envisioned. Nixon also differed from
Kennedy on foreign policy. Where Kennedy often found himself aggressively
challenging the Soviets head-to-head, Nixon adopted a more statesmanlike
approach, preferring diplomacy and negotiation to conflict. Since NASA was
structured at that time to compete directly with the Soviets, Nixon sought to
change it. And finally, the political will that enabled Kennedy to appeal to
Congress and the nation and win their approval for an aggressive space program
had vanished. The Congress was currently more concerned with the domestic
problems of the United States. The war against communism in Vietnam had
bogged down and was draining the national treasury; many in Congress thought
that money would be better spent at home rather than either halfway around the
globe or on the moon. “The conditions that made Apollo possible in the 1960s
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were not present in the new decade. For NASA, the policy problem was not how
to go to Mars but how to keep the space program alive.”146
NASA, once enjoying favored status within the nation and the government, now
had to take its place beside the nation’s other more pressing priorities. For the
first time in its history, NASA had to become political, had to justify its existence
and even had to fight for its survival. After Nixon failed to approve NASA’s lofty
plans for the future, it was forced to fight for anything, something for which it was
not culturally equipped. The national space agency was forced to transform itself
from an idealistic institution fighting for the American way to a political animal
fighting for whatever it could get.
The shuttle decision gave NASA its political baptism. Unable to get their
overall vision approved, NASA scientists and engineers plunged into the
morass of incremental politics. They had to negotiate shuttle design
details with the White House staff. They felt obliged to accept a
technologically inferior program in order to win political support, and they
had to engage in the game of bureaucratic politics, seeking outside
support from groups like the military, who came to NASA’s aid.147
NASA no longer had an advocate in the White House and found itself in very
different and new territory. The agency tried to continue on in the same mode as
it had in most of the 1960s, but this approach was soundly rejected by the new
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administration, in preference for a minimalist approach to space. Lambright and
Van Nijnatten captured the mood of the era accurately when they made the
following assessment:
The heroic years of NASA were followed in the 1970s by less-spectacular
actions in a very different decade. NASA may have wanted to go to Mars,
but political leaders and the general public had other priorities. When von
Braun died in 1977, his original step-by-step paradigm continued, but
NASA was back at an earlier point in the trajectory than it had been in
1969.148
President Nixon denied NASA’s plans for a suite of grand projects, instead
asking them to select one project from the list as a consolation. “Faced with a
choice between the Space Transportation System and a space station, NASA
officials selected the former. They also decided to pursue the remaining
elements in their unapproved long-range plan incrementally, one by one, waiting
to advance the space station until the shuttle became operational.”149 Nixon
approved the space shuttle plans, but the incredible technical infrastructure
created for the Apollo program was left to wither and die. How did this happen?
Why was NASA denied the support it thought it had earned at the very moment
of its greatest triumph? Why did a man who was an advocate of the space
program slash NASA nearly to the bone and leave it with a vehicle in search of a
mission?
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Early Nixon Presidency

Richard Nixon, who we have seen was an advocate of space exploration when a
presidential candidate in 1960, was again nominated by the Republican Party to
run for president in 1968 against Senator Hubert Humphrey. Nixon campaigned
on the argument that the US should never be second in space, but, like Kennedy,
he did not back up his words with actions once he won the presidency. The
same phenomenon took place under Johnson, before Nixon—Johnson was a
space advocate until he became President, at which point, he oversaw a steady
decline in NASA’s budget, just as Nixon did. And like Kennedy, Nixon would
probably not have addressed space at all, but circumstances forced the issue.
Rather than world events’ forcing a decision on Nixon, it was Johnson who did
so, leaving the formulation of space policy for his successor. James Webb,
NASA Administrator under both Johnson and Kennedy, tried unsuccessfully to
get Johnson to dictate NASA’s future the way Kennedy had done. Webb wanted
the full support of the President, whose leadership would drive political
consensus. Johnson would not comply, and the effect was to make no decision
at all on the strategic direction of NASA. The decision and direction were left for
Nixon to determine. Joan Hoff comments that “this is unsurprising, because
Johnson also deliberately postponed implementing desegregation of southern
schools so that this controversial task would likewise fall on the Nixon watch.
Had it not been for Johnson’s procrastination, Nixon would not have immediately
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turned his attention to space policy.”150 In February 1969, Nixon commissioned a
Space Task Group (STG), which was charged with making recommendations on
the future direction of NASA. However, Nixon had in his mind that he wanted to
reduce NASA for fiscal and political, but also very personal reasons.
Well before the moon landing, Richard Nixon was calculating how he
could minimize the space program’s further influence on popular and
political culture, since he believed—rightly, as it turned out—that the glory
of the moon program would be forever associated with his predecessors
Kennedy and Johnson, whom he loathed.151
Nixon considered shutting NASA down entirely, but he did not want to be the
President who ended human spaceflight, which was very popular after the Apollo
11 success. However, with each successive moon shot, the American people
became less and less interested, television coverage withered after Apollo 11.
Nixon greatly enjoyed being the President when humans first landed on the
moon, which he displayed by grandstanding. For example, several minutes after
the astronauts left the LM to walk on the surface of the moon for the first time in
history, Nixon called Armstrong and Aldrin on the lunar surface in perhaps the
greatest presidential photo opportunity ever. It was, in typical Nixon style,
awkward, but Armstrong, as always, was gracious and found elegant words in
the strangest of situations. It was Nixon’s name, not Kennedy’s, that was etched
on the plaques on the LM legs that were left on the lunar surface, and it was
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Nixon who greeted the Apollo 11 astronauts on the deck of the USS Hornet on
their arrival back on Earth. The political benefits for Nixon bestowed by NASA
and the crew of Apollo 11 and of subsequent moon landings were incalculable,
but Nixon persisted in believing that the landings would be Kennedy’s legacy,
which he could not tolerate. Accordingly, Nixon cancelled the scheduled Apollos
18, 19, and 20, even though the money had already been spent in building the
Saturn V launch vehicles and Apollo CSM and LMs for the three missions.
Nixon, while frugal, was even more petty. As we will see, Nixon took the findings
of the STG, which advocated NASA’s vision of a grand plan designed to garner
unparalleled scientific knowledge and national prestige, and put it in his desk
drawer, where it sat for six months before he enunciated his own vision of US
space policy.

Changing Culture and Language

To be fair to him, Nixon took office in a vastly different America than the one he
would have presided over had he won in 1960. 1969 was shaping up to be the
most turbulent period in US history since the Civil War. Civil unrest,
assassinations of public figures, and a general feeling that the anger and
dissatisfaction felt by much of the nation were about to boil over gripped the
country.
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When Kennedy took office, he promised a New Frontier, seizing upon a uniquely
American trope—Frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier metaphor. Turner, a 19th
century historian, delivered a seminal paper, “The Significance of the Frontier in
American History,” to the American Historical Association in 1893, which argued
that the spirit and success of the United States were directly tied to the country's
westward expansion in the 19th century, that the forging of the unique American
identity occurred in the crucible between the civilization of settlement and the
savagery of wilderness, and that taming the wild had developed American
strength, individuality, and exceptionalism. The idea of American
Exceptionalism, which still persists, was first suggested in Turner’s paper, which
swept the nation’s intelligentsia and became a dominant concept. Because of
the frontier experience, Americans were no longer Europeans, but had become
“rugged individualists,” and this unique national experience engendered the
characteristics of the American persona: egalitarian, democratic, aggressive, and
innovative. Jackson’s thesis argued that every positive quality that Americans
possess had its genesis in the frontier experience, and that the frontier calls on
the adventurous spirit of the American people and offers the promise of change
in society.
This idea was a natural fit for Kennedy, who campaigned for public office on the
image of his youthful strength and the themes of dynamism and change, all of
which set him in stark contrast to Kennedy’s depiction of Nixon as an agent of the
Eisenhower administration’s stasis, entropy, and inaction. During Kennedy’s
speech at Rice University in September of 1962, he promoted the Apollo project
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through appeals to the theme of frontier exploration leading to societal change:
“We set sail on this new sea because there is new knowledge to be gained, and
new rights to be won, and they must be won and used for the progress of all.”152
To Kennedy, at least rhetorically, space was a place to be conquered in the
same way that the mythical frontier of the American West was conquered, and
the benefits would be shared by all. Kennedy’s addresses were rife with frontier
metaphors and the notion that we were involved in a space “race” with the
Soviets. The idea of a “race” evoked the image of the settlement of the US west
in the 19th century: a race to expand to the West Coast, Manifest Destiny, and
the race by settlers to stake out their own territory in the wilderness before it was
settled by more eager homesteaders. Humanity was destined to expand into the
cosmos just as the American settlers were destined to conquer the savage
continent. In a speech celebrating John Glenn’s orbital flight in 1962, Kennedy
employed this motif: “We have a long way to go in the space race. We started
late. But this is the new ocean, and I believe the United States must sail on it and
be in a position second to none.”153 Kennedy’s language had an outward thrust,
just as space exploration was leading humanity outward into the unknown—in
Kennedy’s view, humanity was moving out into space, expanding the frontier into
space, racing into space. And Kennedy was highly effective in inextricably
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harnessing his (and the nation’s) current political situation to the historical
aspirations and ethos of the American people.
The race metaphor was key to this rhetorical edifice. As discussed in Chapter
Two, Kennedy was a competitive individual, as was American society.
Competition drove the American economic system, the American obsession with
sports, and the competition with the Soviets for world domination was intense.
Competition with the Soviets in space, especially in the context of the Cold War,
kept the Americans enthusiastic about the space program, although this
enthusiasm would wane with the decline in tensions that accompanied the
cooling off of the Cold War. The space race metaphor, while invaluable in the
short term to maintain Congress’ and the public’s interest and support, ultimately
doomed NASA’ prospects for continued interest and funding. This is because all
races eventually come to an end.
When the US beat the Soviets to the moon with the Apollo 11 landing, the entire
raison d’être for the space program was invalidated. President Kennedy
challenged the entire nation to beat the Soviets to the moon, and the country
dutifully pitched in, sacrificed, won the race, and enjoyed the outpouring of love
and respect that the feat brought about from the world community. Now the race
was over; the US had won—what was next? Jonathan Allday describes the
situation: “The problem NASA faced was the perception that Apollo had been
staged primarily as a race against the Soviets. The scientific benefits of the
program were dubious and had not been emphasized. The race had been won.
In order to justify the continual staging of flights, the science now had to be
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stressed.”154 In the late 1960s, the end of the race was the issue that NASA
struggled with—justifying their continued existence and, more importantly, their
large budget in a period of changing priorities and economic hardship.
A Gallup poll conducted in the early 1970s just after the final Apollo landing
indicated that 59% of the American polls favored spending less in space, while
only 7% favored spending more. What is strange about this result was that the
same poll showed that public confidence in the space program was high—people
still loved the space program, but no longer wanted to pay for it.155 Congress
had the same opinion: they liked the results of the space program, but balked at
the high cost. This contradiction would set the stage for a shift in the rationale for
NASA’s justification for its programs from one of national prestige to one of costefficiency as the driving factor. As we will see, this new emphasis on cost drove
the process by which NASA wound up with the space shuttle.
The “Earthrise” photographs from Apollo 8 and similar images from subsequent
Apollo missions affected anyone who witnessed it in person or who saw the
images in a very basic and emotional way. The “Earthrise” image changed the
way that people viewed their home, the planet Earth. A day after the photograph
was published, poet Archibald MacLeish published a short essay on the effects
of seeing the image, titled “Riders on Earth Together, Brothers in Eternal Cold,”
which ended with a line summing up the experience: “To see the earth as it truly
is, small and blue and beautiful in that eternal silence where it floats, is to see
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ourselves as riders on the earth together, brothers on that bright loveliness in the
eternal cold—brothers who know now they are truly brothers.” On Apollo 8 and
subsequent moon shots, astronauts who were religious talked of having religious
experiences when witnessing this sight; those who were not religious had
spiritual reactions or were profoundly affected in other ways. This realization
occurred at the same time that America was waking up spiritually to the
environmental movement, which was called the ecology movement at the time.
The first Earth Day was declared in April of 1972, and President Nixon founded
the Environmental Protection Agency to look after the biosphere, which was now
seen not only as fragile and vulnerable, but under siege from the forces of human
progress. This was part of the larger “awakening” of the younger generation,
who had an innate distrust of government, was virulently anti-war, and harshly
judged the values on which their generation had been raised.
Where earlier generations of Americans had looked outward to progress and an
expansive future, the new generation coming of age in the late 1960s began to
look inward, to look back at Earth, to question ideas that five years earlier had
been taken for granted. A social sensitivity replaced the Cold War mindset.
While some members of Congress began to question the rationale and great
expense of the Apollo program during the early 1960s, that point of view gained
widespread acceptance toward the end of the decade, just as Apollo began to
realize its objectives.
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Although some Republican members of Congress had, in the first few
days after the Gagarin flight, attacked the President for not investing
enough in the space program, by 1963 GOP representatives and senators
had taken to criticizing him for spending too much. In May, for example,
the Senate Republican Policy Committee released a report urging that
Apollo be scaled back and that the money be redirected to—using a
phrase that would be heard more and more frequently in the years
ahead—“problems here on earth.”156
This sentiment grew over the course of the decade until NASA found itself
moving against the flow of popular opinion. Nixon’s first NASA Administrator,
Thomas Paine, either did not realize this disparity or refused to acknowledge that
times had changed, and continued to fight for NASA’s budget using the old
Kennedy-era rationale, which no longer was effective. In fact, this approach
served to alienate the Nixon administration rather than to sway it. There is
evidence that some in NASA had seen the cultural shift and recognized that the
rules had changed. George Low became NASA Deputy Administrator in
December 1969 and saw firsthand the cultural changes and the stress that they
placed on NASA administration. He was a key player in the fight for the space
shuttle, and his personal notes, preserved within the NASA History Office
archives, give us an inside view into this turbulent period in NASA history. Low’s
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observation on the difference between the NASA of the 1960s and the NASA of
the 1970s is startling in its prescience, coming as it did in 1970:
In the 1960’s, the country was definitely looking outward, and national
priorities included the Apollo goal, because this would establish clearly in
our minds and in the minds of the world technological leadership by the
United States. Therefore, the single-purpose goal was to beat the
Russians to the moon. Everything else in space flight was tacked onto
this goal. The situation in the beginning of the 1970’s is very different.
We are now an introspective nation. We will do only those things that help
ourselves and help ourselves at an early date. We’re looking inward
rather than outward. This is why anything we say about the environment
or the quality of life or ecology has a great deal of appeal, as does health,
education, and welfare, while both national defense and space have very
little appeal. Space, in particular, has received very negative opinions on
every poll that has recently been conducted and, of course, the very close
vote in the Senate also bears this out.157
Not only did Low perceive the shift, but he also foresaw the role that NASA would
take in the future. It was no longer sufficient to explore space and achieve
wondrous objectives, or, for that matter, to win a victory for the nation in a quasimilitary competition.

George Low, Personal Notes No. 27, July 18, 1970, NASA Historical Office
archives, pages 13-14.
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It is clear, therefore, that if we are to move forward with a strong space
program, it, too, must be useful to the people here on earth. This means
that a space applications program and, specifically, an earth resources
program should be the keystone for the space effort of the 1970’s. It is
also clear that a strong United States must continue manned flights and,
therefore, there must be some association between the manned
spaceflight program and the earth resources programs.158
President Nixon certainly recognized this cultural shift, since he was one of the
foci at the center of the storm. Nixon’s 1969 inaugural address reflected this
cultural shift and also manifested his preference for diplomatic cooperation rather
than direct competition.
Those who would be our adversaries, we invite to a peaceful competition-not in conquering territory or extending dominion, but in enriching the life
of man.
As we explore the reaches of space, let us go to the new worlds together-not as new worlds to be conquered, but as a new adventure to be shared.
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With those who are willing to join, let us cooperate to reduce the burden of
arms, to strengthen the structure of peace, to lift up the poor and the
hungry.159
Nixon’s rhetoric in his first Inaugural Address thrusts out into space, only to turn
and look back at the Earth, where space should be used not to compete, but to
solve the problems of the people of the planet. (Interestingly, this rhetorical Uturn co-opts the promises of communism to create a global community in which
want and greed are both conquered as all receive just enough to be satisfied.) In
finishing his Inaugural address, Nixon discusses the effects of and the lessons
learned from the Apollo 8 mission:
Only a few short weeks ago we shared the glory of man's first sight of the
world as God sees it, as a single sphere reflecting light in the darkness.
As the Apollo astronauts flew over the moon's gray surface on Christmas
Eve, they spoke to us of the beauty of earth—and in that voice so clear
across the lunar distance, we heard them invoke God's blessing on its
goodness.
...
In that moment of surpassing technological triumph, men turned their
thoughts toward home and humanity—seeing in that far perspective that
man's destiny on earth is not divisible; telling us that however far we reach
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into the cosmos, our destiny lies not in the stars but on earth itself, in our
own hands, in our own hearts.160
After he describes the Apollo 8 astronauts’ transcendental experience in spiritual
terms, we understand that Nixon, too, has been touched by the Earthrise
experience (or at least his speechwriters were). Nixon again evokes the
“outward-inward” motif here in stating that by reaching for the stars, we have
been able to see Earth (and its problems) with clarity. And by implication, these
problems are those that should occupy our attention.
While the Apollo 11 astronauts were still on the moon, Nixon spoke to students
about the meaning of the moon landing, using the same U-turn motif:
I realize the kind of teamwork, the kind of scientific achievement, the kind
of idealism that we saw in that space shot, that landing on the moon. If we
could just bring all that to bear on the problems here on earth, the
problems of our environment, the problems of adequate food, health, and
shelter, and progress, a fair share for everybody in this earth—if that can
be done, what a world we can create.161
On the return of the Apollo 11 astronauts to Earth several days later, standing on
the deck of the USS Hornet, Nixon evokes the same motif: “this is the greatest
week in the history of the world since the Creation, because as a result of what
happened this week, the world is bigger, infinitely . . ., [yet] as a result of what
160
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you have done, the world has never been closer together.”162 Several weeks
later, during Nixon’s post-Apollo 11 world tour, he remarked in Bucharest, “I
believe that if human beings can reach the moon, human beings can reach an
understanding with each other.”163 Nixon’s other usages of this trope when
discussing the space program in his public remarks are too numerous to list here
and the analysis of them could fill a book. Suffice it to say, the President was not
only aware of the cultural shift and its relationship to the US space program, but
he had also internalized the underlying concept and had begun to think of the US
space program in those terms. Linda Krug summarizes this new understanding
of the relationship between the space program and the American people:
It takes us from the realization that the discovery of the moon cannot
occur without a simultaneous discovery of the earth, it brings us face to
face with the understanding that our quest for understanding is a mainstay
of American character, and it forces us to accept that we have moved
beyond the pioneering stage and must now work on improving our
efforts.164
After ignoring the STG report, Nixon finally released a statement on space policy
on March 7, 1970. Here, Nixon continues usage of the “outward-inward”
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metaphor of having to go into space to be able to truly see the Earth. This time,
however, he uses it to define US space policy:
Over the last decade, the principal goal of our nation's space program has
been the moon. By the end of that decade men from our planet had
traveled to the moon on four occasions and twice they had walked on its
surface. With these unforgettable experiences, we have gained a new
perspective of ourselves and our world.
I believe these accomplishments should help us gain a new perspective of
our space program as well. Having completed that long stride into the
future which has been our objective for the past decade, we must now
define new goals which make sense for the Seventies. We must build on
the successes of the past, always reaching out for new achievements.
But we must also recognize that many critical problems here on this planet
make high priority demands on our attention and our resources. By no
means should we allow our space program to stagnate. But—with the
entire future and the entire universe before us—we should not try to do
everything at once. Our approach to space must continue to be bold—but
it must also be balanced.165
Nixon’s new argument is that in going forward, the space program should
continue to be “bold,” but “balanced.” That is, the US space program needed to
aspire to great achievements, but it also needed to take its place alongside other
Nixon, "Statement About the Future of the United States Space Program,"
March 7, 1970.
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national priorities, like pressing social and economic issues—space projects
needed to “take their place within a rigorous system of national priorities,” among
which are “many critical problems here on this planet make high priority demands
on our attention and our resources.”
In this policy statement, Nixon lays out the three goals that the US program must
accomplish moving forward under his administration. The first purpose was
exploration; the second purpose was the attainment of scientific knowledge (“a
greater systematic understanding about ourselves and our universe”); and the
third was a practical application, of “turning the lessons we learn in space to the
early benefit of life on earth.” He goes on to say that “these lessons will not apply
themselves; we must make a concerted effort to see that the results of our space
research are used to the maximum advantage of the human community.”166
In the same policy statement, Nixon goes on to discuss the specific objectives of
US space policy in his administration. He lays out six goals that NASA should
accomplish. The first is that the US “should continue to explore the moon,”
which we did for the next two years; however, Nixon’s elimination of the final
three planned Apollo lunar landings put a premature end to lunar exploration, and
we have not returned since. The second goal is that NASA “should move ahead
with bold exploration of the planets and the universe,” which it did with the
Voyager, Viking, Mariner, Explorer, and Pioneer probes of the 1970s. Nixon here
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alludes to a human mission to Mars, which he later refused to approve. The third
goal drove the decision-making process that resulted in the space shuttle, when
Nixon decided that NASA “should work to reduce substantially the cost of space
operations.” That the third goal was related to the shuttle program becomes
explicit when Nixon mentions studies underway for a reusable shuttle. The
impulse to reduce costs as a driving force in space policy had adverse
implications, which will be discussed at length later. The fourth goal was that the
US space program “should seek to extend man's capability to live and work in
space,” which was undertaken under the auspices of the Apollo Applications
Program with the launch of Skylab and the three crewed missions to it using
equipment from the cancelled moon missions. The fifth goal is that NASA
“should hasten and expand the practical applications of space technology,”
returning to Nixon’s trope of “outward-inward” and public utility. He argues that
the “very act of reaching into space can help man improve the quality of life on
earth.” The sixth and final objective is that NASA “should encourage greater
international cooperation in space,” a very Nixonian desire to use space as a tool
of foreign policy, which was done during the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) of
1975, and through the various global goodwill tours taken by both Nixon and the
astronauts themselves.167
The US now had a new space policy, one that was markedly different from that of
John Kennedy and distinctly Nixonian. Both policies were products of their time
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and reflected the distinct characteristics of the respective presidents. And
despite the very different global political climate when they were formulated, both
policies were actually born of the Cold War; Kennedy’s came during the most
acrimonious period of the Cold War, and assumed his personal characteristics of
competition, aggression, and confrontation, while Nixon’s space policy was
forged during a “cooler” period of the Cold War, and reflected his preference for
frugality, diplomacy, and international cooperation. Each also reflected the tenor
of the times: Kennedy’s came during a period of world polarization and out of a
US need for “battle” with their mortal foe, the Soviet Union; in contrast, Nixon’s
policy was formulated during a period in which domestic issues largely trumped
international ones—the US, weary of a long war in Vietnam, sought to take care
of the ailing social and political infrastructure at home.
Another entry from George Low’s personal notes perfectly illustrates the
difference between the times and the strategies that NASA had to adopt in each
in order to thrive. In an addendum to his personal notes from 1970, Low writes:
FY ’72 Strategy
1. Strategy of the ‘60s
a) The American way of life is the best
b) It is of the highest national priority to demonstrate this—and to help
preserve our way of life where it is endangered.
c) We will do this with force if necessary.
d) Since the Soviets have selected space as an arena to demonstrate
their state of technology, we must compete in that arena—we must
clearly demonstrate our preeminence there.
e) (should have been ‘a’) Given—the Soviet Union offers a real threat
to us and our way of life
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2. Question—Can we measure results? Did our beating the Russians to
the moon have the desired effect?
3. Situation in 1970
a) There are domestic problems (and an awareness thereof) that did
not exist in 1960.
i. Opposition to war
ii. Campus unrest
iii. Integration
iv. Environment and quality of life
b) Soviets [are] no longer a threat
c) We have demonstrated superiority in space
4. Strategy for ‘70s
Alternative 1– Assume continued international competition (demonstration)
is required to keep US viable and young
– Military intervention (i.e., SE Asia) is fruitless
– Let us firmly establish space as an arena for international
demonstrations—i.e., let us stay first and best
Alternative 2– The country wants to look “inward”—no interest in “being
first,” “preeminence,” etc.
– Space can contribute to that inward look
– Let us establish a program that derives the maximum from
space to solve our domestic problems168

Once again, Low’s perceptive eye has captured the spirit of both ages and has
preserved them for posterity.
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The Space Task Group Report

In early 1969, the new President called for a Space Task Group (STG) to reduce
NASA costs, to determine options for the post-Apollo period, and to look for ways
to increase international cooperation. The team, chaired by Vice President Spiro
Agnew, was to study the situation for six months and report back to Nixon. The
STG planned to issue its report in September, ostensibly in time to influence the
1971 Fiscal Year budget process; however, the budget process was being
conducted in parallel to the STG study. The newly appointed NASA
Administrator, Tom Paine, saw this timing as an opportunity to lobby Agnew, and
by extension, Nixon, on a very expensive crewed Mars mission. In doing so,
Paine overestimated both Agnew’s and NASA’s clout with Nixon, but he
stubbornly refused to see that the environment for post-Apollo projects had
changed drastically. Bureau of the Budget (BoB) director Robert Mayo had
repeatedly stressed the new budgetary reality, but Paine brushed off his advice.
Paine refused to follow BoB reporting procedures and demands, believing that
NASA was so popular that it was entitled to continue to receive its historically
large outlays. Joan Hoff reports that Paine’s arrogance was both evident and
unprecedented: “He ignored BoB’s requests for budget analysis not once, but
twice in the spring and fall of 1969. That Paine’s efforts were poor in this regard
was evident from the moment that he tried to comply with the STG for its longrange plans.”169
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While the STG was undertaking their study, Paine bypassed them and
approached Nixon directly, urging him to publicly release a space policy that
included a Mars mission before the Soviets announced their space station
initiative (or before the STG study had been completed). Nixon did not like
Paine’s imperious demeanor, nor did he care to deal directly with people outside
his inner circle of advisors. Nixon’s inner circle advised him not to respond to
Paine’s attempt to subvert the process, so Paine decided to take a different tack.
He began attempts to influence the STG group’s findings, alienating both the
BoB officials and Nixon’s aides, the very two groups Paine would need to have
on his side in order to get his way with the President. Peter Flanigan, Nixon’s
assistant for internal economic affairs, under whose purview the space program
fell, personally telephoned Paine and “instructed him to stop public advocacy of
early manned Mars activity because it was causing trouble in Congress and
restricting Presidential options.”170
It was becoming clear that Nixon was not in favor of expanding NASA programs,
but rather desired to reduce them. After Nixon made it clear that the new federal
budget would be smaller, special assistant to the president Clay Whitehead, who
had been asked by Flanigan to monitor the NASA budgetary process, reported
back to Flanigan as follows:
As you know, I have expressed in the past some uneasiness about the
review of the future of our space program. My main concern is that NASA
and others will use the enthusiasm generated by a success of Apollo 11 to
170
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create very strong pressures on the President to commit him and the
Nation prematurely to a large and continuing space budget.171
Whitehead also expressed the belief that Nixon wanted to reduce NASA’s budget
from $3.7 billion in 1970 to below $3 billion (and perhaps as low as $2.5 billion) in
1971.172 This impulse would be addressed by BoB director Mayo, who was
unwilling to reduce NASA’s budget to $2.5 billion. Mayo began an internal BoB
study that started with the $3.7 billion allocation for 1970 and explored the
consequences of reducing it further. The first option, estimated at $3.5 billion a
year, cancelled the nuclear engine, NERVA, and closed the Saturn V and Apollo
production lines, but kept Skylab, with three crewed visits, and six Apollo moon
missions. This option would also allow for a space shuttle and a permanent
space station by the end of the 1970s. A second budget option, priced at $2.5
billion, continued Skylab, again with three crewed visits, six Apollo lunar
missions, and a permanent space station, carried into orbit on Titan IIIs and
using Gemini capsules for transportation to and from; however, it would not
provide a space shuttle, and the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville would
close. A third price point, at $1.5 billion, would take NASA out of human
spaceflight altogether after Apollo 14; Marshall, the Manned Spacecraft Center in
Houston, and the Saturn facilities at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida would
all be shuttered; but NASA would still be able to maintain its robotic missions,
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with six Viking Mars landers, and a Voyager mission to the outer planets of the
solar system.173
By early September, the STG report was complete. Committee member Russell
Drew was selected to brief the President at a meeting on September 15. “Nixon
listened attentively, and met as well with STG members and observers, giving
them opportunities to comment.”174 The report recommended that NASA neither
pursue a crewed Mars mission by 1981 (it was listed as an “eventual” mission,
which is how Nixon would describe it in his later space policy statement), nor
abandon human spaceflight altogether; Nixon agreed with both of these
recommendations. The STG instead set out three options, one that would grow
NASA’s budget to $9.4 billion by 1980, a second that would grow the budget to
$7.65 billion by the same date, and a third that would grow the budget to $5.5
billion. In its report, the STG favored the $9.4 billion option, but the task force
eventually settled on the low figure. The report did not list specific
recommendations on programs, but instead mentioned possibilities: a trip to
Mars; extension of moon missions and a permanent lunar base; a permanent
space station; and a space shuttle.
While the report did not make specific suggestions, it did provide the following
guidelines for post-Apollo programs:
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Focus: Develop new systems for space operations with emphasis upon
the critical factors of: commonality, (2) reusability, and (3) economy.
Exploration and exploitation of space is costly with our current generation
of expendable launch vehicles and spacecraft systems. This is particularly
true for the manned flight program. Recovery and launch costs will
become on even more significant factor when multiple re-visit and
resupply missions to on Earth orbiting space station are contemplated.
Future developments should emphasize:
Commonality - the use of a few major systems for a wide variety of
missions.
Reusability - the use of the same system over a long period for a number
of missions.
Economy - for example, the reduction in the number of "throw away"
elements in any mission; the reduction in the number of new
developments required; the development of new program principles that
capitalize on such capabilities as man-tending of space facilities; and the
commitment to simplification of space hardware.175
This three-part recommendation would become the driving force behind the
space shuttle—it was a single system with many uses, it would be reusable, and
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it was supposed to be economical. These three elements were the overriding
criteria for designing the next generation of crewed systems, and would affect
NASA for the next forty years.
William Burrows observes that the most vital part of the STG report is its defense
of human spaceflight:
The manned flight program permits vicarious participation by the man-inthe-street in exciting, challenging, and dangerous activity. Sustained high
interest, judged in the light of current experience, however, is related to
availability of new tasks and new mission activity—new challenges for
man in space. 176
The STG report reinforces the idea that humans that perform “heroic tasks” in
space is mandatory to maintaining the interest and support of the public.
Robotic missions are cheaper and safer than crewed missions, but human
spaceflight keeps the public interested in NASA.
Two weeks after the meeting, BoB director Mayo advised Nixon not to endorse
any of the STG recommendations, because his support would cause increased
NASA budgets and result in the President losing “effective fiscal control of the
program.”177 Any endorsements should come after review by the other
government stakeholders. Nixon took the advice and put the report in his desk
drawer, not making a decision on space policy for another six months.
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Eventually, Nixon would reject all of the STG suggestions, save one. Although
the space shuttle is listed in the STG report as one of the potential options,
through a series of related decisions, it became the sole item of negotiation for
NASA and its only hope of continuing human spaceflight; what had been
conceived as a support vehicle for other programs would have to be justified as a
standalone project.

The Economic Case for the Shuttle

Richard Nixon sought to change the way that the nation spent its money. He
reorganized the BoB to give it more power to manage and evaluate government
programs. The new organization, called the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), would not only evaluate departmental budgets, but would also measure
the effectiveness of the departments and programs. The OMB would have a
much greater voice in the budgeting process than did the BoB, which was
already a powerful group. Nixon, ever frugal, would now have increased control
over how the government spent the people’s money.
This change came at a time of need. Inflation was very high, spending on the
war and on social programs was draining the federal coffers, and Nixon felt that
drastic cuts in spending were urgently required. Domestic politics also played a
role in this belief. Nixon was one of the few presidents of the 20th century, along
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with George H. W. Bush, whose party did not control at least one house of
Congress, so he was more susceptible to spending matters, since Congress
controlled the purse strings. Majorities in both houses of Congress, regardless of
party affiliation, were opposed to the current level of spending on space when
there were more pressing social and domestic matters to address. As a result,
Nixon “was constantly trying to co-opt liberal opinion on certain issues, such as
welfare, to minimize liberal opposition to the war”178 and to garner support for
other legislation in the Congress. Nixon was not about to continue, or to
increase, as Tom Paine had wished, NASA’s budget, which was seen by the
public as too costly, although they were pleased with the results. Just as
Johnson had found before him, Nixon knew that prosecuting the war and tending
to social issues did not leave much desire or money left for the space program,
which many critics saw as an unnecessary expense.
Where Kennedy had a space program that drove a budget, Nixon’s situation
dictated a budget that drove a space program. Coming on the heels of a huge
political boost to Nixon from the Apollo lunar landings, the budget he supported
reflected the reality that Nixon did not desire to get out of the space business
altogether—he did not want to be the president who ended human space flight (a
dilemma that continues to confront contemporary presidents). Because of the
mounting budget pressures and the desire to retain human spaceflight, the cost
of the program became a paramount concern. NASA budgets would be lower for
the near future, and NASA had to adjust to the new reality. The new procedures
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put in place by the OMB regarding the budgeting process gave the OMB more
power; they now played an active role in the budgeting process. In addition to
having an abrasive personality, NASA Administrator Paine did not understand
the old rules, and had even more difficulty understanding the new ones.
Neither Paine nor [his successor] Fletcher seemed to grasp the necessity
of not only complying with, but actually understanding the new cost
accounting methods instituted by the Johnson, Nixon, and Carter
administrations. Neither grasped the importance of knowing the with
whom in the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) and later the office of the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) they absolutely had to maintain
relations in order to receive serious consideration for their projects during
the complicated process that went into determining the yearly expenses of
government.179
It was quite clear that Paine was not James Webb, who, while admittedly
operating in a more NASA-friendly environment, had understood the intricacies of
the budgeting process from his time spent at BoB under President Harry S
Truman. In addition, Webb knew how the political portion of the budgeting game
was played; although Kennedy did not like Webb personally (he felt Webb spoke
too much), Webb, much like Lyndon Johnson, was an excellent politician. Paine,
on the other hand, came to NASA from General Electric, where he was a Ph.D.holding metallurgist and then a manager with no prior political experience. Paine
made few friends in Nixon’s administration or in the OMB, and his departure in
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September of 1970 was viewed with relief by the Nixon administration. In a
memo to Peter Flanigan, Clay Whitehead lays out what the Nixon administration
needed from the next NASA administrator:
We need a new Administrator who will turn down NASA's empire-building
fervor and turn his attention to (1) sensible straightening away of internal
management and (2) working with OMB and White House to show us
what broad but concrete alternatives the President has that meet all his
various objectives. In short, we need someone who will work with us
rather than against us, and will seek progress toward the President's
stated goals, and will shape the program to reflect credit on the President
rather than embarrassment.180
The exit of Paine left Deputy Director George Low as the interim director of
NASA during arguably the most critical phase in NASA’s history.
Shuttle proponents at NASA found themselves in a bind. When the shuttle was
first proposed in the 1960s, it was part of an overall system, one that could ferry
equipment and people to and from a permanent space station. When it became
apparent that NASA would not gain approval for both the space station and
space shuttle, NASA was forced to find another rationale that would justify the
cost of the new system to the taxpayers. The STG report dictated that any new
system would have to be utilitarian, reusable, and economical. The shuttle as
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envisioned was utilitarian—it could carry up to 7 astronauts into LEO, and had
the capability for both deploying satellites and retrieving satellites that needed
repair. It was reusable: the orbiter, taking the form of a space plane, could be
used repeatedly, unlike the current Apollo system and its predecessors, all
single-use systems. Some of the shuttle designs used a fly-back, piloted first
stage on which the orbiter would be carried into orbit, also reusable. “Neither the
space station nor [NASA’s] exploration goals had been approved, however, so
NASA officials adopted a more utilitarian rationale. They turned to Earth-bound
arguments, in particular the cost effectiveness of the system for delivering
payloads into orbit. They promised to make the shuttle cost-effective when in
fact their primary motivation for building it was not economic.”181 The shuttle
would be expensive to build. It featured all-new technology, new materials, and
new techniques, some of which had yet to be invented. “One internal NASA
memo set initial development costs at $10 billion to $13 billion. In order to get
the shuttle program approved, NASA executives felt obliged to propose a shuttle
design with start-up costs estimated at only $5.5 billion, which required rocket
engineers to [eventually] substitute two liquid-fueled boosters for the reusable
first stage.”182 Although shuttle reusability would cut down on recurring costs, the
R& D costs were not in line with the Nixon administration’s budget priorities.
Interim Director Low’s personal papers indicate that he fully understood the
budget situation. In January of 1970, he wrote that “The entire budget situation
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has been tremendously confused. It is clear that in this period of inflation, the
president has to balance the budget and this, of course, is the right thing to
do.”183 All concerned parties clearly saw little chance that NASA’s budget would
be increased under Nixon, who only increased budgets in response to a crisis.
Though some at NASA might have disagreed, he did not feel that the space
program was in a crisis, even with drastically reduced funding.184 Low found this
out first hand from National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, who told Low that
“both he [Kissinger] and the President were very much for the space program
and all that it represented. However, he indicated that at this time period, it was
difficult for the President to support it publicly or to support it with large amounts
of funds because of the overall economic situation in the country.”185
Within this new reality, Low searched for a way to fit the shuttle into the fiscally
constrained budget, and the high development costs made this a difficult feat.
Several days later, Low decided that shuttle functionality should be weighed
against development costs, and that cost should be the main driver of the design:
We really need to state only one objective for the space shuttle: to develop
a low-cost space transportation system. This implies that we must have
low development costs as well as low operational costs. . . . The other
factors that we have previously stated, such as cross-range, go around
George Low, Personal Notes No. 5, January 17, 1970, NASA Historical Office
archives, page 1.
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capability, fly-back capability, and even payload weight and size, should
be categorized as requirements and not as objectives. Many of these
requirements will be in conflict with the basic objectives and should
therefore be examined in terms of overall cost before they are included.186
Much of this would be revisited when taking into account the Department of
Defense’s (DoD) requirements. NASA officials found themselves in the
unfamiliar territory of selling the space shuttle to the White House, the OMB, and
Congress on an economic basis rather than on the strength of capabilities and
occupant safety, which were the traditional deciding factors. In past project
funding cycles, cost had been a factor, but not the determining factor. The Apollo
program also weighed time of development very heavily due to the priority of
beating the Soviets to the moon. In short, with the Apollo program, time was
more important than cost.
The present budget situation had reversed the paradigm. Economic factors now
drove the decisions, and they took primacy over other factors; the space shuttle
was being sold like a commodity, as a system that would drive down costs rather
than provide superior capabilities and safety. Suddenly, the shuttle became a
way to drive down launch costs for everything related to space exploration and
research:
NASA officials sought to package the program in a way that fit the new
ethic surrounding US space policy, which meant emphasizing its
George Low, Personal Notes No. 6, January 24, 1970, NASA Historical Office
archives, pages 1-2.
186

144

economic benefits. A reusable spacecraft, they argued, would
dramatically lower launch costs (as low as $100 per pound), thereby
providing “routine access to space.” This, in turn, would open up the
space environment to more users than ever before: commercial
opportunities and scientific research, for example, would be greatly
expanded. In addition, since its costs were to be below that of expendable
launch vehicles, the shuttle could be used to launch satellites (including
those of the Department of Defense, a key selling point) and deep-space
probes, as well as to repair, maintain, and even return objects from earth
orbit.187
Out of this drive to sell the shuttle on an economic basis originated the mantra of
“cheap and routine access to space.” The promise of cheap and routine access
to space sold the idea of the space shuttle (and this promise continues to drive
NASA and the NewSpace markets). Part of this argument was directed not just
at Nixon, his advisors, and Congress, but at the American people, who were
convinced that the government had been spending too much money in space. It
was not just NASA advancing this public relations campaign, but also space
advocates, who were also lobbying for an increased American presence in
space. Howard McCurdy comments on this campaign: “Rather than announce
that they needed larger developmental outlays, space advocates perpetuated the
myth of cheap and easy space flight by announcing that the era had arrived.
Dissent was largely ignored. Optimism prevailed. The public, as a result, was
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largely unprepared for a catastrophe.”188 The idea of a shuttle was sold as not
only a cheaper and easier, but a safer, means of access to space. This idea later
came crashing down to Earth after the Challenger accident in 1986; the shuttle
had proven not to be cheap, routine, or even very safe.
Roger Launius notes this subtle shift in the economic argument for the shuttle,
one that he points out has affected the cost of space access ever since.
As a result of deliberations between NASA and the White House’s Office
of Management and Budget, the question of access to space was shifted
from ‘what is the least costly design for access to space’ to ‘what design
will provide low-cost access to space.’ As a result, NASA’s rationale for
the Shuttle become much narrower; and instead of talking about the
benefits of the vehicle in toto, its rationale became just that it be low
cost.189
This new emphasis, as we will see, caused NASA to offset costs by raising the
number of planned flights for each shuttle, thereby presumably taking advantage
of economies of scale. Since the shuttle would be too expensive to massproduce, the number of flights per year had to be increased to drive the price
down. The combination of reducing development costs, thereby forcing design
compromises, and increasing the frequency of flights in a system that would be
anything but routine, would unnecessarily decrease the safety of the shuttle itself.
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Using the analogy of the airline industry to paint the space program as another
potentially competitive market, shuttle advocates claimed that the US
government had subsidized the airline industry until the equipment became
sound enough and the flights numerous enough for the industry to become
profitable and self-sufficient, and prices were thus driven down. This argument
was used to sell the space shuttle, and to claim that the shuttle would drive down
the cost of access to space. This was an incorrect analogy—the forces acting on
a shuttle are manifestly greater than those acting on an airliner. As a direct result
of this simple fact, space flight is inherently more dangerous, more difficult, and
more expensive than operating an airline. The thinking that drove the
comparison with the aviation industry was found to be faulty by the Rogers
Commission that investigated the Challenger accident; the unrealistic launch
schedule was found to be a potentially contributing factor because it greatly
increased the stresses on the materials and system as a whole.
In addition to the argument for savings coming from an increased number of
launches, NASA began to look at how the revenues that would be received for
launching payloads would drive down the costs of operation. In effect, the space
shuttle could be a profitable delivery service, taking the place of the ELVs
currently in use. George Low notes this concept in an entry in his personal notes
from March of 1970: “[M]uch of the cost savings for the shuttle will come from
payload savings, as opposed to coming from the savings in operational costs.
This makes it mandatory once again that all of NASA’s payloads should be
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planned for the space shuttle.”190 While Low argues here for all of NASA’s
payloads to be launched by the shuttle, the thinking eventually turned to the
shuttle carrying commercial payloads, as well as all military payloads, which we
discuss below.
Not everyone at NASA was on board with the reduced cost rationale for the
shuttle. According to Low, Wernher von Braun, who originated the space shuttle
concept, was ironically not a supporter of the shuttle idea, and might have even
opposed it. Apparently, von Braun felt that NASA estimates for developing the
shuttle were unrealistic and that NASA could not afford it.191 As it turned out von
Braun was correct; NASA could afford neither the development nor the
operations of the shuttle, and as we will see in Chapter Four, the high cost of the
shuttle was to hobble NASA for thirty years.

Mathematica, Inc.

The stagnant state of the US economy, a declining public and congressional
opinion of the necessity for a large space program, and a frugal President
determined to get the US budget under control all contributed to a reduction of
NASA’s budget request by one billion dollars, with more cuts likely on the way; as
a result, NASA abandoned plans for a space station and instead focused solely
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on the shuttle. The new focus on a balanced US budget and the requirements of
the newly-formed OMB had forced NASA to justify the shuttle on an economic
basis. George Low commented on this rationale in retrospect in 1979 in a letter
to John Logsdon:
The economic analysis was something that we were forced to do by the
OMB, and it was probably wrong from the beginning for NASA to accept
this approach. A major capability in space, like the shuttle, should not be
sold purely on economic grounds, and, yet, once we had started the
economic analysis, it was very difficult not to be wedded to it.192
To provide data to support its new rationale for the shuttle’s providing cheaper
and more routine access to LEO, NASA turned to a Princeton, NJ, think tank
called Mathematica. Mathematica performed an economic feasibility study for
the space shuttle in 1971, which was conducted by economist Klaus Heiss. The
study, which cost NASA $600,000, concluded that by conducting a particular
number of flights per year, the shuttle could in fact save NASA money over ELVs,
and these findings were used to justify the shuttle on economic grounds. The
issue is that Mathematica’s original findings did not justify the expense, so NASA
instructed them “to recalculate the savings based on an almost mind-boggling
714 flights over that twelve-year period, or a little more than a flight a week with
each flight carrying a 65,000-pound payload. The numbers were being bent with
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desperation.”193 Later in the decision process Heiss determined that a particular
configuration of the shuttles called TAOS (Thrust Assisted Orbiter Shuttle) would
work under the budgetary conditions; this configuration involved an orbiter with
engines, an external tank large enough to allow the orbiter engines to burn from
liftoff to orbit, and two external strap-on boosters, which could be either liquid- or
solid-fueled, would fall away at staging velocity.194 While the Mathematica study
was flawed in estimating the number of flights needed per year to achieve
economic savings, whether due to Heiss or NASA’s dictum, Heiss was
successful later in identifying the ultimate configuration of the shuttle. The liquidfueled boosters were eventually abandoned in favor of solids in order to keep
development costs down; solids were cheaper and less complicated, but unlike
liquid-fueled boosters, could not be shut down in an emergency.
The assumptions going into the study were flawed. Rather than deriving a
realistic number of flights per year for each orbiter, and calculating costs from
that, Heiss was ordered to start with a desired figure of savings and determining
the number of flights that it would take to achieve those numbers. The number of
flights used to justify building the shuttle was unrealistically high, as high as 55
flights a year—in reality, the shuttle program was never able to achieve more
than 9 launches, which it did in 1985 with 3 of the 4 existing orbiters. George
Low later surmised that the Mathematica study had an “influential and
unfortunate” effect on the shuttle decision because it supported the idea that the
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shuttle was a great investment strictly on financial terms.195 Heppenheimer
comments,
The work of Mathematica was brilliant. If its sole purpose had been to
allow one of Klaus Heiss's graduate students to win a PhD, it would have
succeeded magnificently. At the OMB, however, key people hardly
believed a word of it.196
The shuttle remained in limbo, without a sponsor in the Nixon administration,
Congress, or in the OMB. The administration wanted a cheaper version of the
shuttle, and the task was to find a way to build a program with the available
budget.

The Grand Compromise

During the early days of the Space Shuttle design in the 1960s, many types of
design ideas were developed. The early thinking was that the permanent space
station would be put into orbit by Saturn-class boosters, not by the shuttle itself.
The shuttle was “merely a handmaiden, a logistics vehicle that was poorly
defined,” according to Heppenheimer.197 By 1970, the shuttle was the main
vehicle pursued by NASA, and the Saturn boosters were exceedingly rare due to
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budget cuts and production line closings. Any space station would now need to
be built in modules, which increased the importance of the shuttle. With the
postponement of the station, the shuttle needed to become an all-purpose
vehicle, fulfilling the STG report’s utility mandate. NASA would now need to find
other customers aside from NASA for its payload launch services. They would
turn to two other sources: commercial enterprises, such as telecommunications
companies, and the Department of Defense (DoD).
NASA’s relation with the DoD stretched back to before its founding in 1958. In
1955, when Eisenhower was formulating the first national space policy, there was
a strong military/defense link with space. Eisenhower wanted, among other
things, a reconnaissance satellite program run by the CIA and ICBMs for delivery
of the US nuclear arsenal. The reconnaissance satellites would be put into orbit
by ICBMs, which would become dual-use systems. Eisenhower would pursue
this military objective under the guise of a civilian program. Project Vanguard
was a Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) endeavor managed and designed by
civilians, and headed by Milt Rosen. The project featured a launcher that was
designed for civilian purposes, and integrated from other rockets, including the
scientific-use Viking; Vanguard was given a civilian/science public face. Wernher
von Braun’s team in Huntsville, part of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA)
had a superior launcher, the Jupiter-C, but it was a version of the Army’s
Redstone missile, and von Braun’s team was inextricably linked with the Third
Reich, all of which constituted a public-relations risk. It was only after the
Vanguard test flight failed on live television that von Braun was given permission
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to use his system, which he had been developing in secret, and, working with
MIT and JPL, his team put Explorer-1 into orbit on January 31, 1958.
Eisenhower insisted that the proposed NASA space agency be a civilian
organization, but it retained strong military ties. The early launchers were all
modified ICBMs, and the astronauts were all military test pilots. The various
branches of the US military also pursued separate space programs, although in
1956 the Army was limited to tactical missiles with a maximum 200-mile range.
When NASA was created on October 1, 1958, it was given NACA, the Army’s
JPL, part of the Army’s ABMA (including the von Braun team), and parts of the
Navy’s NRL. The Saturn-class of rockets started as the Army’s Super Jupiter
design and its F-1 engines began as an Air Force project. While NASA was not
a military organization, it had military genes.
In February 1961, the DoD signed an agreement with NASA that moving forward,
neither organization would develop a new launch system without “seeking the
consent” of the other.198 Heppenheimer also reports that between 1958 and
1964, the DoD and NASA signed 88 major agreements binding them together,
including a joint Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board (AACB) that
coordinated launch vehicles, spacecraft, and crewed space flight, and that in
1966, the AACB researched concepts for reusable launch vehicles.199 In light of
this relationship, it is not surprising that NASA turned to the DoD for support in
their quest to win budgetary support for their new launch vehicle, the shuttle.
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While the economic studies could be massaged to show the cost savings that the
shuttle promised, the OMB was not convinced. There were simply not enough
NASA payloads to justify the number of flights dictated by the economic
analyses. NASA needed another customer or partner that would rely on the
shuttle. NASA also needed an ally in their struggle, especially one that had
significant clout and intimately knew the political process that had to be navigated
in order to get the shuttle approved; that the Air Force had deep pockets and
could help to pay for the staggering development costs made this partnership an
even better fit. That ally would prove to be the DoD—NASA would need the
support and development money of the DoD if they were to stay in the human
spaceflight business.
NASA determined that they would need to carry all of the DoD’s payloads to
justify the shuttle. George Low documents this reality in his discussions with Bob
Seamans, who had served as NASA Associate Administrator, Co-Chair of the
AACB, and who now served as the Secretary of the Air Force; Low reports after
a meeting with Seamans in late January of 1970 that Seamans “would not be
able to support the space shuttle unless NASA would work jointly with the Air
Force on it to meet Air Force requirements.” He adds that “on the technical
subjects, Bob and I saw eye-to-eye in that we both believe the most important
thing is to build a shuttle that will get economical space operations for both the
Air Force and for NASA. We also both agree[d] that we should not so over-
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specify the shuttle that we [would] never be able to build one.”200 The shuttle
would now have to accommodate not only NASA’s requirements, but those of the
Air Force, which would drastically change its configuration; the tricky part, they
realized, was not to “over-specify” the shuttle. It would have to be even more
utilitarian than had been originally envisioned in order to win and keep a critical
ally. “According to an analysis by the President’s Science Advisory Council
(PSAC), 12 different launch systems could be replaced ‘with a STS used jointly
by both DoD and NASA as a national transportation system capability.’”201 The
shuttle would now need to be economical and satisfy the needs of the DoD—the
game had changed again.
It was vital for NASA to have the support of the Air Force, but the Air Force did
not need the shuttle (or NASA, for that matter) to the same degree. Although the
Air Force had seen their Dyna-Soar winged spacecraft and MOL space station
projects cancelled in the mid-1960s and had no way to put military astronauts
into orbit, they still had several launch systems that could launch their payloads,
which typically consisted of reconnaissance and communications satellites. This
asymmetrical relationship tipped the balance of power in the Air Force’s favor,
and the Air Force was in the perfect position to dictate the terms of the
relationship. As Heppenheimer explains,
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These Air Force leaders knew that they held the upper hand. They were
well aware that NASA needed a shuttle program and therefore needed
both the Air Force's payloads and its political support. The payloads
represented a tempting prize, for that service was launching over two
hundred reconnaissance missions between 1959 and 1970. In addition to
this, Air Force support for a shuttle could insulate NASA quite effectively
from a charge that the Shuttle was merely a step toward sending
astronauts to Mars.202
The shuttle’s capabilities would have to be altered to accommodate those that
the Air Force required, and negotiations between the two entities began.
The two sides met in Williamsburg Virginia, on January 19-20, 1971, to negotiate
requirements, although “negotiate” is too strong a word; NASA, coming from a
much weaker position, conceded to the Air Force everything it wanted. In
addition, the Air Force would not have to contribute to the development process,
but would instead be responsible for building its own launch site at Vandenberg,
called SLC-6. The Air Force had some very specific requests due to the nature
of their payloads. They demanded a 60-foot payload bay, the ability to fly polar
orbits, an 1,100 mile cross-range glide capability and 40,000 pound polar orbit
capacity, and a once-around capability that allowed the shuttle to return to
Vandenberg Air Force Base in California after one orbit. The 60-foot payload bay
was needed to both launch and retrieve the Air Force’s Big Bird reconnaissance
satellites, which were larger than a school bus. Previous reconnaissance
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satellites de-orbited film capsules, which were then snared in flight by a specially
equipped plane, a complicated procedure; the ability to retrieve a spy satellite
from orbit if necessary would be a big plus for the Air Force.
The 1,100-mile cross-range capability was also a key element of shuttle
functionality for several reasons. Spy satellites could weigh up to 40,000 pounds
and typically flew in polar orbits, which involve orbiting from pole to pole rather
than the more common equatorial orbit of communications satellites. In
executing a polar orbit, each orbit of 90 minutes finds the satellite (or shuttle in
this case) approximately 1,100 miles away from its launch point. An 1,100-mile
cross range capability would allow the shuttle to return to Vandenberg after only
one orbit, which is critical since the orbiter/shuttle was designed to glide
unpowered back to Earth after reentry. Because the shuttle would be launching
and retrieving Air Force reconnaissance satellites to observe the Soviet Union,
the ability to fly polar orbits from Vandenberg was a requirement. Another
reason for the cross-range capability would be to ensure that in an emergency
situation, the orbiter would be able to avoid coming down in the Soviet Union or
China.
The Air Force wanted a once-around capability for two reasons. The first was to
be able to abort back to the launch site, which would involve the 1,100 mile cross
range, as described above. It also wanted to use the shuttle’s capabilities to
snatch Soviet satellites from orbit, place them in the payload bay, and return to
Vandenberg after one orbit—the one orbit requirement is essential here to avoid
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any Soviet anti-satellite defenses, and the Air Force thought it best to stay in orbit
as briefly as possible when engaged in such missions.
The 60-foot payload bay would require a more massive and heavier orbiter and
launch system than NASA had been planning, which would drive up costs,
increase complexity, and decrease safety. The 40,000 pound polar orbit carrying
capacity converted into a 65,000 pound equatorial orbit carrying capacity. These
new requirements would ultimately become a benefit when the shuttle carried the
ISS modules into orbit for assembly beginning in the late 1990s, but would
require a different type of design than had been envisioned. The 1,100 mile
cross-range capability would require large delta wings, eliminating the
conventional wings that designer Max Faget had favored, and created a much
larger surface area that would need to be protected from the heat of reentry,
which would be done with thermal tiles, which proved to be extremely
problematic. In addition, delta wings required the shuttle to glide much more
steeply than planned, and perform a flare maneuver just prior to its high-speed
landing. The high landing speeds ruled out most of the world’s landing strips,
since they would be too short to accommodate the shuttle, and put greater stress
on the landing gear and brakes, which would need to be reinforced.
The Air Force would eventually testify to Congress on behalf of the shuttle, and
their support mattered a great deal. NASA would now have the backing and
clout of the Air Force in their corner, but the remaining hurdle was the
requirement to win over the politicians in the OMB and in the White House, which
was an entirely different matter.
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The Shuttle Decision

While Richard Nixon fully embraced the Apollo landings, even becoming part of
the story with strategically placed phone calls and photo ops with the astronauts,
he still would not commit to a future for NASA. He felt that other domestic and
international priorities were more pressing, and decided not to make a decision at
all for an extended period. In an unpublished manuscript on the space shuttle,
John Logsdon wrote of the myriad factors that constrained planning for NASA:
In the final accounting, though, decisions on the future of the space
program were constrained by the overall fiscal situation and by the
President’s priorities as they were expressed through the budget process.
With respect to NASA, there was not any bias on the part of the President
or anybody around the White House. . . . It was just that [Nixon could not]
do all of what NASA was proposing because of the President’s other
priorities and the limited budget resources available.203
Another major factor in play was the personality of Nixon and how the structure
of the White House reflected it.
Nixon did not possess the gregarious personality that Kennedy enjoyed; instead
he was solitary, distrustful, and secretive. He did not like the chaotic
environment of the White House from which Kennedy seemed to draw energy;
Nixon sought order in his White House, and the structure he put in place
Logsdon MS, “From Apollo to Shuttle: Policy Making in the Post-Apollo Era,” V13.
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guaranteed this. According to Nixon’s White House advisors, his personality was
“dominated by two prominent characteristics: a passion for order and a passion
for solitude. Order insures that he receives a regular flow through familiar
channels of the best advice the bureaucracy and his staff can give him. Solitude
insures that when he receives the options he can safely disappear and, in an
atmosphere of studied detachment, arrive at a decision.”204 With little patience
for the distractions of human interaction, Nixon set in place a structure that
restricted White House access to a select few advisors. Where Kennedy
surrounded himself with aides, advisors, and cabinet heads, always seeking
opinions and advice, Nixon worked best when “surrounding himself with
committees and councils, delegating heavy responsibilities to trusted aides, [and]
depending on a staff system of his own design,” and that Nixon “deliberately
sought to isolate himself from the minor irritations of government and husband
his energies for major concerns.”205 Nixon not only spoke with a select few, but
he also delegated many of his decisions to a trusted nucleus of advisors, his
inner circle. This inner circle included White House Chief of Staff H. R.
Haldeman and White House Counsel then Chief Domestic Advisor John
Ehrlichman (both later of Watergate fame), Director of OMB George Shultz, and
Deputy Director of OMB Casper Weinberger (both later members of the Reagan
cabinet), among others. This method of working made it less likely that Nixon
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would act decisively in support of NASA after the STG rendered its report in
1969, but would instead spend time delegating and stalling.
According to Nixon’s aides, who perhaps knew him best, he was a fan of the
space program, especially of human spaceflight. Ehrlichman claimed in 1983
that the President thought
there should be some form of continuing manned space flight program; an
unmanned program didn’t have any magic. . . . I can remember Nixon
coming off a phone conversation with the astronauts. And you know, they
are up on the moon, and [Nixon was] as high as a kite. He got a big
charge out of them. Then when the astronauts would come to the White
House for dinner afterwards, he would always be enormously stimulated
by contact with these folks. He liked heroes. He thought it was good for
this country to have heroes. . . . He had this metaphysical thing about
national morality and national fiber and national ideals.206
Much evidence suggests that Nixon considered astronauts to be symbols of the
best that America had to offer. Ehrlichman also reported on Nixon’s persistent
belief that space flight was instrumental to national prestige. To maintain
America’s favored status in the world, it had “to be at the leading edge of applied
technological development . . . If we were not, a great deal of national virtue was
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lost, and [sic] our standing in the world.”207 As he did while Vice President,
Nixon still believed that a robust space program was a source of prestige.
Heppenheimer also tells of Nixon’s interactions with astronauts and the
connection to foreign policy:
Like other presidents before and since, he basked in the reflected glory of
spacefarers. When the crew of Apollo 11 returned from the first landing
on the moon, he was aboard the aircraft carrier USS Hornet to greet them.
He then used this triumph to gain diplomatic advantage, for after hailing
the achievement, he set out on a nine-day world tour that took him to
capitals in Southeast Asia, India, Pakistan, and Europe. Significantly, he
had planned this tour well in advance of the Apollo 11 flight, anticipating its
safe return.208
Nixon’s forte as President was his skills in foreign policy and geopolitics; had not
his baser personality traits led to his demise with Watergate, he likely would have
been remembered as one of the better foreign policy presidents, having
successfully mitigated the Cold War by bringing on détente with the Soviet Union
and opening up Communist China to the West. As a result of Nixon’s penchant
for foreign policy and to negotiate rather than confront, Tom Paine’s entreaty to
Nixon to approve a Mars mission before the Soviets announced a space station
policy did not have the impact it would have had on Kennedy or perhaps even
Logsdon MS. “From Apollo to Shuttle: Policy Making in the Post-Apollo Era,” V13.
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Johnson. The US under Nixon was no longer racing the Soviets, but looking to
coexist with them. Nixon did not feel compelled to “use the space program to
prove himself able to deal with the Soviets, as Kennedy and Johnson apparently
thought they did.”209 Although Nixon enjoyed beating the Soviets to the moon,
and reaped innumerable political benefits from it, he was more inclined to
cooperate with them in space. “Although Nixon spoke of the Apollo 11 mission
as the ‘most exciting event of the first year of my presidency,’ his presidential
papers document clearly that his personal interest was more in the diplomacy of
space.”210 That being said, Nixon considered the Apollo program the legacy of
Kennedy and Johnson, two political enemies and men he detested, and partially
for that reason, ended the program prematurely during its most historic moments.
During a later meeting between George Low and Nixon in 1972 (their only
meeting) to announce the space shuttle decision, Nixon expressed that he was
“most interested in making the space program a truly international program” and
that Nixon “wanted us to stress international cooperation and participation for all
nations. He said that that he was disappointed that we had been unable to fly
foreign astronauts on Apollo.”211 Nixon’s desire to cooperate with the Soviet
Union was the essence of détente, a method to co-opt them by enticing them into
the interconnected matrix of the larger international community, where the more
destructive elements of Soviet foreign policy would damage any benefits they

209

Hoff, in Myth, 93-4

210

Hoff, in Myth, 97.

211

Memorandum from George Low, January 12, 1972, NASA History Office.
163

enjoyed from being a cooperative member of that community; according to the
weltanschauung of Nixon and Kissinger, this strategy would “preserve
international stability by according the Soviet Union a greater stake in the status
quo.”212
Low recounts an illustrative anecdote that sheds light on Nixon’s interest in the
space program. When Nixon welcomed the newly-returned Apollo 12 crew at the
White House, astronaut Pete Conrad was alarmed that Nixon showed no interest
in the mission details and, when asked about the future of the space program by
Conrad, Nixon quickly changed the subject to small talk. In a panic, Conrad
called George Low and told Low that “the only note of interest concerned the
proposed world tour for the Apollo 12 crew. Here the President was more
interested and said he would personally play a major role in planning which
countries would be visited and how the visit should be conducted.”213 As much
interest as Nixon took in the space program as a tool of foreign policy, which was
in line with the views he revealed to the Greenewalt Committee in 1959, it was
obvious that he considered it much more than that: “Although there were
certainly international and national security aspects to the space program, in the
Nixon White House issues related to NASA were handled through the channels
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set up for the President’s domestic policy agenda.”214 NASA was a domestic
program, and Nixon largely saw it in those terms.
As Nixon’s Chief Domestic Advisor, Ehrlichman was a major influence on Nixon
regarding domestic policy. And any decision that Nixon, Ehrlichman, or any of
the trusted inner circle, consummate politicians all, would make on the shuttle
would ultimately be a political one. The thinking of Nixon and his advisors,
according to Ehrlichman, was that “the country had had enough excitement” after
Apollo and that “bold new adventures were not needed.” “[E]verybody
recognized that the Apollo program had a lot of payoffs for any president”;
however, “we didn’t get much credit” for starting a new program that would pay
off politically after the maximum eight years of Nixon’s presidency. Nixon, ever
frugal and ever political, had the belief regarding a new space project that “I’m
not going to be around then and you are not going to spend my money on those
kinds of things.” Ehrlichman commented that “there was a good deal of that
[attitude] in the approach to NASA from a political standpoint, [though we]
recogniz[ed] at the same time that it had a life of its own and we could not
terminate it.”215 This was also the view of the inner circle. But because Nixon’s
trusted advisors were the ones who did the legwork on projects and policies, the
space shuttle decision was in limbo without a sponsor to shepherd it, fully
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developed, to Nixon with a recommendation. The call for a space shuttle went
largely unheard by Nixon’s advisors.
Nixon had no close advisors promoting the space program as he did on
the major domestic initiatives he undertook. Put most simply, NASA
administrators Thomas O. Paine and James C. Fletcher, and even Nixon’s
first two science and technology advisors, Lee A. DuBridge and Edward E.
David, Jr., did not have the ear of Nixon or any of Nixon’s inner staff.216
The buffer provided by the firewall that his advisors maintained between Nixon
and outside agencies insulated the President from the debate and shielded him
from having to make a decision either way. OMB had been hashing out details
with NASA on economic terms, but had yet to pass a recommendation up the
hierarchy to the President. This lack of interest and sponsorship among the inner
circle was not lost on Low, who wrote a decade later,
The single most significant factor affecting the space shuttle decision was
that there was no top-level leadership in the White House. President
Nixon was unwilling to deal with his agency heads and dealt solely with his
staff. This placed a great deal of decision-making responsibility with the
OMB, and by definition the OMB is far more interested in short-range
budgetary problems than in the long-range future of the nation.217
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Low felt the frustration that Paine had felt earlier and was even less likely to get
the President’s ear since Paine had made such a negative impression on Nixon.
This circumstance was in stark contrast to the Apollo decision, in which Kennedy
made the decision himself after soliciting input from a host of advisors and
stakeholders. By contrast, Nixon provided no leadership on the matter of the
NASA budget or the space shuttle decision, aside from the general mandate that
the federal budget needed to be reduced and that the US could not leave the
arena of human spaceflight.
The space shuttle did have one political factor working in its favor. Congress had
cancelled the SST project, which further hurt the recession-impacted aerospace
industry. Much as Robert McNamara had felt during the deliberations over the
Apollo decision, a space project would shore up an aerospace industry in
recession and would win political support from potential donors in the upcoming
election. And Ehrlichman helped Nixon to embrace this view: he “pointed out to
Nixon that some ‘close’ states controlling large numbers of electoral votes were
also those with space industries that would benefit from the new space shuttle
program.”218 Cancelling the human space program was now certainly out of the
question, and approving the shuttle could provide a political win for Nixon.
Nixon also realized that the US national defense depended on the maintaining
the skill set of the US aerospace industry, so keeping the industry in business
was in the best interest of the nation.
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Neither President Nixon nor Vice President Agnew had any particular
interest in the space program except perhaps as it fed a large industry,
somehow contributed to national security, and could be milked for political
advantage at home and abroad. In other words, space was making the
transition from luxury to necessity, and therefore it could not be allowed to
languish. So new goals had to be found.219
To this end, Nixon commissioned a committee to study steps that the
government could take to harness the power of the flagging aerospace industry
to solve the nation’s problems. Formed in the latter part of 1971, the committee,
called the New Technology Opportunities Program (NTOP), was headed by
William Macgruder, former head of the ill-fated SST program. Ehrlichman
assisted in the effort, sending out letters to various government agencies, in a
scene reminiscent of Kennedy’s request for Johnson to find a space project that
would give the US space primacy. NTOP proposals included building high-speed
rail in the Northeast corridor; developing two-way television; integrated utilities
that would combine power, sewage, heat, light, and waste disposal through
single units in office and apartment buildings; peaceful uses of nuclear weapons;
offshore oil terminals for tankers; and other ideas. In the end, none of them was
approved, NTOP died, and only the shuttle seemed ideal for buoying the
aerospace industry.
NTOP nevertheless was important, for it represented a serious White
House attempt to redirect the resources of aerospace toward new
219
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domestic priorities. When the attempt faltered, it soon became clear that
Nixon would not try to help the beleaguered aerospace industry by having
its people work on mass transit or pollution control. Instead, he would give
them an election-year gift by keeping that industry's resources within the
realm of aerospace.220
Still, the shuttle had no champion within Nixon’s circle of advisors.
Nixon had appointed James Fletcher, the President of the University of Utah and
a PhD physicist who had previously been a Vice President at Aerojet, as Paine’s
successor as NASA Administrator (Low had been Acting Administrator). Fletcher
was seen by Nixon’s staff as someone who would be easy to work with and as
someone who would not be committed to empire-building; this satisfied the
description of the ideal administrator as outlined in Whitehead’s memo to
Flanigan (discussed above). Fletcher took office on May 1, 1971, and,
recognizing the budgetary realities being imposed by OMB, he adopted a phased
approach to shuttle development. Six weeks after he assumed the post, he
approved the TAOS configuration suggested by Klaus Heiss, with an external
tank and two solid boosters, which would eventually become the final
configuration. NASA had agreed to build the shuttle that they could afford, not
the one they wanted, which would have a piloted first stage—that design would
have to wait. Marshall Space Flight Center, still under von Braun’s direction in
Huntsville, had been pushing for liquid-fueled boosters to justify their existence,
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but solids were cheaper to develop. NASA would eventually abandon the
phased approach and settle on what had been intended as an intermediate
approach, with an external tank and strap-ons, as the preferred configuration.
Many questions remained to be answered, however: what NASA’s budget would
be, what the final configuration of the orbiter would look like, and whether the
President would approve a shuttle at all. And the shuttle still had no champion
within Nixon’s circle of advisors.
That support was soon to come from an unlikely source—from within OMB.
During the course of the OMB budget negotiations with NASA, the OMB argued
against the shuttle program and wanted to further cut the NASA budget to $2.8
billion, a funding level that would certainly mean the end of human space flight.
Caspar Weinberger, Deputy Director of OMB and trusted Nixon advisor, acted as
Nixon’s main conduit to the shuttle negotiations and, along with OMB assistant in
charge of NASA budget initiatives Donald Rice, Ehrlichman, and Flanigan,
provided advice to Nixon on the shuttle issue. When he learned of the $2.8
billion budget figure, Weinberger decided to act. Weinberger, who Low
described as “a real space buff” and as “the only one in OMB really positive
toward the NASA program,”221 was the only one of Nixon’s four trusted shuttle
advisors who was in favor of funding a shuttle. Weinberger actively opposed
recommendations from OMB staffers who suggested cutting shuttle funding from
NASA’s budget.222 He believed that the $2.8 billion budget figure would not only
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kill the shuttle, but also two Apollo missions (in addition to the three Nixon had
already cut) and Skylab—that in essence, the US would be out of the human
spaceflight business. On August 12, 1971, Weinberger wrote a memo to Nixon
that saved the shuttle and human spaceflight:
From:

Caspar W. Weinberger

Via:

George P. Shultz

Subject:

Future of NASA

Present tentative plans call for major reductions or change in NASA, by
eliminating the last two Apollo flights (16 and 17), and eliminating or
sharply reducing the balance of the Manned Space Program (Skylab and
Space Shuttle) and many remaining NASA programs.
I believe this would be a mistake.
1) The real reason for sharp reductions in the NASA budget is that NASA
is entirely in the 28% of the budget that is controllable. In short we cut it
because it is cuttable, not because it is doing a bad job or an unnecessary
one.
2) We are being driven, by the uncontrollable items, to spend more and
more on programs that offer no real hope for the future: Model Cities,
OEO, Welfare, interest on the National Debt, unemployment
compensation, Medicare, etc. Of course, some of these have to be
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continued, in one form or another, but essentially they are programs, not
of our choice, designed to repair mistakes of the past, not of our making.
3) We do need to reduce the budget, in my opinion, but we should not
make all our reduction decisions on the basis of what is reducible, rather
than on the merits of individual programs.
4) There is real merit to the future of NASA, and its proposed programs.
The Space Shuttle and NERVA particularly offer the opportunity, among
other things, to secure substantial scientific fall-out for the civilian
economy at the same time that large numbers of valuable (and hard-toemploy-elsewhere) scientists and technicians are kept at work on projects
that increase our knowledge of space, our ability to develop for lower cost
space exploration, travel, and to secure, through NERVA, twice the
existing propulsion efficiency for our rockets.
It is very difficult to re-assemble the NASA teams should it be decided
later, after major stoppages, to re-start some of the long-range programs.
5) Recent Apollo flights have been very successful from all points of view.
Most important is the fact that they give the American people a much
needed lift in spirit, (and the people of the world an equally needed look at
American superiority). Announcement now, or very shortly, that we were
cancelling Apollo 16 and 17 (an announcement we would have to make
very soon if any real savings are to be realized) would have a very bad
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effect, coming so soon after Apollo 15's triumph. It would be confirming, in
some respects, a belief that I fear is gaining credence at home and
abroad: That our best years are behind us, that we are turning inward,
reducing our defense commitments, and voluntarily starting to give up our
super-power status, and our desire to maintain our world superiority.
America should be able to afford something besides increased welfare,
programs to repair our cities, or Appalachian relief and the like.
6) I do not propose that we necessarily fund all NASA seeks — only that if
we decide to eliminate Apollo 16 and 17, that we couple any
announcement to that effect with announcements that we are going to
fund space shuttles, NERVA, or other major, future NASA activities. We
could perhaps base any announcement of curtailment of Apollo 16 and 17
on the ground that Apollo 15 was so successful in gathering needed data
that we can now shift, sooner than previously expected, to the Space
Shuttle, Grand Tour, NERVA, etc. Also, I am certainly not suggesting that
we give up our attempts to have NASA increase its efficiency, and
eliminate waste or unnecessary expense in its base or elsewhere.
7) I believe I can find enough reductions in other programs to pay for
continuing NASA at generally the $3.3 - $3.4 billion level I propose here.
This figure is about $400 - $500 million more than the present planning
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targets. This would mean finding reductions elsewhere, so as to stay
within the $250 billion figure that is now our goal.223 [emphasis mine]
Weinberger knew exactly how to appeal to Nixon—by claiming that drastically
cutting the NASA budget and getting out of human spaceflight would be an
admission to the world that the US was abdicating its superpower status and that
“our best years were behind us.” Weinberger would certainly have known that
Nixon would find this idea revolting; like Weinberger, Nixon believed in American
exceptionalism and felt that America had a role to play as the leader of the free
world. While cutting the US budget was a priority, the reasons why it was high
were related to priorities and budgets that had been inherited from the previous
administration and from the opposition party. To cut the NASA budget simply
because it was easier than cutting social programs was not the right answer,
especially since the world would then see America as a weaker nation. The
argument was clever, and it was pitch-perfect in appealing to all of Nixon’s core
beliefs and foibles: the need for geopolitical strength, the need to avoid political
pitfalls, the need to cut the budget, the need to address social issues, the need to
support the aerospace industry, even an appeal to Nixon’s loathing of Lyndon
Johnson. It is all there in one memo, and it worked both perfectly and
immediately. The proof of its effectiveness is scrawled across the top of the
memo in Nixon’s hand: “I agree with Cap [Weinberger].” The shuttle now had its
champion inside Nixon’s inner circle, and it once again had a fighting chance.
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Nixon’s sudden conversion was not known by the rest of the OMB staff until OMB
Director Shultz received a staff memo in mid-September that read:
The President read with interest and agreed with Mr. Weinberger's
memorandum of August 12, 1971 on the subject of the future of NASA.

Further, the President approved Mr. Weinberger's plan to find enough
reductions in other programs to pay for continuing NASA at generally the
3.3 - 3.4 billion dollar level, or about 400 to 500 million more than the
present planning targets.224
NASA was still in the dark about Nixon’s change of heart. However, when things
looked bleak, when Fletcher and Low considered abandoning the shuttle
altogether, Fletcher sent a letter to Shultz on September 30, 1971, containing a
FY1973 budget request totaling $3.385 billion, including $228 million for shuttle
development. At an OMB meeting with NASA on October 22, 1971, the OMB
staff recommended cancellation of the shuttle program. Weinberger opposed
their recommendation, but did not overrule them. The staff said that if a shuttle
would be built, it could be done more cheaply than NASA had suggested.
Weinberger compromised and decided that a shuttle would be built, but that
another review would be required to determine where costs could be further cut.
One month later, on November 22, Low submitted NASA’s recommendations for
a list of cheaper shuttle options that ranged from an orbiter with a variety of
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booster types to a low-cost, unpowered glider that would be launched on a TitanIII booster. OMB’s proposals featured a similar glider on a Titan-III as their most
expensive option, and a variety of smaller glider/booster options that were less
expensive. Low argued convincingly against the unpowered glider concept at a
later OMB meeting.
On December 2, 1971, OMB sent Nixon a memo soliciting his opinion on space
policy, and included a place for him to approve or disapprove various options,
including a “reduced-cost smaller Space Shuttle program,” the Apollo Soyuz
mission, Apollo 16 and 17, and other Earth-orbiting missions. A week later,
Nixon approved a shuttle, but a smaller version with a 30-foot bay and a capacity
of 30,000 pounds. Fletcher would not accept this decision. The fight over the
shuttle was not over.
The OMB effectively killed the Air Force’s involvement with their suggestion of a
smaller payload and decreased capacity, making the OMB-recommended shuttle
too small to carry the DoD’s reconnaissance satellites. This design would
consign the Air Force to continue using Titan-III launch vehicles as their primary
launch vehicle. Charles Donlan, acting Director of the NASA’s Shuttle Program
Office, decided to revisit the 1,100 mile cross-range capability requirement to
determine whether they could cut additional costs by abandoning the delta wing
and reverting to Faget’s conventional wing design. Donlan determined that the
high cross range would enable a more abort possibilities and make the shuttle
safer. A delta wing would be inherently more stable at both super- and sub-sonic
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speeds and from various angles of attack. NASA and the OMB met multiple
times and made offers and counteroffers until a meeting with George Shultz and
key White House advisors was scheduled for December 29, 1971. Fletcher and
Low had prepared to accept a much smaller shuttle, one with a 45-foot cargo bay
and a 40,000 pound capacity rather than the configuration desired by the Air
Force, which was a 60-foot bay with a 60,000 pound capacity. Low describes the
meeting as follows:
On the 29th of December, Fletcher and I met with Shultz, Weinberger,
Flanigan, David, Rice, and Rose to review our Shuttle recommendations.
Before going to the meeting, Fletcher and I decided that we could accept
something as small as 14x40’ with a 40,000 lb. capability, but anything
less than that would require a presidential decision. During the meeting
Shultz looked at the facts and figures and decided that really the only thing
that makes any sense, as NASA has said all along, is the 15x60’—60,000
lb. Shuttle capability.225
Donlan recalled in 1983 that according to Fletcher, Shultz said, “Well, what are
you fooling around with that 45-foot configuration for? It doesn't cost that much
more. Why don't you get the one you want — take the 60-foot one.”226 Willis
Shapley, NASA Associate Deputy Administrator, in 1984 told the story slightly
differently. His account has Shultz deciding, “If we're going to do it, let's do it
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right; let's do the big shuttle and forget about the Bureau of the Budget
shuttle.”227 In his personal notes, Low brought out some other, more ominous
factors in the final shuttle design. Several days after the fateful meeting with
Schultz, he commented,
In trying to analyze what’s wrong with the decision process, it comes back
to the fact that there is nobody in the White House willing to make any
decisions. Everybody feels that the issue of Shuttle size is too small an
issue to take to the President, and of course they’re right, but they’re
unwilling to let the Administrator of NASA make that decision. Therefore,
they let their various staffs continue to do the work and continue to ask
nickel and dime size questions without ever calling a halt to that procedure
and say it’s about time that we made up our mind and let’s proceed. Short
of going to the President, I see no way of avoiding this kind of mess, and
yet the question is not one of going ahead with the shuttle at all but merely
one of Shuttle size and weight, I would also agree that we should not take
this kind of a decision to the President too early.228
With the President unwilling to make a decision himself or to participate in the
decision-making process, the entire negotiation process took on the
characteristics of a bureaucratic nightmare. By trying to simplify the presidential
decision-making process, Nixon made the process infinitely more complicated for
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NASA. NASA finally got its shuttle, the one that the Air Force had specified, and
although for NASA it was a compromise, it was still a spacecraft that would keep
them in space for the foreseeable future. Many design decisions were yet to be
made, but the shuttle would happen after years of indecision.
With the size issue finally settled by Nixon’s advisors, Shultz made his
recommendation to Nixon, who agreed. All that was left to do was to meet the
President for the public announcement. NASA was asked to prepare a
statement that the President could issue. The meeting occurred on January 5,
1972, when Low and Fletcher flew to the Western White House in San Clemente,
California, where Nixon had stayed for the holidays. Nixon and Ehrlichman were
to meet with Fletcher and Low for a 15-minute photo opportunity. The actual
meeting went over by almost 45 minutes, and Nixon showed a genuine interest in
the details of the shuttle program. Low recalls in his personal notes that “[t]he
discussion was warm, friendly, and productive. . . . [Nixon] is obviously very
much interested in space for the sake of exploration and space for the sake of
what it means for the future of the United States.”229 Nixon asked questions
about the shuttle and the space program in general, and made some
observations:
The President wanted to know if we thought the shuttle was a good
investment and, upon receiving our affirmative reply, requested that we
stress the fact that the shuttle is not a ‘$7 billion toy,’ that it is indeed
229
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useful, and that it is a good investment in that it will cut operations costs
by a factor of 10. But he indicated that even if it were not a good
investment, we would have to do it anyway, because space flight is here
to stay. Men are flying in space and will continue to fly in space, and we’d
best be part of it.230
Low reported that Nixon, ever the statesman, commented at the time on the
foreign-policy aspects of space:
We also discussed with him the real possibility of conducting a joint
docking experiment in the 1975 time period. The prospect of having
Americans and Russians meet in space in this time period appeared to
have great appeal to the President. . . . The President asked John
Ehrlichman to mention both the international aspects of the shuttle and the
USSR docking possibilities to Henry Kissinger.”231
Nixon pointed out that he “liked the fact that ordinary people would be able to fly
in the shuttle, and that the only requirement for a flight would be that there is a
mission to perform.”232 The shuttle would democratize space and would be
utilitarian, unlike Kennedy’s Apollo, which only carried test pilots and was built for
a sole purpose. This was to be Nixon’s machine—he held the model of the
shuttle during the entire meeting as if he would never give it up.
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Nixon’s statement, largely written by NASA’s William Anders, was edited by
Nixon in his own hand.
I HAVE decided today that the United States should proceed at once with
the development of an entirely new type of space transportation system
designed to help transform the space frontier of the 1970's into familiar
territory, easily accessible for human endeavor in the 1980's and 1990's.
This system will center on a space vehicle that can shuttle repeatedly from
Earth to orbit and back. It will revolutionize transportation into near space
by routinizing it. It will take the astronomical costs out of astronautics. In
short, it will go a long way toward delivering the rich benefits of practical
space utilization and the valuable spin-offs from space efforts into the daily
lives of Americans and all people.
The new year 1972 is a year of conclusion for America's current series of
manned flights to the moon. Much is expected from the two remaining
Apollo missions--in fact, their scientific results should exceed the return
from all the earlier flights together. Thus they will place a fitting capstone
on this vastly successful undertaking. But they also bring us to an
important decision point--a point of assessing what our space horizons are
as Apollo ends, and of determining where we go from here.
In the scientific arena, the past decade of experience has taught us that
spacecraft are an irreplaceable tool for learning about our near-Earth
space environment, the moon, and the planets, besides being an
181

important aid to our studies of the sun and stars. In utilizing space to meet
needs on Earth, we have seen the tremendous potential of satellites for
intercontinental communications and worldwide weather forecasting. We
are gaining the capability to use satellites as tools in global monitoring and
management of natural resources, in agricultural applications, and in
pollution control. We can foresee their use in guiding airliners across the
oceans and in bringing televised education to wide areas of the world.
However, all these possibilities, and countless others with direct and
dramatic bearing on human betterment, can never be more than
fractionally realized so long as every single trip from Earth to orbit remains
a matter of special effort and staggering expense. This is why
commitment to the space shuttle program is the right next step for
America to take, in moving out from our present beachhead in the sky to
achieve a real working presence in space--because the space shuttle will
give us routine access to space by sharply reducing costs in dollars and
preparation time.
The new system will differ radically from all existing booster systems, in
that most of this new system will be recovered and used again and again-up to 100 times. The resulting economies may bring operating costs down
as low as one-tenth of those for present launch vehicles.
The resulting changes in modes of flight and reentry will make the ride
safer and less demanding for the passengers, so that men and women
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with work to do in space can "commute" aloft, without having to spend
years in training for the skills and rigors of old-style space flight. As
scientists and technicians are actually able to accompany their
instruments into space, limiting boundaries between our manned and
unmanned space programs will disappear. Development of new space
applications will be able to proceed much faster. Repair or servicing of
satellites in space will become possible, as will delivery of valuable
payloads from orbit back to Earth.
The general reliability and versatility which the shuttle system offers
seems likely to establish it quickly as the workhorse of our whole space
effort, taking the place of all present launch vehicles except the very
smallest and very largest.
NASA and many aerospace companies have carried out extensive design
studies for the shuttle. Congress has reviewed and approved this effort.
Preparation is now sufficient for us to commence the actual work of
construction with full confidence of success. In order to minimize technical
and economic risks, the space agency will continue to take a cautious
evolutionary approach in the development of this new system. Even so,
by moving ahead at this time, we can have the shuttle in manned flight by
1978, and operational a short time later.
It is also significant that this major new national enterprise will engage the
best efforts of thousands of highly skilled workers and hundreds of
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contractor firms over the next several years. The amazing "technology
explosion" that has swept this country in the years since we ventured into
space should remind us that robust activity in the aerospace industry is
healthy for everyone--not just in jobs and income, but in the extension of
our capabilities in every direction. The continued preeminence of America
and American industry in the aerospace field will be an important part of
the shuttle's "payload."
Views of the earth from space have shown us how small and fragile our
home planet truly is. We are learning the imperatives of universal
brotherhood and global ecology--learning to think and act as guardians of
one tiny blue and green island in the trackless oceans of the universe.
This new program will give more people more access to the liberating
perspectives of space, even as it extends our ability to cope with physical
challenges of earth and broadens our opportunities for international
cooperation in low-cost, multi-purpose space missions.
"We must sail sometimes with the wind and sometimes against it," said
Oliver Wendell Holmes, "but we must sail, and not drift, nor lie at anchor."
So with man's epic voyage into space--a voyage the United States of
America has led and still shall lead.233
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In the drafting of his statement, Nixon was faced with one more decision—what
to name the program. Various names were floated, in the style of Mercury,
Gemini, and Apollo: Pegasus, Hermes, Astroplane, Skylark, even Space Clipper,
which was proposed in one draft. Nixon settled on “Space Shuttle,” which was
an appropriately utilitarian name for the new system. The shuttle would
eventually be called something even more prosaic and utilitarian: the Space
Transport System or STS.
The statement touches on all of the elements of the new culture: the Earth as a
fragile place, the need for universal brotherhood, the need for ecological
husbandry, the fact that by going into space, we will improve our lives on Earth.
It also emphasizes the requirements of the STG report: utility, reusability, and
economy. The statement announces the space shuttle as a new type of
spacecraft for a new generation. It begins by using Turner’s frontier metaphor
and ends with an appeal that deploys the Kennedy-esque rhetorical trope of
space as a sea that must be sailed and as a voyage in which the United States
must lead. Nixon, moved by his creation, waxed romantically on the subject of
space.
The shuttle decision was largely made by Weinberger and Shultz—Weinberger
fought for the shuttle against an OMB determined to kill it, and once it had
become clear that Nixon would approve a shuttle, Shultz decided on the size.
Following Nixon’s modus operandi, the decision was brought to him for an up or
down vote. As was the case in the Nixon White House, his aides did all of the
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heavy lifting, and Nixon gave it a thumbs up or down, much like a Roman
emperor deciding on the fate of a defeated gladiator at the Coliseum. In the case
of the shuttle, it received a thumbs-up. While Nixon was inclined to slash the
NASA budget, Weinberger, a space buff, knew exactly how to appeal to Nixon to
win his approval of an increased budget. It was, however, ultimately Nixon’s
decision.
The space shuttle decision stands in sharp contrast to Kennedy’s Apollo
decision. Kennedy asked for and received the input of advisors, experts, and
stakeholders; Nixon’s aides went through the same information-gathering
exercises in the case of the shuttle decision. Kennedy was interested in the
Apollo program as a way to revive his political fortunes and to boost world
opinion of the US; Nixon had little to gain from approving the shuttle, other than
avoiding becoming the president who cancelled the human spaceflight program
and garnering some donations from the aerospace industry in the 1972
presidential campaign. Kennedy had real skin in the game, risking real political
capital by appealing to Congress and the nation to support the moon program on
live television; Nixon’s decision was done in offices and meeting rooms, far from
the attention of the public, without the benefit of one public speech in favor of the
shuttle. Nixon issued only a single press release on authorizing the shuttle.
Kennedy made his decision days after receiving the report outlining the results of
Johnson’s queries; Nixon’s decision dragged on for years. Kennedy’s decision
came at a critical point in the Cold War, with the fate of the world in the balance
during the darkest period of the Cold War; Nixon’s choice also came at a critical
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time, but a critical domestic time for America, in the midst of civil unrest, a
growing counterculture, and economic hardship. Kennedy acted as a leader,
personally selling the project and overseeing its implementation; Nixon acted as
the topmost bureaucrat, only signing off on a decision that others had negotiated
incrementally.
Kennedy gave the nation a destination that needed a system; Nixon gave the
nation a system that needed a destination. While Kennedy gave NASA more
than it could have dreamed, Nixon gave NASA much less than it wanted.
Kennedy enjoyed the company of astronauts, because they represented the
machismo and heroism he valued personally, and he probably detected elements
of himself in them; Nixon enjoyed the company of the astronauts because he
could vicariously enjoy their exploits and thought that the country needed heroic
symbols. Kennedy was a risk-taker; Nixon was a risk mitigator.
The two decisions could not have been more different; the two men who made
them could not have been more different. Although the two decisions were
influenced by their respective times and circumstances, the manner in which the
decisions were made was imbued in each instance with the respective
personality of each man.

187

Aftermath

As the 1970s progressed, work continued on the design of the space shuttle, but
the large, make-or-break decisions had been made. Nixon kept Apollos 16 and
17, Skylab and the three crewed visits, and, to his great joy, the Apollo-Soyuz
Test Project (ASTP) mission. The ASTP was the embodiment of the spirit of
Nixon in space—a foreign policy initiative by which détente was staged in orbit.
Ostensibly undertaken to ensure cooperation between the two space
superpowers and to improve safety by developing systems by which each space
program could rescue the other in an on-orbit emergency—a concept that had
been discussed in Kennedy’s time, but was unlikely to happen due to Cold War
tensions and posturing—the mission was one that Krushchev would never have
allowed. Such a mission would have afforded the US a first-hand view of Soviet
technology, which would have shattered the illusion of Soviet space superiority
that the USSR propaganda machine had built up over the years.
In a sense, it was Krushchev who drove the space race, with Eisenhower and
then Kennedy reacting to Khrushchev’s propaganda-fueled spectaculars.
Eisenhower eventually agreed to a space program larger than he would have
preferred after a series of successful Sputniks and US failures. Kennedy, whom
Krushchev thought was green and thus easy to manipulate, reacted to
Krushchev’s Gagarin move and the subsequent press frenzy, although it was the
Bay of Pigs debacle that ultimately drove Kennedy to action. Krushchev
continued to drive Kennedy into space until Kennedy’s death. By contrast, Nixon
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personally clashed with Krushchev as Eisenhower’s Vice President during the
Kitchen Debate of 1959 in Moscow (which launched Nixon’s reputation as an
international statesman). However, Krushchev had been deposed by the time
Nixon ascended to the presidency. Even if Krushchev had still been in power,
the balance between the two space programs had shifted drastically toward the
US program, which was only months away from landing on the moon when Nixon
took office.
As Bob Dylan had sung in 1964, the times were a’ changin’, and that very
palpable change was apparent to all by the late 1960s. Nixon would withdraw
from an aggressive space program just as he would eventually withdraw from
Vietnam. Nixon sought to extract America from its costly foreign entanglements,
to create a more peaceful world abroad through diplomacy, and to win peace at
home by tending to America’s immediate social needs. “At the very moment
when Apollo achieved full success and when NASA had the moon within its
grasp, changing national priorities would prevent this agency from pursuing a
follow-up program of extensive lunar exploration leading towards manned flight to
Mars. Rather than going forward as a focus for the nation’s hope, the space
program would have to find its home in a prosaic world where the glow of
Kennedy’s challenge had faded, with many people viewing Apollo as a waste of
money.”234
NASA would survive the most turbulent period in its history, having to drastically
downsize soon after the glories of Apollo. The space shuttle decision would
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serve as NASA’s political baptism by fire, and would also serve as the model for
NASA’s next 40 years, a future of shrinking budgets and political dogfights.
Although the Kennedy model is widely viewed by the public as the way NASA
gets its projects, the reality is much more like the Nixon model. Many at NASA
themselves originally shared the same view: NASA officials viewed the shuttle
decision as something of an anomaly, the result of having to negotiate program
details without much consensus on long-range goals during a period of severe
budgetary constraints. “The further NASA got away from the shuttle decision,
however, the more the Apollo program started to look like the anomaly.”235
The shuttle was NASA’s only method of bringing crews into LEO when it debuted
in 1981, and would remain so until 2011, when it flew its final mission. After that,
NASA would rely on the Russian Space Agency and the Soyuz for rides to the
ISS, something unthinkable in either the Kennedy or Nixon era. America had
abdicated the primacy in space that had been won with treasure and tragedy.
While the nation awaits the next chapter in American space history, the recent
death of Neil Armstrong has prompted Americans to look back fondly to the
heady days of Kennedy’s bold challenge to go to the moon just 60 years after
humanity’s first flight, and also to wonder what happened to the spirit of daring
that animated his challenge. The space shuttle program sought to make access
to space routine, and that it did. As a result, Americans became bored with
hundreds of similar shuttle missions, even though human spaceflight remained
difficult and risky, only paying attention in times of tragedy, either after the loss of
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lives in the two catastrophic shuttle accidents or in response to the costly nearfiasco of the Hubble Space Telescope and its heroic repair. Ever since the
Apollo 17 splashed down in the Pacific, NASA has sought to rekindle the nation’s
love affair with space; but we now live in a different era. This loss of heroes,
daring missions, and amazing feats is sobering and disappointing for many;
however, we should remain hopeful about the future of space exploration and of
NASA.
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CHAPTER IV
THE RECKONING

Project Apollo and the space shuttle program have dominated NASA for the past
50 years. Apollo is recalled fondly by space advocates and Americans of a
certain age as representing the Golden Age of Space Exploration. The pleasant
nostalgia was very evident at the recent celebrations of the 40th anniversary of
the first moon landings and again, more recently, at the passing of Apollo 11
astronaut Neil Armstrong. The era of Apollo is considered NASA’s best of times,
although the actual landings themselves continued for only three years. The
shuttle era is largely absent that public feeling of heroism and adventure, instead
instilled with the image of the shuttle program as being routine, perhaps boring,
and being an astronaut as more akin to performing a job than acting bravely or
heroically.
As Roger Launius wrote in his essay “Perceptions of Apollo: Myth, nostalgia,
memory, or all of the above?” the Apollo missions have assumed a mythical
quality in American culture. The Apollo program has come to represent different
things to different people, who have in turn projected their own views onto the
program. For some, Apollo represents the glorious and uniquely American
pursuit of the “final frontier.” Others see Apollo as the failed promise of NASA’s
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utopian vision of the future, one in which the people of the world would could
achieve perfection by journeying to the stars, leaving their prejudices and
imperfections behind; for these people, Apollo was a failure, as Apollo did not in
any sense perfect society or bring the nations of the world closer together. For
policy wonks, Apollo is seen as a triumph of the technocratic model, where
wartime mobilization could be applied to solve peacetime problems. These
people consider Apollo to be the one “good” government project. Space
advocates view Apollo as a failed opportunity; a false start that should have been
the beginning of a human diaspora throughout the universe. For Americans and
space buffs who lived through the Apollo missions, the majority view is that of
sehnsucht, or wistful nostalgia, either a pleasant memory of the Apollo era as the
age of Kennedy and a time of innocence and dreams, or a memory resonant of
the human tendency to reflect on one’s childhood as better times than the
present, and of Apollo as emblematic of those better times. Spiritual people of
the Apollo era saw the program as a secular religious experience, one that
evoked emotions of awe, devotion, omnipotence and redemption; these people
saw the space program in quasi-religious terms, with a new clerical caste
(astronauts), new rituals (mission control activities), a sense of higher purpose, a
new language (NASA jargon), and a theology of salvation (the promise of a new
start in space). Wernher von Braun himself saw Apollo as a new beginning for
mankind.
Another group of people, including those who personally participated in the
program, view Apollo as a squandered opportunity for the next step in human
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evolution. They feel that after the miracles wrought by Apollo, human spaceflight
became a mundane LEO exercise performed without mystery by the space
shuttle. This sense that space travel was quotidian stems from the fact that
NASA did its job all too well. It was only after the two shuttle accidents that
Americans were reminded of just how dangerous the flights still were, and of how
brave astronauts are; the two shuttle accident reports stress these facts, along
with the fact that NASA itself, while still striving for the ultimate safety of the
astronauts, believed its own claims that flights were routine, safe, and that the
risks could be managed.
These views, that Apollo was a mythical voyage and that the shuttle was a
utilitarian workhorse, reflect how each project was originally sold. NASA
discovered early on that, even before the first Mercury flight, the seven men
selected as astronauts were considered heroes by the American people. Life
magazine, which had negotiated exclusive access to the Mercury astronauts,
sold them to the public as such, a product they could market to increase
subscription rates and advertising revenue, and the public eagerly consumed the
myths. What is surprising is that this marketing campaign began under
Eisenhower’s administration, which sought a modest space program, and not
under Kennedy’s. Project Apollo was championed by the Kennedy
administration as a way for America to both beat back the advancing Soviet bear
and fulfill America’s unique human destiny—an exceptional people performing
exceptional acts. Kennedy sold it as a holy quest, with an ever-looming time
limit, a ferocious enemy, heroes pure of heart, great dangers to be faced, and
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with a sacred prize to be won after great travail. After Kennedy (and arguably the
Apollo 1 astronauts) died, the project had a patron saint who had been martyred
in the cause of good.
The shuttle had been sold to decision-makers and the public in an entirely
different manner. Rather than resorting to a mythical and emotional appeal, it
was sold rationally, using a more practical argument. Keeping in line with the
recommendations that the STG report outlined, the shuttle was marketed as a
safe, reusable, economical, and utilitarian system. In a time of changing
priorities, it appealed to the new ethos—less wasteful, less costly, and less elitist.
The shuttle was a versatile system that presented a more democratic way to get
into space—even Nixon remarked that he liked how the shuttle would open
space to regular people, including people from countries that could not afford
their own space programs. NASA chose to sell the shuttle as a routine way to
get into space to perform work rather than to explore. And the shuttle adequately
performed this workhorse role for thirty years.
The popular dictum that time is money is true of the Apollo and shuttle decisions.
In the case of the Apollo decision, Kennedy’s mandate had emphasized a
timeline of landing on the moon before the decade had elapsed. This time limit
was the driving factor behind the entire program, and the appropriate funds were
provided and design choices were made expressly to meet this deadline. As a
result, Apollo successfully met this deadline, even with a decreasing budget after
1966 and a two-year hiatus after the Apollo 1 fire. In the case of the shuttle, the
OMB had indicated that the budget for development of a shuttle would be less
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than half of what NASA had requested. As a result of this basic constraint,
money rather than time became the dominant factor. The timetable for
developing the shuttle was lengthened to accommodate the allocated funds, and
the design choices, primarily compromises from designs that NASA had originally
advocated, reflected the necessity of meeting economic requirements rather than
any timeline. The development of the shuttle took about as long as the entire
Apollo project did, a decade, but it came in over budget. Time and money were
tradeoffs in each case, and can be considered the main influences on the
ultimate configurations and operational processes in each space system. Apollo
featured a policy determining the budget, while the shuttle featured a budget
driving the policy. Apollo’s policy was a destination: the moon. The shuttle’s
policy was a concept: cost-efficient spaceflight. In essence, Apollo was a
destination looking for a system, while the shuttle was a system looking for a
destination.

Evaluating Apollo

Thus, the question remains—was Apollo successful? Taken in terms of
Kennedy’s original mandate, the answer is a resounding yes. It safely landed not
just one, but four humans on the moon by the end of the decade, and returned
them safely to Earth. The US space program had surpassed the Soviet program
at some point during Project Gemini, when it successfully docked two spacecraft,
but Gemini had been undertaken as an intermediate project to develop the
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techniques that Apollo would need to employ in order to land on the moon. The
Gemini project’s success, however, was not readily apparent to most non-space
buffs. When Apollo 8 orbited the moon, it was clear to the world that the US
program was ahead of the Soviets’, and Apollo 11 fulfilled Kennedy’s challenge
by putting Americans on the moon before Soviets; to this day, no one but
Americans have walked on another celestial body. Soon after the US moon
landings, the Soviets quietly abandoned both of their clandestine crewed moon
programs and turned their focus toward space stations.
Apollo brought unprecedented goodwill and prestige to the US after the Apollo 11
success. Embarking on a world tour as soon as they had left their mandatory
three-week quarantine, the Apollo 11 astronauts visited New York, Chicago, and
Los Angeles, where they were feted by the President, Vice President,
congressional legislators, most state governors, and ambassadors from 83
nations. They then embarked on a 45-day, 25-nation goodwill tour, visited heads
of state, and were attended by overflowing crowds at all points along the way.
The lunar landing had been watched by almost the entire planet, except for some
of the closed societies like the USSR and China, and the people of the world
have probably never been in closer relationship before or since. It was hailed as
an achievement by humankind, not just by Americans. Dozens of nations issued
stamps celebrating the landings.
Apollo accomplished its goals remarkably well. Technologically, it was
wondrous. In addressing the requirements of the program, many technologies
and sciences were advanced rapidly. This is especially true with computing.
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While Gemini featured an on-board computer to calculate orbital parameters, the
Apollo systems were run entirely by computers. Due to limitations of computing
power and memory size, the astronauts were required to load the operational
programs for each phase of the mission one step at a time. However, the entire
flight, from liftoff to lunar landing, from lunar liftoff to splashdown, was computercontrolled. The computer on which this was written owes a debt of gratitude to
the Apollo engineers.
Considering whether Apollo was successful in a larger sense is more
problematic. Apollo was born of the Cold War and of a sense of urgency, if not
panic, and the decisions made in the course of prosecuting the project may
therefore be questioned. By specifying the Apollo challenge as a race against
time and the Soviets, NASA’s objective became not just getting to the moon, but
getting there as quickly as possible. As such, the decisions regarding the
equipment designed and the procedures developed had both speed of
attainment and a narrowness of purpose as strategic factors. All of the decisions
regarding equipment were made to simply land on the moon, and not to derive a
more utilitarian system that could be used effectively in a post-Apollo
environment. The feat of going to the moon and back required equipment that
was purpose-built for the specific challenges of that environment: the Saturn V
launch vehicle, the Apollo CSM/LM system, and the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous
(LOR) approach were all designed with landing on the moon as their only goal.
The systems developed were prohibitively expensive, and were not practical for
other non-lunar missions, although some of them were adapted as Skylab after
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the final three Apollo missions had been cancelled—this was more of a
retrofitting exercise than of designing mission-specific equipment. Because of
the monomaniacal nature of the objective, not much thought was given to postApollo usage; engineering decisions were made to facilitate the short-term needs
of landing on the moon and left NASA without a sustainable infrastructure. In the
words of NASA Deputy Administrator Hans Mark, “Apollo was essentially a deadend from the technical viewpoint.”236
The Apollo Applications Project (AAP), out of which Skylab emerged, was an
attempt to leverage Apollo-era equipment to keep the program alive after the
moon landings ceased; this involved Skylab missions, and the ASTP, which
featured a modified Apollo vehicle. AAP extended the Apollo program for several
missions, but did not prompt new development. In fact, after the ASTP mission
in 1975, America was left without a way to put humans into orbit, including no
way to travel to Skylab, which deorbited in 1979 before the shuttle could come
online.
The method Kennedy used to achieve the lunar landings, the large-scale, warlevel, national mobilization method, was, in the final analysis extremely short
sighted on the part of America’s leadership. In solving an immediate political
problem, an inordinate amount of national treasure and effort was spent.
Because it was issued as a challenge rather than the coherent long-term policy
that James Webb had advocated, when Apollo ended, NASA was left with very
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little political capital. When the BoB reviewed the Apollo decision years later, it
seemed to understand this fact, but it framed the evaluation in terms of Apollo
rather than the space program as a whole; in order to be successful, Apollo
needed constant, steady support, and “a commitment to a long-term effort and to
provide the resources it requires. Starts and stops, changes in goals, or failure to
provide the required level of budgetary report would impair the success of the
program.”237 Apollo benefitted from all of these requirements for success, but the
larger space program, which had been largely ignored during Apollo, did not.
And when Apollo ended, the US space program became moribund.
By tying Apollo to national security, Kennedy was able to fend off critics of the
program, especially those opposed to the high costs. W.D. Kay writes,
“[D]efining space policy in a way that makes it essential to ‘national survival’
allowed Apollo’s supporters to answer—or, in some cases, ignore—criticisms of
the program’s high costs, which began in earnest in 1961 and continued for the
rest of the decade.”238 These criticisms would come from within and outside of
NASA. When first discussing the possibilities of beating the Soviets to the moon
with Kennedy, NASA Administrator Webb balked at pursuing one large program,
and instead favored a more balanced approach that included other initiatives:
“President Kennedy considered that landing Americans on the moon was the
major purpose of NASA’s priorities, while Administrator Webb disagreed, saying
that the national objective was to become preeminent in space, and he would not
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take responsibility for a program that was not a balanced one.”239 Vice Admiral
Hayward also saw the dangers in this approach, stressing, as did Eisenhower
earlier, a more orderly, structured space program over one large crash program
that would preclude starting other space projects. Without this balanced
approach, NASA “became what James Webb had feared, a one-program
agency; given the budget constraints of the period, there was no money available
for major new starts on alternative programs.”240
Others outside of NASA were critical of the project as well. Senator William
Fullbright of Arkansas was a vocal opponent of the focus on the Apollo project as
early as 1962, saying he was not against “the lunar goal itself, but rather the endof-decade timetable, which added considerably to the cost of the program.”241
Historian Arnold Toynbee pejoratively compared Apollo to the Great Pyramids,
claiming that it was “rather scandalous, when human beings are going short on
necessities, to do this,” implying that Apollo was unfairly built on the backs of the
people.242 By the time of the first moon landing in July of 1969, while worldwide
interest in the achievement of Apollo 11 was at its peak, public interest in the
Apollo program itself had waned. One need only look at the New York Times on
July 22, 1969 to gauge the mood of the country: of the 34 intellectuals and
luminaries who gave their opinions on the achievement, half believed that it was
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not worthwhile, and Saul Alinsky thought it only worthwhile had the entire Nixon
administration been sent to the moon.
Historian Michael Beschloss takes a hard look at the Apollo project with hindsight
and deems it a bad decision:
As Kennedy concluded, his decision for an accelerated Moon landing was
ultimately a political decision made in terms of cold war strategy. How
does it stand up now that the cold war is over? Not well. We now know
that the reason the Soviet Union gave up in that struggle was that it
recognized that it could not compete with the Western economies and
Western societies in those areas of life and death that mattered. Although
the Moon program contributed a great deal to the United States, the tens
of billions of dollars spent in the 1960s on what Kennedy essentially
thought of as world propaganda could probably have been better devoted
to US defense or the American domestic economy, and that might have
convinced the Soviets more quickly of the fruitlessness of the tragic
conflict with the United States.”243
Heppenheimer comments on the costs of the program: “Apollo, with a program
cost estimated at $12.0 billion in mid-1963, ballooned to $21.35 billion by the
time of the first moon landing in July 1969. That program indeed had fulfilled
President Kennedy's promise by reaching the moon during the decade of the
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1960s, but only because it had drowned its problems in money.”244 John
Logsdon, while conceding that Apollo “turned out to be a dead end undertaking in
terms of human travel beyond the immediate vicinity of this planet,”245 comes to a
different conclusion than Beschloss: “Perhaps the technological capabilities
developed for Apollo were in fact too large and too expensive for subsequent
regular use, but the principle that the United States should be the leading
spacefaring nation has served the country well.”246
While Apollo was a glorious moment in American and human history, and a
worthwhile endeavor, the decision to prosecute Apollo as an accelerated, quasimilitary effort to the exclusion of other space projects was a mistake that would
haunt NASA at the end of the Apollo program, and would influence their choice of
the shuttle design and funding priorities. Further, the rather arbitrary timeline
introduced exceptional costs that eroded public support for NASA, a critical error.

Long-Term Effects of Apollo on NASA

Apollo affected NASA in the long term in two important ways: it set a precedent
for large budgets and larger thinking that was hard to overcome; and it gave
NASA its greatest moment of glory just a decade after its founding, one that it
would likely never be able to recreate. Wernher von Braun commented that “the
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legacy of Apollo has spoiled the people at NASA. They believe that we are
entitled to this kind of a thing forever, which I gravely doubt. I believe that there
may be too many people in NASA who at the moment are waiting for a miracle,
just waiting for another man on a white horse to come and offer us another
planet, like President Kennedy.”247 That Apollo achieved so much and had been
such a national priority caused NASA to develop an enlarged sense of
entitlement. They reasoned that since it was they who had beaten the Soviets,
they could set their sights on bigger and better projects. While in many ways
Apollo was an end, NASA had the view that Apollo was only the beginning, and
badly misread the mood of the national leadership and the populace concerning
the program. Administrator Paine demonstrated this attitude of entitlement in the
early discussions of NASA’s post-Apollo future and in his interactions with the
STG group, and this attitude proved to be counterproductive, if not nearly
program-ending.
In lobbying the Nixon administration for a substantially larger budget than Nixon
had in mind, NASA had not been able to recognize the new reality that, postApollo, they would not be handed a blank check. “In 1969, proud of having met
the goal of taking humans to the moon, NASA officials trotted out their long-range
plan for the exploration of space. . . . The results, for NASA, were disastrous.
One of the surest ways to kill a long-range plan is to smoke it out before its
advocates have lined up the necessary support. President Richard Nixon, to
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whom the plan was presented, rejected it.”248 As we discussed in the previous
chapter, the game had changed radically, and Paine was the last person to
realize it.
The mechanics of Kennedy’s decision had become the script by which NASA
wished to operate: the President made a speech, and everyone lined up with
their support. The reality in Washington is nearly always the opposite, all the
more when the President does not have a partisan majority in at least one house
of Congress. George H.W. Bush unsuccessfully tried this technique with his
Space Exploration initiative (SEI), as did his son, George W. Bush, with his illfated Vision for Space Exploration (VSE); SEI’s high price tag doomed it with
Congress, and VSE died after Bush did not follow up with adequate funding and
it began to run behind schedule, finally to be cancelled by President Barack
Obama. The difference with Apollo is that Kennedy had Congressional support
lined up through the efforts of Lyndon Johnson and James Webb, and Kennedy
brought the nation along with him after a series of effective speeches. In the
case of the two Bushes, they did not do the legwork that would help to win
congressional support and failed to get the approval of the public. The Kennedy
model was unique and grew out of a certain time in history, and, as we have
said, it was not to be repeated. A space program needs presidential support,
political will, and congressional support in the form of adequate funding. If one or
more is missing, the effort is doomed.
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After Apollo, NASA would have to develop a compelling rationale for any new
program. Because the decision would be made by a politician, the rationale had
to be political in nature. Kennedy’s decision was political, as was Nixon’s. With
the rationale solidly in place, NASA would need to find a champion; if not the
President, then it had to be someone who had the President’s ear. The state of
the economy and of public opinion of the time must also be aligned with NASA’s
intentions. To mount an ambitious program like Apollo, the public needs a
compelling reason to spend the high levels of taxpayer money to justify the
decision. And, as Apollo proved, public opinion and congressional support can
change very quickly. Space projects are expensive and lengthy, while the
public’s attention and congressional priorities are short and fickle. As a result of
all of these realities, there has not been another decision like the authorization for
Apollo since then.
Another long-term effect that Apollo had on NASA was that its greatest
achievement to date came relatively near the beginning of the agency. After the
successes of Mercury and Gemini, followed by the sublime achievements of
Apollo, all coming in quick succession and creating an upward trajectory, there
was no way for NASA to top the public spectacle without spending even more
money—which could not happen during the recession-plagued 1970s.
Economics and changing public priorities, combined with a lack of political
support, would combine to shrink NASA’s budget markedly. Any program
following Apollo, short of going to Mars, would be seen as a decline. Bigger and
bigger spectaculars are needed when relying on the fickle public’s support. As
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Kay points out, space histories and stories are written by space enthusiasts, who
see Apollo as NASA’s apex and everything that followed as a decline—without
considering that it was Apollo that was the exception, and not the rule.249
Eisenhower was correct in recommending a space program that grew modestly,
organically, and sustainably. After Apollo, the Eisenhower model is what the US
space program returned to, but not without a difficult, but necessary, change of
attitude at NASA.
While Apollo was a short term boon for NASA and the US, it ultimately hurt
NASA in the long term by setting unrealistic expectations within NASA and with
the public, expectations that could never be met.

Evaluation of Shuttle

There is no question that the space shuttle is an astounding technological
achievement and a beautiful and elegant spacecraft, a true triumph of
engineering. This is especially true when one considers the amount of design
compromise that was necessary to get the shuttle built at all. The shuttle that
flew for thirty years was not the one that NASA had either envisioned or desired.
It is a minimalist version of what NASA wanted, but it was still wondrous. One
need only stand next to an Apollo capsule at the Udvar-Hazy Air & Space
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Museum, keeping in mind that Apollo was built with a colossal budget, and then
stand next to the Discovery orbiter, which was developed on a more limited
budget. It is nearly inconceivable that something as large and complex as
Discovery ever made it into space, and did so over 130 times.
Was the shuttle a success? As we did with Apollo, we must first evaluate the
shuttle by comparing it to the terms of the shuttle’s original mandate. The space
shuttle was designed to be reusable, economical, utilitarian, and to make access
to space routine. To fairly evaluate the shuttle’s success, we must consider each
of these design goals. The shuttle was certainly reusable to a degree. Each
orbiter was designed to be used over 100 times, or for ten years of planned
flights, but one orbiter was used for 39 flights, and the others fewer, and they
were used for 30 years. Each orbiter required much more maintenance between
flights than forecast, and the maintenance was more expensive than had been
planned. The stresses affecting the shuttle during liftoff and reentry were far
more severe than had been anticipated. The external tanks had to be replaced
with each flight, but the solid boosters were recovered from the ocean and
reused. NASA had originally planned a fully reusable shuttle with a fly-back
piloted first stage, which was estimated to cost $15 billion to develop, but
dropped this idea when only $5.5 billion was allocated for development. The final
configuration was mandatory if a shuttle was to be built at all. So the shuttle
system was partially reusable.
The shuttle, largely sold on the basis of being a more economical system than
the expendable system NASA had used in the 1960s, never achieved the
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promise of $100 a pound, or even $1,000 a pound, to LEO that was predicted. In
fact, it is estimated that the shuttle made access to orbit exponentially more
expensive than any other launch system. In addition to the development costs,
the recurring costs of flights were grossly underestimated—the original $10
million estimated cost per flight quickly rose to $57 million, and then ballooned to
$225 million per flight. By 1992, NASA was estimating the recurring cost per
flight at a staggering $412 million each, and the program finished at about $450
million per flight. Designed to decrease costs drastically, it instead raised them
even more dramatically, which would soak up much of NASA’s budget for the
next thirty years.
The shuttle was designed for utility, and it was fairly utilitarian. It could carry
space station modules and laboratories, launch and retrieve satellites, ferry crew
to and from the ISS, and stay in orbit for up to two weeks. It was able to launch
very large payloads, like Key Hole reconnaissance satellites and the Hubble
Space Telescope, and it was able to service the Hubble several times. It carried
NASA, DoD, and commercial satellites until the Challenger accident and
investigation, which determined that the shuttle was more risky than had been
believed, and that only NASA and DoD satellites should be carried. As all of the
US launch service eggs had been placed into the shuttle basket and the ELVs
had been discontinued, for the several years that the shuttle program was
grounded, European consortium Arianespace became the prime launch vendor
for commercial satellites in the world. The US launch industry was effectively
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killed off, although it may finally be recovering with the emergence of private
commercial space vendors like SpaceX and Orbital Sciences.
The Challenger accident review board found that management pressure to
maintain an ambitious launch schedule in order to drive costs down by
economies of scale, as had been promised by NASA in the early 1970s, was a
contributing factor in the accident. As a result, the launch schedules were
relaxed and became much more realistic.
The shuttle was supposed to make spaceflight routine. This it did not do. The
planned 50+ launches per year to achieve cost savings never even reached
higher than 9, and that was before the Challenger accident in 1986, while
scheduling pressures were still in play. The spaceflight “industry” never became
an industry like the airline industry, which had been NASA’s vision—shuttle
flights never really made it past the experimental stage. Pre-Challenger
accident, NASA had begun to engage in political and publicity stunts, sending
Senator Jake Garn and Congressman Bill Nelson, both from NASA-heavy
constituencies, on shuttle flights, but this tactic backfired badly when Teacher-inSpace Christa McAuliffe was killed in the Challenger accident. Despite the fact
that the shuttle flew over 130 times, its flights never became routine.
When measured against its original objectives, the shuttle fails badly. On the
positive side, it kept US crews in space for 30 years. On the negative side, the
extremely high costs of operation precluded spending on other NASA priorities,
such as planetary exploration and the development of a follow-on crewed space
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system. The planned Constellation system never received the funding it needed
to be developed on the required schedule and it was cancelled, leaving the US
with no immediate follow-on to the shuttle and the US reliant on the Russian
Space Agency for rides to the ISS. This situation is likely to change in several
years, when SpaceX, Boeing, and Sierra Nevada begin private, crewed service
to the ISS, barring delays or cancellations.
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board, convened after the loss of the
Columbia in 2003, summarizes the shortcomings of the larger shuttle program. It
was not a failure necessarily of design, although that was part of the issue. The
Board found that the issue with the shuttle was a failure of the original concept
and objectives:
It is the Boardʼs view that, in retrospect, the increased complexity of a
Shuttle designed to be all things to all people created inherently greater
risks than if more realistic technical goals had been set at the start.
Designing a reusable spacecraft that is also cost-effective is a daunting
engineering challenge; doing so on a tightly constrained budget is even
more difficult. Nevertheless, the remarkable system we have today is a
reflection of the tremendous engineering expertise and dedication of the
workforce that designed and built the Space Shuttle within the constraints
it was given.
In the end, the greatest compromise NASA made was not so much with
any particular element of the technical design, but rather with the premise
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of the vehicle itself. NASA promised it could develop a Shuttle that would
be launched almost on demand and would fly many missions each year.
Throughout the history of the program, a gap has persisted between the
rhetoric NASA has used to market the Space Shuttle and operational
reality, leading to an enduring image of the Shuttle as capable of safely
and routinely carrying out missions with little risk.250
W.D. Kay explains how the shuttle program is representative of NASA in the
early 1970s, and that the shuttle was “very much a product of its time. Viewed in
its larger political and historical context, it is a near-perfect example of a
technology designed by an agency with no clear mission: the means for
implementing an undefined policy.”251 This all falls at the feet of Richard Nixon,
who was responsible for both the policy and the program.

Long-Term Effects of the Shuttle

The shuttle program, while keeping NASA in human spaceflight for 30 years, was
ultimately a net negative for the agency and for spaceflight in general. One of
the failures was the budgetary drain on NASA due to the exceedingly high costs
of operation for the shuttle program, while the overall NASA budget was either
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flat or being gradually reduced. As stated above, the cost of the ongoing shuttle
operations left little for developing its replacement.
Another failure is one of popular imagination. The shuttle sought to make
spaceflight routine, but instead made it mundane. Launches were not
considered newsworthy unless there was trouble or drama associated with them,
such as when John Glenn returned to space as a septuagenarian. In a
consumer society, new products and newness keep the interest of the buying
public--this is true of the US space program as well. The early space program
was the model of cutting-edge innovation, and new boosters and spacecraft were
introduced every few years. This all came to a halt with the shuttle program,
where the same 1970s technology became the face of NASA for 30 years.
Shuttle technology eventually became stale and hard to sell to a bored public,
which had gravitated to reality television, celebrity news, and professional sports.
It wasn’t just the public’s interest in NASA that suffered. Scientific achievement
also suffered as a result the shuttle program. “[After the Challenger accident,] Big
Science lost its luster. Congress cancelled the Superconducting Super Collider
and nearly abolished the International Space Station (ISS). NASA’s continuing
travails with the remaining space shuttles clearly revealed that the transport
vehicle had failed to meet its original cost, schedule, and reliability goals.”252
Children no longer dreamed of being astronauts, engineers, or scientists. They
were no longer inspired by NASA, which had become uninspiring.
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After the second space shuttle accident and national tragedy in less than twenty
years, even NASA began to understand. In 2005, NASA administrator Mike
Griffin told the USA Today editorial board that the decision to build the space
shuttle “was not the right path," and that "[w]e are now trying to change the path
while doing as little damage as we can." He also testified to Congress that the
shuttle was “inherently flawed.”253 Griffin admitted NASA’s failures, and then
placed NASA on the pathway to the future. His advocacy of leveraging the
forces of private commercialization in some space activities just may be the way
to a better NASA, as we will see below.

Lessons Learned

The main lesson we can take away from this study is the vital need for all of the
following to achieve a successful government space program: consistent political
will across administrations; a high level of funding over the lifespan of the project;
and a compellingly articulated rationale for the space program. All of these
requirements were understood by perhaps the best NASA administrator, James
Webb, who articulated them to Lyndon Johnson during the Apollo debate:
“There’s got to be political support over a long period of time, like ten years, and
you [Johnson] and the President have to recognize that we can’t do this type of
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thing without that continuing support.”254 As we have seen, other factors can
come into play, such as changes in the economy, the nature of science and
engineering development, and international affairs. These factors all had lasting
effects on Apollo, the shuttle, and on NASA itself. Unforeseen events like
accidents can influence a space program—with the Apollo 1, Challenger, and
Columbia accidents, NASA was grounded and had to retrench for approximately
two years each time. Unfortunately, these accidents are part of the learning
process and eventually contribute to future safety. But they can also influence
public support for the space program. In the cases of the Apollo 1 and
Challenger accidents, public support for the space program grew. But after the
Columbia accident, NASA began to plan for a post-shuttle future.
A program cannot be formulated as a reaction to circumstances, because when
the circumstances change, the rationale for the expenditures is lost; this
happened to Apollo. The exception to this rule would be a program to address a
threat to humanity, such as a potential NEO strike, which would almost certainly
guarantee public support of an Apollo-type program. Another type of
circumstance that might prompt such a reaction from the public would be a
paradigm-shifting event, such as the discovery of extraterrestrial life or, more
dramatically, contact with intelligent extraterrestrial life. Short of this type of
event, it is hard to imagine the public advocating a large-scale space endeavor
like a trip to Mars, unless the spending is spread out incrementally over a period
of time and involves international cooperation and shared funding. An incident
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that might spark another space race would be a Chinese moon landing—the US
sees the Chinese as the new competition rather than the former Soviet Union, so
an event like a moon landing has a chance to spark a new space race. But a
new race in response to Chinese technological achievement is rendered less
likely by the fact that the Chinese are not currently a military threat as much as
an economic threat to the US.
What the shuttle decision teaches us is that it is folly to build a space system
either as a compromise or on the cheap. If we are to place men and women in
space vehicles, it should not be in a vehicle that is “good enough,” but rather, the
vehicle should be the best that can be designed and produced. Space travel is
difficult and dangerous, and will remain so into the future; and even if space
travel becomes much less costly, it will still be dangerous because of the
unforgivingly hostile environment of space. If a system fails, the crew will die.
The forces of nature will not change as our space systems become more
economical.
We should heed the advice of Dwight Eisenhower and maintain a steady, organic
space program. The pace should be natural and should be such that it could
remain funded through the vagaries of economic cycles and changing political
climates. We cannot race, nor can we stagnate. Eisenhower and Webb were
right—we need a space program that is balanced and affordable.
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The Way Forward

When the 30-year old US Space Shuttle program ended in 2011, America was
again left without the means to ferry crews to LEO. A similar situation has
happened three times since NASA started sending humans into space: from
1963 to 1965, during the period between Projects Mercury and Gemini; from
1966 to 1968 during the period between Projects Gemini and Apollo (extended
by the Apollo 1 tragedy and its aftermath); and from 1975 to 1981, during the
period after the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project and before the inaugural flight of
Columbia. In each case, NASA was developing the next-generation spacecraft
during the interim, and it was assured that the American human spaceflight
program would again proceed after the temporary disruptions. However, after
the last flight of Atlantis took place, the future of America's crewed space
program became less than certain.
History tells us that the failure of strong presidential leadership on the issue of
human spaceflight will likely result in confusion and false starts. Several
presidents have attempted to jump-start post-Apollo NASA by introducing space
policies and making nationally-televised policy speeches, but without sufficient
funding and follow up support, the attempts were destined for failure. Realistic
deadlines must be set and met, and sufficient funding must be provided by a
supportive Congress.
President Bush's Vision for Space Exploration (VSE), first proposed in early
2004, promised trips back to the Moon and on to Mars and featured as its
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centerpiece the Constellation Program. But this program has fallen victim to poor
planning and inaccurate cost estimating, a lack of political will and support, and
flat budgets; the funding that had been allocated was largely consumed by the
prohibitively expensive STS program. The Constellation Program, composed of
the Ares launchers, the Orion crew capsule, and the Altair lunar lander, and
originally expected to begin service to the ISS early in this decade, has been
cancelled by the Obama administration following the recommendations of the
Augustine Commission. Although its decisions were non-binding, the Augustine
Report stated that Constellation Program was negatively impacted by inadequate
funding, massive cost overruns, schedule delays (the report estimated that
Constellation could not be ready before 2017), and seemingly intractable design
and technical issues.
Without a new vehicle in the works but with an immediate need for crew and
cargo service to the ISS, America has turned to the international community for
assistance. NASA contracted with the Russian Federal Space Agency
(Roscosmos) to provide crew transport services to the ISS on the venerable
Soyuz, and is working with Roscosmos, the European Space Agency (ESA), and
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) on automated cargo flights for
resupply services to the ISS. NASA has studied the possibility of human-rating
the Enhanced Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELV) such as the Delta IV Heavy
and Atlas 5. These changes underline the obvious point that NASA needed to
move in a new direction if it was to maintain its leadership in human space flight.
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During the past decade NASA has done just that by positioning itself to support,
leverage, and eventually rely on, private companies for access to LEO.
The VSE program called for the end of the shuttle flights by 2010, exacerbating
the need for supply missions to the ISS. When NASA administrator Mike Griffin
admitted that the shuttle was a mistake, he sought to provide a more economical
solution. Rather than looking to cut corners or to compromise, he decided that
an entirely new approach was necessary: to change the way NASA deals with
contractors and to rely more on market forces to contain development and
operational costs. Griffin determined that the cargo resupply capabilities of
Roscosmos, ESA, and JAXA would be insufficient to keep the station adequately
provisioned, and that there would be a gap of at least four years between the end
of shuttle service and the start of Constellation service; Griffin and NASA
therefore turned to private industry to develop commercial solutions to bridge this
gap. In 2005, Griffin created the Commercial Crew and Cargo Program (C3PO)
to fulfill three objectives: implement US Space Exploration policy with
investments to stimulate the commercial space industry; facilitate US private
industry cargo and crew space transportation capabilities with the goal of
achieving reliable, cost-effective access to LEO; and create a market
environment in which commercial space transportation services are available to
government and private sector customers.
The C3PO has developed several novel programs that work with commercial
companies in a partner capacity (rather than in the traditional NASA-style
government/contractor relationship). These programs include the Commercial
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Orbital Transportation Services (COTS), the Commercial Crew Development
(CCDev) and the Commercial Resupply Service (CRS) programs, which are
transforming the way NASA does business. These programs, which partner with
private space ventures to provide cargo service to the ISS and will someday
soon carry US crews to the ISS, are not based on the traditional “cost plus”
financial model as old as the Space Age itself. Instead, these programs bring
market forces to bear on the space industry by using Space Act Agreements
under the "other transactions" authority in the National Aeronautics and Space
Act when contracting with vendors. These agreements are milestone-driven,
performance-based contracts that only release funds to the contracts when predefined milestones are successfully met. In a revolutionary new twist, at certain
points in the timetable the companies under contract, such as SpaceX and
Orbital Science in the case of the COTS program, are required to provide some
of their own investment funds to match NASA’s. This structure requires the
companies under contract to remain viable and, therefore, attractive to private
and institutional investors, from whom they raise the equity they need to bring to
the table with NASA. In this way, NASA, now itself an investor in space
technology, is able to ensure that the companies under contract are sound,
viable, and are being run in such a way as to appear to be a good business risk,
regardless of the potential value of their technology.
Recent history has seen NASA wrestle with an identity crisis. Should NASA be a
development or a mission agency? Should it continue to operate in the
traditional cost plus/prime contactor aerospace mode, or should it become
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leaner, leveraging the forces of privatization to bring the costs of travelling into
space down and increase reliability? The accident review conducted after the
2003 Columbia accident recommended that the shuttle program be terminated by
2010, but the supporting Constellation program that was championed by the VSE
program became a multi-billion dollar boondoggle that was over-budget, late, and
underperforming. The only certainty at NASA was that funding would remain flat
at best, and most likely be reduced in the face of a prolonged and deep
economic recession, with the US seeming to teeter on the verge of bankruptcy.
In May of 2009, the Obama administration’s Office of Science and Technology
Policy announced that a review of NASA’s Human Space Flight (HSF) plans
would be undertaken by the newly formed Review of United States Human
Space Flight Plans Committee. The Augustine Committee, as it has come to be
known, was composed of 10 space experts, astronauts, professors, and
aerospace executives, and headed by Norman Augustine, former CEO of
Lockheed Martin. The Committee’s findings were intended to inform and shape
the Obama administration’s space policy in the post-Shuttle era. In a widely
covered media event, the Committee’s 157-page final report was released on
October 22, 2009. Public reception of the report was mixed. The House Science
and Technology Committee excoriated it.255 Many NASA-philes lamented the
recommended death of the Constellation program. Some thought the panel was
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misguided, focusing on means rather than ends.256 The Committee fulfilled its
charge to take a hard look at the current NASA human spaceflight trajectory,
reconcile it with budgetary and timeline realities, and provide options for moving
forward with human spaceflight. On the whole, this Presidential Review
deserves a lot of credence because its findings are based on sound science and
a clear-eyed look at the realities.
The Augustine Commission Report discussed two options for transporting crews
into LEO: government-operated systems and private, commercial systems. Due
to budget and scheduling conflicts, Ares I would not have been ready to support
the ISS when the shuttle was retired, as had been planned. The Report
recommended that the capability to launch humans into LEO be provided by
private industry, as Mike Griffin had suggested and NASA had been pursuing;
the return from the complex and reusable shuttle back to simpler and smaller
capsules is seen as an opportunity to turn this capability over to the US private
sector. Although this approach does have risks, it could reduce the operating
costs due to the introduction of market forces. It would also accelerate the
timeline for providing a US-based system of putting humans into LEO and
servicing the ISS. Such a system could be achieved through governmentawarded, guaranteed contracts to private firms, thereby stimulating the
commercial space industry, driving up the number of commercial launches, and
driving down operating costs for NASA and others in need of launch services.
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By outsourcing the launch services to a third party, NASA could focus on its core
competencies, such as research and development, designing and operating
exploration systems (especially beyond LEO), and program management. The
Committee went on to say, in the strongest possible language, that it was time for
NASA to resume its “crucial role in developing new technologies for space.” The
available alternatives for space exploration are limited due to NASA’s lack of
strategic investment in space technology development over the past thirty years.
They further stated that it is crucial for NASA to develop a technology path that
would serve their future goals of exploration. With appropriate funding, the
Committee felt this new focus could serve to reenergize the thinking at
universities, in industry, and within NASA itself, and should be done with the dual
goals of developing new capabilities and reducing development and operating
costs.
Current NASA structure is ideal for Cold War-era Apollo-style projects,257 but is
insufficient for current needs, and the Augustine Commission Report made
recommendations for improving the structure and operational aspects of NASA to
better suit it for its future mission of exploration. For example, they recommend
that the NASA administrator have the proper authority to effectively manage the
organization’s resources, including funds, personnel, and facilities. Additional
funding should be provided to cover unanticipated overages or delays. Funds
should be transferable from one project to another when needed. Requests for
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additional funding should be addressed more quickly than the current two years.
The Augustine report makes it clear that the NASA organization must become
flexible, responsive, and resilient if it is to move forward successfully, and that to
facilitate this success, government support for NASA should be steady, constant,
and reliable.
Whether the cancellation of Constellation for a privatized LEO capability is the
appropriate strategy remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is that
Constellation was underfunded and behind schedule, and the clock on the shuttle
and ISS programs was ticking. The actions and funding allocations necessary to
deliver Orion and Ares I by 2012 needed to have been made years ago, but were
neglected; that failure constitutes the political reality that the Augustine
Committee confronted when it examined NASA’s plans for human spaceflight.
The Committee fulfilled its charter and made the difficult, unpopular, but
necessary choices in determining the best way for NASA move safely and surely
into the future.
The Augustine recommendations were not binding, but the Obama administration
adopted many of the suggestions in its new Space Policy in 2010. The Space
Policy is also non-binding, as Congress determines the direction of the US space
program. However, the recommendations for leveraging private space
companies to deliver crew and cargo to LEO rather than relying on the
Constellation program or on international vendors continues the trajectory started
by Mike Griffin towards the privatization of launch services that NASA can
purchase rather than develop.
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It is certain that Congress cannot easily decide what to do with NASA. For every
advocate who believes in privatizing cargo and crew missions into LEO, another
Representative or Senator continues to fight for "big space," the traditional
method of space procurement, if only to protect their constituencies, many of
whom relied on the shuttle and Constellation programs for employment. To
replace the lost Constellation program, Congress has authorized the Space
Launch System (a heavy lift system that may or may not ever be built), or SLS,
and a modified Orion capsule, which will be used for future NASA missions
beyond LEO.
How the current situation will play out is still unknown. NASA is changing how
they do business in an attempt to do more with smaller budgets. But the nature
of the privatized commercial launch business is such that one accident or
dramatic failure, especially one involving loss of life, can kill a company or even
arrest the broader move toward privatized spaceflight. Putting crew and cargo
into orbit is an extraordinarily difficult and dangerous task fraught with roadblocks
and fickle politicians, and is always dogged by the ever-present and immutable
laws of physics.
If companies like SpaceX are successful in their efforts, maintain their
relationships with NASA, remain profitable, and, most importantly, deliver on their
contractual obligations, they are positioned to become the means by which
American astronauts travel into LEO for years to come. If SpaceX's Falcon
Heavy is successful and lives up to its early marketing claims of delivering 53
tons into LEO for about $100 million dollars a flight, it will almost certainly change
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the dynamics of a world launch market that is presently dominated by the ESA
and Russia, and may just recapture the US share of world launches that was lost
after the Challenger accident. Another factor that hinders the US share of the
launch market besides cost is the restrictive International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR) regime, which deserves revisiting and perhaps an overhaul.
The success of private launch services, of course, is merely speculative at this
point. The spaceflight community has long been fueled by unrealistic
expectations and fantasies. Oftentimes, it is difficult to separate fact from fond
wish. However, if at all possible, SpaceX has shown positive signs that it can
work with NASA in a partnership to develop an American launch system that may
eventually drive down costs and safely deliver crews to the ISS, and could even
usher in the next phase of spaceflight: private space access. SpaceX recently
successfully delivered cargo to the ISS and is now contracted to do so moving
forward, as is Orbital Sciences. SpaceX's success to date has been based in
reality, not on PowerPoint presentations and puffery.
The way forward should involve private spaceflight services for crew and cargo to
LEO. Prices for these services can be negotiated, and the necessary funds set
aside by Congress and NASA for each scheduled flight. NASA should be
involved in space research and beyond-LEO space missions. The projects that
they undertake should be well-defined, and money should be put away
incrementally in advance of the missions, so that the funds can draw interest and
be available when needed, in an effort to mitigate the effects of cyclical budgets.
The mission planning and fund sequestering activities must transcend
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presidential terms and need to become national projects not subject to the whims
of changing administrations. This would require a change made to the NASA
Authorization Act that would take the budget and planning process out of the
hands of politicians once the decisions have been made. NASA should continue
its public outreach efforts—NASA should emphasize, however, how small the
NASA budget really is to counter the public perception that it is huge. NASA TV
should be reconceived and financially supported to make it accessible and
appealing to the general public. The public will continue to determine whether
NASA is treated as a priority or deemed a waste of taxpayer money, so public
outreach should be seen as a vital effort of the agency.
There are no easy answers here, but it appears that NASA is finally on the right
track with its recognition that the premise, and not so much the design, of the
shuttle was to blame for its failures. The fact that human spaceflight is very
expensive is due to the fact that getting into space is very difficult. The forces of
nature and the physical principles will not change, so costs should be brought
down through the application of market forces and not through design-impacting
cost-saving measures. The deployment of market forces should not be done,
however, by the government itself, as was discovered through the shuttle
experience, but rather, through contracting with private companies in a manner
that emphasizes efficiency and economies of scale. The impulse for economical
space travel was correct, but the economy should come in the manufacturing and
operations efficiencies, not in cutting corners on the design or in creating a onesize-fits-all system.
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The US should have a separate system, built by private industry, to ferry crews
into LEO, which is a largely known quantity at this point. A second system
should be used for the more exploratory purposes, like the SLS/Orion system.
Large scale projects should be avoided, or if they are necessary, should be
planned well in advance so the costs could be amortized over time to minimize
the effects of political fickleness and changing budgets. Funding a future Mars
mission would be a great start—the funds could begin to be allocated for the
journey twenty or thirty years in advance, perhaps even through selling bonds or
crowdsourcing, and a portion should be allocated for the mission, in addition to
the R & D funds. Compound interest could be a powerful way to increase future
NASA budgets.
NASA itself also needs a good reorganization and culture change. The
employees are likely the right ones, but bureaucratic inertia and territoriality
constitute a real drag on the management side. The organization should become
leaner and more aggressive, and it must move out of the bureaucratic mode. If a
few changes could be made, it could do more with less, as American business
has had to do over the last two decades. The money saved from overhead and
bureaucracy could be spent on research or banked for the future.
NASA’s future is bright, and I believe that it is finally on the correct path. Mike
Griffin’s changes are starting to bear fruit, and the Augustine Commission has
made some excellent recommendations that should be followed. NASA was able
to capture the imagination of a large portion of the public with the excellent
outreach efforts it made surrounding the Mars Science Laboratory landing
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several months ago—the agency is beginning to understand the nature of the
new online culture and to deploy social media to garner support. I am very
optimistic that NASA’s best days are still ahead. I hope someday to read of a
person who, as a 10-year old, was inspired by what NASA was doing in 2012
and stands on the surface of Mars.
Both Kennedy and Nixon were right—space is a frontier to be conquered, and
America does need heroes. NASA is an organization that, with the help of
American industry and ingenuity, can enable those heroes to conquer that
frontier far into the future. While the mythology of Apollo makes for good
marketing, NASA cannot count on that type of support and must remain cleareyed and tenacious moving into the future. NASA’s charge moving forward
should be, borrowing a quote from Alfred, Lord Tennyson: to strive, to seek, to
find, and not to yield.
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